Re: [Wikimedia-l] An idea that may improve Wikipedia's fundraising
On 07/08/13 07:32, Jane Darnell wrote: If a template exists for specific dump-creation, it might be useful to have this be a paid service, where the product is not necessarily one dump on a dvd, but a hyperlink to a specific dump that can be updated periodically (once a year maybe?). Doesn't have to be a dump per se. There could be a client program which could retrieve a list generated by the server or the user could produce an existing list. The program would use it to download the articles via the API (or maybe get it from an official dump) and generate offline versions. - Svavar Kjarrval signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, mailto:wikimedia-l-requ...@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe
[Wikimedia-l] Happy birthday Wikimedia Foundation!
I'd like to wish the Wikimedia Foundation a happy 10th birthday. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiMedia_Foundation With regards, Svavar Kjarrval signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l
Re: [Wikimedia-l] PRISM
On 10/06/13 14:12, Tobias wrote: No one will bother trying to break SSL/TLS. The NSA certainly doesn't need to. They can just sign their own certificates and perform man-in-the-middle attacks. Browsers will in most cases accept those forged certificates, since the NSA can make sure that they are signed by a CA trusted by many browsers. With all the computing power they do have and will have they could, in theory, try to break the CA certificates themselves. They can collect and store the encrypted traffic and then at any time decrypt said traffic when they've done breaking the CA certificate used to encrypt it. It could be worth it for them in case of the big CAs. For all we know, the big CAs could have received secret court orders where they are required to hand over the certificates themselves, foregoing the aforementioned step. This incertainty due to this kind of secrecy isn't good for the mind. - Svavar Kjarrval signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l
Re: [Wikimedia-l] Thoughts on Admin Rights on WMF Wiki (and other things)
Hi. There's also the viewpoint that a person being fired could go overboard and do irreparable harm to the site and the public's view of the WMF. There's of course the possibility to revert the changes on the website, since it is a wiki, but very hard to do on the public opinion, like if a soon-to-be-fired admin changed a protected page to something which would damage public relations of the WMF. That's why many companies don't want fired employees to continue working for them after the employee termination has been announced. Of course a counter-argument would be that a majority of those admins wouldn't do something like that and I don't doubt their good intentions. But the WMF wouldn't be aware of which admin would go on an unwarranted rampage, if any, and who wouldn't. The safest approach would be to take away their admin privileges without a prior announcement. I do agree, though, that some kind of public announcement should have been made after the fact regarding this policy change and the former admins thanked for their contributions. With regards, Svavar Kjarrval signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l
