[whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Hallvord R M Steen
Adam Barth and Collin Jackson pointed out to me that while investigating frame navigation policies they found that a recipient of a postMessage in Opera can set event.source.location, thus navigate the sender window/document. I think this is a bug in the API itself. This seems to violate the

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Thomas Broyer
On Feb 7, 2008 10:24 AM, Hallvord R M Steen wrote: Adam Barth and Collin Jackson pointed out to me that while investigating frame navigation policies they found that a recipient of a postMessage in Opera can set event.source.location, thus navigate the sender window/document. I think this is a

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Adam Barth
Hallvord, On Feb 7, 2008 1:24 AM, Hallvord R M Steen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Adam Barth and Collin Jackson pointed out to me that while investigating frame navigation policies they found that a recipient of a postMessage in Opera can set event.source.location, thus navigate the sender

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread David Gerard
On 07/02/2008, Hallvord R M Steen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: That is of course a possibility. I don't have Firefox 3 handy so I'd appreciate somebody explaining how it is implemented there. By the way, I recommend Minefield (the Firefox 3 nightlies) to anyone. I now use it as my default browser

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Hallvord R M Steen
On 07/02/2008, Thomas Broyer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Feb 7, 2008 10:24 AM, Hallvord R M Steen wrote: Adam Barth and Collin Jackson pointed out to me that while investigating frame navigation policies they found that a recipient of a postMessage in Opera can set event.source.location,

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Hallvord R M Steen
Adam Barth and Collin Jackson pointed out to me that while investigating frame navigation policies they found that a recipient of a postMessage in Opera can set event.source.location, thus navigate the sender window/document. I think this is a bug in the API itself. When one frame posts

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Adam Barth
On Feb 7, 2008 2:27 AM, Hallvord R M Steen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Opera assumes that if a script has a JavaScript pointer to a frame then that script is permitted to navigate that frame. This is actually per the spec and required for web compatibility: any script that has a pointer to a

[whatwg] Calendar subscription as a feed?

2008-02-07 Thread Mikko Rantalainen
Consider a site that has something like an event calendar (may be displayed with a table layout or just a simple list). How should one link to iCalendar information that is meant for subscription or importing to reader's calendaring software? (This is different from a single event information for

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Maciej Stachowiak
On Feb 7, 2008, at 2:27 AM, Hallvord R M Steen wrote: The source attribute of the message event does not leak any privileges to the recipient in Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Safari because these browsers do not make this assumption and instead check whether the script is permitted to

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Hallvord R M Steen
Opera assumes that if a script has a JavaScript pointer to a frame then that script is permitted to navigate that frame. This is actually per the spec and required for web compatibility Here is a test case: http://crypto.stanford.edu/~abarth/research/html5/sibling/ Ah sorry, I see

Re: [whatwg] postMessage: event.source allows navigation of sender

2008-02-07 Thread Thomas Broyer
On Feb 7, 2008 10:59 AM, Hallvord R M Steen wrote: Have a look at section 4.7.4.1. Security which reads: User agents must raise a security exception whenever any of the members of a Location object are accessed by scripts whose origin is not the same as the Location object's associated