>>> On 08.12.14 at 17:45, wrote:
> If a guest who has control of a passthrough device can cause these
> reserved ranges to change, then there may be reason to prevent others
> from querying them, but that doesn't appear to be the case here.
Right, in that case we definitely would need a check.
J
On 12/08/2014 05:00 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 08.12.14 at 07:17, wrote:
On 2014/12/3 3:47, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 05:24:21PM +0800, Tiejun Chen wrote:
@@ -1101,6 +1129,29 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd,
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
break;
>>> On 08.12.14 at 07:17, wrote:
> On 2014/12/3 3:47, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 05:24:21PM +0800, Tiejun Chen wrote:
>>> @@ -1101,6 +1129,29 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd,
>>> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
>>> break;
>>> }
>>>
>>> +#ifdef
On 2014/12/3 3:47, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 05:24:21PM +0800, Tiejun Chen wrote:
From: Jan Beulich
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
Signed-off-by: Jan B
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 05:24:21PM +0800, Tiejun Chen wrote:
> From: Jan Beulich
>
> This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
> to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
> RMRRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
> Acked-by: Kevin Tian
> ---
From: Jan Beulich
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
Acked-by: Kevin Tian
---
xen/common/compat/memory.c | 54 +++
