On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 10:56:40 + Alyssa Ross said:
> Carsten Haitzler writes:
>
> >> > What I think would be of value is a standardized method to decide which
> >> > wayland clients should be locked down and which should not be. This is
> >> > currently "undecided". Something a compositor
On Wednesday, July 28th, 2021 at 19:22, Carsten Haitzler
wrote:
> On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 10:56:40 + Alyssa Ross h...@alyssa.is said:
>
> > Carsten Haitzler ras...@rasterman.com writes:
> >
> > > > > What I think would be of value is a standardized method to decide
> > > > > which
> > > > >
>
Pekka Paalanen writes:
> On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 11:06:43 +
> Alyssa Ross wrote:
>
>> Daniel Stone writes:
>>
>> >> One big issue for us is protecting the system against potentially
>> >> malicious Wayland clients. It's important that a compartmentalized
>> >> application can't read from the
On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 11:05:11 + Simon Ser said:
> On Wednesday, July 28th, 2021 at 12:30, Carsten Haitzler
> wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 09:51:53 + Simon Ser cont...@emersion.fr said:
> >
> > > Please read the (lengthy) discussion at 1.
> > > In particular, the "get_credentials →
On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 at 18:22:55 +0100, Carsten Haitzler wrote:
> but in the end almost everyone wants some way to differentiate what clients
> can
> and cannot do based on some kind of sandboxing and rules.
Before that can happen, you need a concept of identity: you can't say
anything about what
Carsten Haitzler writes:
>> > What I think would be of value is a standardized method to decide which
>> > wayland clients should be locked down and which should not be. This is
>> > currently "undecided". Something a compositor can easily look up given the
>> > client socket and then decide
Hi Carsten, thanks for the detailed reply.
Carsten Haitzler writes:
> On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 19:29:45 + Alyssa Ross said:
>
>> Hi! I'm Alyssa and I'm working on Spectrum[1], which is a project
>> aiming to create a compartmentalized desktop Linux system, with high
>> levels of isolation
Carsten Haitzler writes:
> On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 19:29:45 + Alyssa Ross said:
>
>> Hi! I'm Alyssa and I'm working on Spectrum[1], which is a project
>> aiming to create a compartmentalized desktop Linux system, with high
>> levels of isolation between applications.
>>
>> One big issue for
Please read the (lengthy) discussion at [1].
[1]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wayland/weston/-/issues/206
In particular, the "get_credentials → PID → executable path" lookup is
racy. PID re-use allows a malicious process to be recognized as another
executable.
On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 09:51:53 + Simon Ser said:
> Please read the (lengthy) discussion at [1].
>
> [1]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wayland/weston/-/issues/206
>
> In particular, the "get_credentials → PID → executable path" lookup is
> racy. PID re-use allows a malicious process to be
Simon Ser writes:
> On Wednesday, July 28th, 2021 at 11:17, Alyssa Ross wrote:
>
>> A further thought I've just had -- the pid lookup is generally done
>> through libwayland-server's wl_client_get_credentials(), right? So if
>> libwayland-server could be taught about the proxy, and the proxy
On Wednesday, July 28th, 2021 at 12:30, Carsten Haitzler
wrote:
> On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 09:51:53 + Simon Ser cont...@emersion.fr said:
>
> > Please read the (lengthy) discussion at 1.
> > In particular, the "get_credentials → PID → executable path" lookup is
> > racy. PID re-use allows a
On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 09:08:03 + Alyssa Ross said:
> Hi Carsten, thanks for the detailed reply.
>
> Carsten Haitzler writes:
>
> > On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 19:29:45 + Alyssa Ross said:
> >
> >> Hi! I'm Alyssa and I'm working on Spectrum[1], which is a project
> >> aiming to create a
Carsten Haitzler writes:
> On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 09:51:53 + Simon Ser said:
>
>> Please read the (lengthy) discussion at [1].
>>
>> [1]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wayland/weston/-/issues/206
>>
>> In particular, the "get_credentials → PID → executable path" lookup is
>> racy. PID
Hi Alyssa,
On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 at 20:30, Alyssa Ross wrote:
> Hi! I'm Alyssa and I'm working on Spectrum[1], which is a project
> aiming to create a compartmentalized desktop Linux system, with high
> levels of isolation between applications.
I've seen, it's neat!
> One big issue for us is
On Wednesday, July 28th, 2021 at 11:17, Alyssa Ross wrote:
> A further thought I've just had -- the pid lookup is generally done
> through libwayland-server's wl_client_get_credentials(), right? So if
> libwayland-server could be taught about the proxy, and the proxy could
> communicate the
Daniel Stone writes:
>> One big issue for us is protecting the system against potentially
>> malicious Wayland clients. It's important that a compartmentalized
>> application can't read from the clipboard or take a screenshot of the
>> whole desktop without user consent. (The latter is
On Wednesday 2021-07-28 12:30, Carsten Haitzler wrote:
>
>> Please read the (lengthy) discussion at [1].
>>
>> [1]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wayland/weston/-/issues/206
>>
>> In particular, the "get_credentials → PID → executable path" lookup is
>> racy. PID re-use allows a malicious
On Wednesday, July 28th, 2021 at 13:06, Alyssa Ross wrote:
> That's true for screenshots, but it's not true for clipboard contents,
> right? As I understand it, any application can paste, with the only
> restriction being that it has to be in the foreground at the time, and
> wl-clipboard[1]
On Wed, Jul 28, 2021 at 01:36:54PM +, Alyssa Ross wrote:
> Jonas Ådahl writes:
>
> > On Wed, Jul 28, 2021 at 11:06:43AM +, Alyssa Ross wrote:
> >> Daniel Stone writes:
> >>
> >> >> One big issue for us is protecting the system against potentially
> >> >> malicious Wayland clients.
Jonas Ådahl writes:
> On Wed, Jul 28, 2021 at 11:06:43AM +, Alyssa Ross wrote:
>> Daniel Stone writes:
>>
>> >> One big issue for us is protecting the system against potentially
>> >> malicious Wayland clients. It's important that a compartmentalized
>> >> application can't read from the
On Wed, Jul 28, 2021 at 11:06:43AM +, Alyssa Ross wrote:
> Daniel Stone writes:
>
> >> One big issue for us is protecting the system against potentially
> >> malicious Wayland clients. It's important that a compartmentalized
> >> application can't read from the clipboard or take a
On Wednesday, July 28th, 2021 at 15:36, Alyssa Ross wrote:
> That's good to know, but even so, there's no way for the compositor to
> know that the interaction corresponds to a user intent to paste. So an
> application could still abuse a mouseover, or just some unrelated typing
> in its window,
On Wed, 28 Jul 2021 11:06:43 +
Alyssa Ross wrote:
> Daniel Stone writes:
>
> >> One big issue for us is protecting the system against potentially
> >> malicious Wayland clients. It's important that a compartmentalized
> >> application can't read from the clipboard or take a screenshot of
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