http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/994/op1.htm
15 -21 April 2010 Issue No. 994 Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 People's power In the Arab world popular protests have not yet reached a critical mass. But if the status quo remains, writes Ayman El-Amir*, they inevitably will -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In Kyrgyzstan, a mass street revolt overthrew President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and sent him fleeing to the southern tribal refuge of Jalalabad. Opposition leader Roza Otunbayeva, a former foreign minister, announced the dissolution of parliament and government and set up an interim "people's government" for six months to prepare for new elections. In Thailand, violent unrest by Red Shirt protesters entered its sixth week. They are demanding the removal of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in favour of his predecessor, ousted by a bloodless army coup in 2006. China had violent street unrest and deadly clashes last summer in the predominantly Muslim regional city of Urumqi, Xinjang province, followed by a government crackdown. In Nepal, the Maoist-oriented communist party of Nepal fought a "People's War" against the monarchy for 14 years until it came to power in 2008, following a negotiated settlement and constitutional change that limited the powers of the monarchy. In Myanmar, the 48-year-old military regime has brutally crushed a peaceful march of tens of thousands of Buddhist monks and civilians asking for democratic rule, national reconciliation and the release of opposition leaders. Street protests, often violent, sometimes leading to protracted guerrilla warfare, seem to be the hallmark of Asian countries when political institutions fail people's aspirations and autocratic regimes persist. The 1979 revolution in Iran, and the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986, are prime examples of regimes being changed by people power. In Africa military coups are almost a way of life, a text- book tactic for changing governments. The most recent took place in Niger in February. Regimes that came to power by military coup are often ousted by newer coups. This, combined with ethnic and tribal rivalries and low rates of development, accounts for the level of instability and civil wars on the continent. The lack of any tradition that could curb the temptation to change regime at gunpoint has set back the possibility of any peaceful transition to democracy. The African Union's decision to withhold recognition from governments that come to power by military coups that oust democratically elected administrations has done little to reverse the phenomenon. In the absence of a vigorous civil society, labour unions or political activism, military coups seem to be the easiest way to rotate power. And it is all done in the name of the people. Africa has learned little from the transition of many South American countries from oppressive military dictatorships to neo-nationalist democracies. They passed through the purgatory of US-supported military regimes, mass persecution and liquidation of the opposition, civil war and genocide, extreme poverty and political disaffection to popular consensus that led to change. Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Brazil and Argentina are stitching together a loosely-knit coalition of socialist economies and collaboration to help poorer South American countries rid themselves of debt. They are averse to the economic paradigm set by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay, whose military juntas collaborated in hunting down, torturing and secretly executing leftist opponents have brought many human rights abusers to justice as they reconciled themselves with their dark era of military rule in the 1970s. They also share a tendency to distance themselves from the controlling influence of the US and have opposed its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Compared to Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and South America, the Arab Middle East has been stagnant for 50 years. Post-independence military regimes and traditional tribal dynasties have done little to advance institution-building and democratic governance in their countries. Republican regimes developed into military dictatorships before turning into police states that suppressed and persecuted opponents. Maintaining a monopoly on power, these pseudo-republican regimes have fared badly in terms of economic development. They have presided over increased poverty, deprivation, corruption and political alienation. In the absence of any concept of the rotation of power by peaceful and democratic means, populations grow more restive, particularly as economic pressures take their toll. In oil-rich countries the impact of socio-political retardation is cushioned by oil wealth, even when it is not equally distributed. Oligarchy- rule policies in Arab countries are increasingly proving counter-productive, as the case of Yemen has demonstrated. Strikes and political demonstrations in Egypt reflect increasing disenchantment with the economic and political situation. Mass protests against election fraud in several Arab countries hardly assure the ruling elite of stability. Access to a diversity of media is shaping a new awareness among the masses, building comparative knowledge of the rest of the world and improving communication among grass-root movements and members of a besieged civil society. Civil and political rights groups are putting mounting pressure on authoritarian regimes that are becoming increasingly isolated, cornered into a garrison-state mentality. Charades of reform are losing their appeal and credibility. The situation is escalating into an intractable political crisis. On the one hand, should the ruling autocracies implement genuine democratic change, they will certainly see themselves voted out of office and probably held to account. If they persist, tensions will keep rising until the situation boils over with incalculable results. It is no longer if, but when. The Arab phenomenon of protest is different from the Asian one in that it has not accumulated the critical mass that could overwhelm the garrison state. As a result, the paramilitary security shield has not been fully tested. In the case of Yemen, the army was fully mobilised to battle secessionists in the south and the Houthis in the north. However, the war has not been conclusive. From another perspective, there is no consensus on challenging the sitting government in a full scale confrontation that could lead to uncontrollable bloodshed. People are wary of the daily carnage in Iraq. Although millions of people in a number of Arab countries are suffering abject poverty, hunger, destitution and political exclusion, a political and moral reverence for the power of government remains. The global terrorism that has had a destabilising effect on many countries is inseparable from state terrorism of the opposition or regional aspirations for self-determination. Al-Qaeda has become the scapegoat for homegrown violence. While Al-Qaeda has set a terrifying example of the violent expression of grievances, linking every violent act to it is the oppressive regimes' way of tightening their grip on opposition movements. This is a misleading justification for the enforcement of emergency laws that provide sitting regimes with a wide range of measures to curb the opposition. People's power has not matured in the Arab region. There is a cause but no trigger. Street protests are scanty, overpowered by massive state security force, and usually have a narrow perspective that misses the wider picture. Circumvention of fundamental freedoms, human rights and the choice of rotating the decades-long oligarchies by free and fair elections have created a state of malaise. Oppressive regimes are walking a blind alley where, at one dark corner, people's power is watching and waiting for a chance to pounce. * The writer is former Al-Ahram correspondent in Washington DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
