flight 104153 qemu-mainline real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104153/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-armhf-armhf-xl 6 xen-boot fail REGR. vs. 104106
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 05:32:09PM +0100, Nicolas Dichtel wrote:
> What I was trying to say is that I export those directories like other are.
> Removing those files is not related to that series.
Perhaps the correct solution is to only copy files matching "*.h" to
reduce the risk of copying
flight 104155 ovmf real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104155/
Perfect :-)
All tests in this flight passed as required
version targeted for testing:
ovmf 521981ee7608b75b51693ea367c9e1d83687d110
baseline version:
ovmf
On 01/12/2017 01:27 PM, Ian Jackson wrote:
Dario Faggioli writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] Xen 4.8 + Linux 4.9 + Credit2 = can't
bootup"):
Anyway, we should have some multi-socket boxes on OSSTest, AFAICR.
I think we do but I haven't got a systematic way of answering that
question other than by
flight 104156 xen-unstable-smoke real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104156/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 12 migrate-support-checkfail never pass
test-armhf-armhf-xl
On 01/12/2017 02:00 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 12/01/17 12:13, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
## Proposed solution using the STAO
The general idea of this method is to use the STAO in order to hide the pCPUs
from the hardware domain, and provide processor objects for vCPUs in an extra
SSDT table.
On 01/12/2017 03:51 PM, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 01/12/2017 03:48 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 12/01/17 20:46, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>> On 01/12/2017 02:27 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 12/01/17 18:00, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>> Ahh! found it. This is a side effect of starting to
flight 104150 xen-unstable real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104150/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking):
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 13 saverestore-support-checkfail like 104104
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt
On Wed, 11 Jan 2017, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 10:49:15AM -0800, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > On Wed, 4 Jan 2017, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > > On Wed, 4 Jan 2017, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Jan 04, 2017 at 10:00:01AM -0800, Stefano Stabellini
On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 01/12/2017 04:33 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> >> On 01/11/2017 06:36 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> >>> The following commit:
> >>>
> >>> commit 72a9b186292d98494f26cfd24a1621796209
> >>>
flight 104151 ovmf real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104151/
Perfect :-)
All tests in this flight passed as required
version targeted for testing:
ovmf 6157f6500c4098d7b541c1f1e9ba28e73fe9b70c
baseline version:
ovmf
On 1/12/17 6:04 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 04:23:59PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>> On 1/12/17 2:28 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:52:15AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
On 1/12/17 6:50 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at
On 1/12/17 6:04 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 04:23:59PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>> On 1/12/17 2:28 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:52:15AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
On 1/12/17 6:50 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 04:23:59PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On 1/12/17 2:28 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:52:15AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> >> On 1/12/17 6:50 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 02:20:15PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 04:20:00PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On 1/12/17 3:45 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 01:46:41PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> >> On 1/12/17 1:30 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >>> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:44:59AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>
On 01/12/2017 12:17 PM, David Miller wrote:
From: Vineeth Remanan Pillai
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 23:17:17 +
@@ -1054,7 +1059,11 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int
budget)
napi_complete(napi);
flight 104148 qemu-mainline real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104148/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2 15 guest-start/debian.repeat fail REGR. vs. 104106
Regressions
On 1/12/17 2:28 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:52:15AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>> On 1/12/17 6:50 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 02:20:15PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
On 1/11/17 1:47 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at
On 1/12/17 3:45 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 01:46:41PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>> On 1/12/17 1:30 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:44:59AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>>
>>>
view there's no reason for adding MB2 support for BIOS since it
The tools that use kexec are asynchronous in nature and do not keep
state changes. As such provide an hypercall to find out whether an
image has been loaded for either type.
Note: No need to modify XSM as it has one size fits all check and
does not check for subcommands.
