On Fri, Aug 2, 2013 at 7:23 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
On Fri, Aug 2, 2013 at 10:07 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
Anthony wrote:
How much padding is already inherent in HTTPS?
None, which is why Ryan's Google Maps fingerprinting example works.
Citation
On Sat, Aug 3, 2013 at 4:19 AM, Ryan Lane rl...@wikimedia.org wrote:
On Fri, Aug 2, 2013 at 7:23 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
It seems that the ciphers which run in CBC mode, at least, are padded.
Wikipedia currently seems to be set to use RC4 128. I'm not sure what,
if
any,
On Sat, Aug 3, 2013 at 4:19 AM, Ryan Lane rl...@wikimedia.org wrote:
We're currently have RC4 and AES ciphers in our list, but have RC4 listed
first and have a server preference list to combat BEAST. TLS 1.1/1.2 are
enabled and I'll be adding the GCM ciphers to the beginning of the list
On Aug 1, 2013, at 10:07 PM, Ryan Lane rl...@wikimedia.org wrote:
Also,
our resources are delivered from a number of urls (upload, bits, text)
making it easier to identify resources. Even with padding you can take the
relative size of resources being delivered, and the order of those sizes
George William Herbert wrote:
...
It would also not be much more effort or customer impact
to pad to the next larger 1k size for a random large fraction
of transmissions.
Padding each transmission with a random number of bytes, up to say 50
or 100, might provide a greater defense against
On Fri, Aug 2, 2013 at 1:32 PM, James Salsman jsals...@gmail.com wrote:
George William Herbert wrote:
...
It would also not be much more effort or customer impact
to pad to the next larger 1k size for a random large fraction
of transmissions.
Padding each transmission with a random
On 08/02/2013 01:32 PM, James Salsman wrote:
Padding each transmission with a random number of bytes, up to say 50
or 100, might provide a greater defense against fingerprinting while
saving massive amounts of bandwidth.
It would slightly change the algorithm used to make the fingerprint, not
How much padding is already inherent in HTTPS? Does the protocol pad to
the size of the blocks in the block cipher?
Seems to me that any amount of padding is going to give little bang for the
buck, at least without using some sort of pipelining. You could probably
do quite a bit if you
Marc A. Pelletier wrote:
...
A minor random increase of size in document wouldn't even slow
down [fingerprinting.]
That's absolutely false. The last time I measured the sizes of all
9,625 vital articles, there was only one at the median length of
30,356 bytes but four articles up to 50 bytes
On 08/02/2013 05:06 PM, James Salsman wrote:
Marc, I note that you have recommending not keeping the Perl CPAN
modules up to date on Wikimedia Labs:
http://www.mediawiki.org/w/index.php?title=Wikimedia_Labs/Tool_Labs/Needed_Toolserver_featuresdiff=678902oldid=678746
saying that out of date
On 08/02/2013 05:50 PM, Matthew Flaschen wrote:
It seems from the context better tested meant something like people
are using this in practice in real environments, not only automated
testing.
And, indeed, given the constraints and objectives of the Tool Labs
(i.e.: no secrecy, all open source
... random padding without (at least) pipelining and
placards *is* worthless to protect against traffic analysis
No, that is not true, and
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2012/papers/4681a332.pdf
explains why. Padding makes it difficult but not impossible to distinguish
between two HTTPS
On 08/02/2013 08:15 PM, James Salsman wrote:
No, that is not true, and
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2012/papers/4681a332.pdf
explains why. Padding makes it difficult but not impossible to distinguish
between two HTTPS destinations. 4,300,000 destinations is right out.
... have you
Marc A. Pelletier wrote:
...
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2012/papers/4681a332.pdf
...
have you actually /read/ that paper?
Of course I have. Have you read the conclusions at the bottom right of page
344? What kind of an adversary trying to infer our readers' article
selections is going to
Anthony wrote:
How much padding is already inherent in HTTPS?
None, which is why Ryan's Google Maps fingerprinting example works.
Citation needed.
... Seems to me that any amount of padding is going to give little
bang for the buck
Again, can we please procure expert opinions
On Fri, Aug 2, 2013 at 10:07 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
Anthony wrote:
How much padding is already inherent in HTTPS?
None, which is why Ryan's Google Maps fingerprinting example works.
Citation needed.
Also please address
please address
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_modes_of_operation#Padding
Sure. As soon as someone creates
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunset_Shimmerso I can use an appropriate
example.
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Anthony, padding in this context means adding null or random bytes to the
end of encrypted TCP streams in order to obscure their true length. The
process of adding padding is entirely independent of the choice of
underlying cipher.
In this case, however, we have been discussing perfect forward
On Fri, Aug 2, 2013 at 11:09 PM, James Salsman jsals...@gmail.com wrote:
Anthony, padding in this context means adding null or random bytes to the
end of encrypted TCP streams in order to obscure their true length. The
process of adding padding is entirely independent of the choice of
On Fri, Aug 2, 2013 at 11:33 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
AES and CBC, which would be a block cipher which pads to 128 or 256 bytes.
I mean bits, of course.
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With the NSA revelations over the past months, there has been some very
questionable information starting to circulate suggesting that trying to
implement perfect forward secrecy for https web traffic isn't worth the
effort. I am not sure of the provenance of these reports, and I would like
to see
On Thu, Aug 1, 2013 at 1:33 PM, James Salsman jsals...@gmail.com wrote:
With the NSA revelations over the past months, there has been some very
questionable information starting to circulate suggesting that trying to
implement perfect forward secrecy for https web traffic isn't worth the
Ryan Lane wrote:
...
Assuming traffic analysis can be used to determine your browsing
habits as they are occurring (which is likely not terribly hard for Wikipedia)
The Google Maps example you linked to works by building a huge
database of the exact byte sizes of satellite image tiles. Are you
On Thursday, August 1, 2013, James Salsman wrote:
Ryan Lane wrote:
...
Assuming traffic analysis can be used to determine your browsing
habits as they are occurring (which is likely not terribly hard for
Wikipedia)
The Google Maps example you linked to works by building a huge
database
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