I don’t see precisely how mandatory HTTPS could help spread the knowledge;
accordingly if users feel themselves spied and it prevent them to
contribute, yes, HTTPS helps; but if others feel cluttered by HTTPS (time
load, unfriendly firewalls, various problems), it could also lower the
number of
Theo:
They even have a Key
recovery service and it's been going on for a long while apparently, to
the point that the NSA has been steering the release of encryption
standards and tools. I suppose that should make the politics of
encryption a bit less relevant?
No; with Perfect Forward
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 12:23 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
Their orders would be classified; disclosure of them would be a crime.
Not a problem for us, but a big problem for staff on the ground in China.
Indeed, I believe it may even be outright life threatening to have
strong
Hoi,
Fred, what is different in your scenario from what happens in the USA ?
Thanks,
GerardM
On 3 September 2013 00:23, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
On 31/08/13 15:17, Erik Moeller wrote:
It could be argued
that it’s time to draw a line in the sand - if you’re
On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 10:58 PM, Peter Gervai grin...@gmail.com wrote:
illegally collect personal data about them and *monetize it *or use to
pressure or
threaten selected individuals, companies or agencies.
Monetize it?
I am in no way going to defend my government on most of this given
Any censor from the United States or European governments that works
directly with us (I have no personal knowledge of this, I just know it
has to be) is concerned with classified information, not someone's
opinions or factual information about historical events or political
personalities.
Fred,
Sorry, there is no us. As far as the United States is concerned they
allowed themselves to spy on any person who is not one of US to be speid
on. Given that our movement is a global movement, the fact that it is based
in the US is incidental.
Thanks,
GerardM
On 3 September 2013
And from that assertion what practical action or policy should follow?
Fred
Fred,
Sorry, there is no us. As far as the United States is concerned they
allowed themselves to spy on any person who is not one of US to be speid
on. Given that our movement is a global movement, the fact that it
On 09/03/2013 08:36 AM, Fred Bauder wrote:
Any censor from the United States or European governments that works
directly with us (I have no personal knowledge of this, I just know it
has to be) is concerned with classified information, not someone's
opinions or factual information about
On 09/02/2013 06:17 PM, Tim Starling wrote:
OK, well there's one fairly obvious solution which hasn't been
proposed or discussed.
[collaborating with the PRC]
That's because, ideologically, it would be abhorrent to a very large
segment (possibly even the majority) of editors, staff and
On 09/03/2013 09:45 AM, Fred Bauder wrote:
Abusive nonsense does not make that fact go away. Someone,
actually, many someones, need to be trusted.
Доверяй, но проверяй.
I agree with your assessment of the risks of working with the PRC, I
simply think that if you think that those risks do not
On 09/03/2013 12:33 PM, Delirium wrote:
I certainly agree with learning from history, but when it comes to
censoring encyclopedias or similar reference works, are there good
examples that might more concretely narrow down the specific type of
thing we ought to be learning from history?
Not
I guess emergencies should not go to legal as there may be a considerable
delay.
Fred
Are there more successful attempts?
It would be difficult to enumerate successful attempts since, by
definition, they would have been successful at not being known. :-)
-- Marc
I once suppressed
Are there more successful attempts?
It would be difficult to enumerate successful attempts since, by
definition, they would have been successful at not being known. :-)
-- Marc
I once suppressed information about a troop movement underway in Iraq
after a request. Troop movements are
On 9/3/13 4:28 PM, Marc A. Pelletier wrote:
On 09/03/2013 09:45 AM, Fred Bauder wrote:
Abusive nonsense does not make that fact go away. Someone,
actually, many someones, need to be trusted.
Доверяй, но проверяй.
I agree with your assessment of the risks of working with the PRC, I
simply
Hi Fred,
Emergencies should go to emerge...@wikimedia.org. Any other concerns
should be directed to le...@wikimedia.org.
Please note that emergency@ should only be used for actual emergencies
(i.e. immediate threats to life, limb, or property).
Thanks!
-Michelle
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 10:48
To be fair, none of the people receiving requests through legal@ or emergency@
have security clearances either.
Kirill
On Sep 3, 2013, at 1:44 PM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
Are there more successful attempts?
It would be difficult to enumerate successful attempts since,
The thing is, it's kind of a crapshoot anyways. You might see something that
you think might be classified and report it; but, unless you actually have the
corresponding clearance yourself, you have no way of knowing for certain
whether the material is in fact classified in the first place.
Erik Moeller wrote:
So, what to do? My main suggestion is to organize a broad request for
comments and input on possible paths forward. I think we’re doing the
right thing by initially implementing these exemptions -- but I do
think this decision needs to finally rest with the Board of the
There are many very sane comments in this thread. I agree with most of
them -
- Network encryption is important as one aspect;
- Local threats and digging dirt are an important realistic threat
(far more people are of interest to *THEIR OWN COMMUNITIES* vs nationally,
or open to so
On 09/02/2013 06:17 PM, Tim Starling wrote:
It would allow WMF to monitor censorship and surveillance by being in
the request loop.
There's no guarantee they would accept HTTPS, even if there were still
user surveillance inside the data center.
It would be kind of like the cooperation we
On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 6:38 AM, Matthew Flaschen
matthew.flasc...@gatech.edu wrote:
But as far as I know, the U.S. government has never blocked the general
public from accessing a Wikipedia article, nor have they sent a takedown
that was based on ideology/social harmony/etc.
Instead they use
Le 31/08/2013 07:17, Erik Moeller a écrit :
We can, of course, ask users in the affected countries. Given that
this may lead to degradation or loss of access, users are likely to be
opposed, and indeed, when plans to expand HTTPS usage were announced,
a group of Chinese Wikipedians published
Hi folks,
As many of you know, this week we enabled HTTPS for logged-in users of
Wikimedia projects. See:
https://blog.wikimedia.org/2013/08/28/https-default-logged-in-users-wikimedia-sites/
We have geographically exempted users geo-located to China or Iran
from this [1], because these
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