Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-09-04 Thread Daniel Veditz
Ian Hickson wrote: Note that the problems you raise also exist (and have long existed) with cookies; at least the storage APIs default to a safe state in the general case instead of defaulting to an unsafe state. In what way do the storage API's default to a safe state? What unsafe state is

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-29 Thread Shannon Baker
Ian Hickson said (among other things): It seems that what you are suggesting is that foo.example.com cannot trust example.com, because example.com could then steal data from foo.example.com. But there's a much simpler attack scenario for example.com: it can just take over foo.example.com

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-28 Thread Shannon Baker
Ian Hickson wrote: This is mentioned in the Security and privacy section; the third bullet point here for example suggests blocking access to public storage areas: http://whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/#user-tracking I did read the suggestions and I know the authors have given these

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-28 Thread Jim Ley
On 28/08/06, Shannon Baker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I accept tracking is inevitable but we shouldn't be making it easier either. You have to remember that the WHAT-WG individual is a Google employee, a company that now relies on accurate tracking of details, so don't be surprised that any

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-28 Thread Martijn
On 8/28/06, Jim Ley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 28/08/06, Shannon Baker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I accept tracking is inevitable but we shouldn't be making it easier either. You have to remember that the WHAT-WG individual is a Google employee, a company that now relies on accurate tracking

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-28 Thread Ian Hickson
On Mon, 28 Aug 2006, Shannon Baker wrote: This is mentioned in the Security and privacy section; the third bullet point here for example suggests blocking access to public storage areas: http://whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/#user-tracking I did read the suggestions

[whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-27 Thread Shannon Baker
I've read the 2006-08-21 draft of Web Applications 1.0 carefully and I'm horrified that section 5.9 on persistent storage is being considered as a web standard - at least in its current form. My objections can be summarised as: * Authors failure to handle the implications of global storage. *

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-27 Thread Alexey Feldgendler
On Sun, 27 Aug 2006 19:11:17 +0700, Shannon Baker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But why bother? This whole problem is easily solved by allowing data to be stored with an access control list (ACL). For example the site developer should be able to specify that a data object be available to

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-27 Thread Ian Hickson
On 8/27/06, Shannon Baker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: == 1: Authors failure to handle the implications of global storage. == First lets talk about the global store (|globalStorage['']) which is accessible from ALL domains. This is mentioned in the Security and privacy section; the third bullet