On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 5:34 PM Jose Marinez wrote:
> I appreciate this proposition as well as your summary for the current state
> of Wireguard for this particular case. I agree with you wholeheartedly that
> before the mass adoption of Wireguard happens these use cases should be
> addressed
Hi Fredrik,
I appreciate this proposition as well as your summary for the current state of
Wireguard for this particular case. I agree with you wholeheartedly that before
the mass adoption of Wireguard happens these use cases should be addressed
properly. I'd love to hear what Jason has to say
On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 1:05 PM Henning Reich wrote:
>
> Thank for your reply too,
>
> I "use" this list and conversation to get a bit more information about crypto
> at all (it looks like I need that :-)
>
I see. When I wanted to learn more about network security protocols I
read the RFC for
On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 1:05 PM Henning Reich wrote:
>
> 3. The attacker uses the VPN server static private key to decrypt the
> recorded handshakes, revealing client static pubkeys.
>
> I think, this is not possible.
> WG use DH for Key-Exchange as other VPNs do (like OpenVPN). Only with
>
Hi,
> 3. The attacker uses the VPN server static private key to decrypt the
> recorded handshakes, revealing client static pubkeys.
Create a service that sets a new temporary pubkey. Call it *before*
connecting with WG.
Switching during a connection doesn't help much IMHO, because if you
have
Greetings fellow WireGuard users,
I represent Mullvad, a privacy-focused VPN provider. We and some
others think there are currently two aspects of WireGuard that make
its deployment in a privacy-focused setting a bit challenging. The
goal of this email is to present current thoughts on the issues
