Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself

>>> On 19.08.16 at 17:02, wrote: > On 19/08/16 15:58, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 19.08.16 at 16:12, wrote: >>> --- a/xen/common/memory.c >>> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c >>> @@ -903,7 +903,16 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, >

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself

On 19/08/16 15:58, Jan Beulich wrote: On 19.08.16 at 16:12, wrote: >> --- a/xen/common/memory.c >> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c >> @@ -903,7 +903,16 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, >> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) >> >> if ( op ==

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself

>>> On 19.08.16 at 16:12, wrote: > --- a/xen/common/memory.c > +++ b/xen/common/memory.c > @@ -903,7 +903,16 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, > XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) > > if ( op == XENMEM_populate_physmap > &&

[Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] xen/physmap: Do not permit a guest to populate PoD pages for itself

PoD is supposed to be entirely transparent to guest, but this interface has been left exposed for a long time. The use of PoD requires careful co-ordination by the toolstack with the XENMEM_{get,set}_pod_target hypercalls, and xenstore ballooning target. The best a guest can do without toolstack