Note: No need to check
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 01:46:41PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On 1/12/17 1:30 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:44:59AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>
> >
> >> view there's no reason for adding MB2 support for BIOS since it provides
> >> no advantage over MB1 when booting
> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
> index e8a9ea7..25a7c43 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
> @@ -141,25 +141,6 @@ void __init xen_init_spinlocks(void)
> pv_lock_ops.vcpu_is_preempted = PV_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_vcpu_stolen);
>
The following commit:
commit 72a9b186292d98494f26cfd24a1621796209
Author: KarimAllah Ahmed
Date: Fri Aug 26 23:55:36 2016 +0200
xen: Remove event channel notification through Xen PCI platform device
broke Linux when booting as Dom0 on Xen in a nested Xen
On 01/12/2017 04:33 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>> On 01/11/2017 06:36 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>>> The following commit:
>>>
>>> commit 72a9b186292d98494f26cfd24a1621796209
>>> Author: KarimAllah Ahmed
>>> Date: Fri
On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 01/11/2017 06:36 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > The following commit:
> >
> > commit 72a9b186292d98494f26cfd24a1621796209
> > Author: KarimAllah Ahmed
> > Date: Fri Aug 26 23:55:36 2016 +0200
> >
> > xen: Remove
flight 104146 xen-unstable real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104146/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
build-armhf-xsm 4 host-build-prep fail in 104136 REGR. vs. 104119
Tests which are
On 1/12/17 1:30 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:44:59AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>
>> view there's no reason for adding MB2 support for BIOS since it provides
>> no advantage over MB1 when booting from the BIOS. Now MB2 solves a
>
> From your point of view maybe it does
On 01/12/2017 03:48 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 12/01/17 20:46, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>> On 01/12/2017 02:27 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 12/01/17 18:00, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> Ahh! found it. This is a side effect of starting to generate the dom0
> policy in Xen.
>
> Can
On 12/01/17 20:46, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 01/12/2017 02:27 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 12/01/17 18:00, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
Ahh! found it. This is a side effect of starting to generate the dom0
policy in Xen.
Can you try this patch?
>>> Intel/AMD HVM/PV 64/32bit all
On 01/12/2017 02:27 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 12/01/17 18:00, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>> Ahh! found it. This is a side effect of starting to generate the dom0
>>> policy in Xen.
>>>
>>> Can you try this patch?
>> Intel/AMD HVM/PV 64/32bit all look good. So
>>
>> Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:52:15AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On 1/12/17 6:50 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 02:20:15PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> >> On 1/11/17 1:47 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >>> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 02:51:27PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On
This is a follow-up of commit cfd8983f03c7b2 ("x86, locking/spinlocks:
Remove ticket (spin)lock implementation"). The static_key structure
paravirt_ticketlocks_enabled is now removed as it is no longer used.
As a result, the init functions kvm_spinlock_init_jump() and
xen_init_spinlocks_jump() are
From: Vineeth Remanan Pillai
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 23:17:17 +
> @@ -1054,7 +1059,11 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int
> budget)
> napi_complete(napi);
>
> RING_FINAL_CHECK_FOR_RESPONSES(>rx, more_to_do);
> -
> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
> index e8a9ea7..a822606 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
> @@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static __init int xen_init_spinlocks_jump(void)
> if (!xen_domain())
> return 0;
>
> -
c/s a11e8c9 "x86/pv: Use per-domain policy information in pv_cpuid()" switched
PV domains from using a (hardware for dom0, toolstack-chosen from domU) value
masked against pv_featureset[], to actually using the value calculated by
recalculate_cpuid_policy().
For domU, this is no practical change
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 09:44:59AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On 1/12/17 6:18 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> So as an aside, IMHO this is where the series should end and the next
> set of patches should be a follow on.
> >>>
> >>> Hmmm... Why? If you do not apply rest of patches then MB2
On 12/01/17 18:00, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>> Ahh! found it. This is a side effect of starting to generate the dom0
>> policy in Xen.
>>
>> Can you try this patch?
>
> Intel/AMD HVM/PV 64/32bit all look good. So
>
> Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky
Does this mean that newer
Hi,
On 12/01/17 19:15, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Andre Przywara wrote:
>> Hi Stefano,
>>
>> On 05/01/17 21:36, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>>> On Thu, 22 Dec 2016, Andre Przywara wrote:
For the same reason that allocating a struct irq_desc for each
possible LPI is
On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Andre Przywara wrote:
> Hi Stefano,
>
> On 05/01/17 21:36, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > On Thu, 22 Dec 2016, Andre Przywara wrote:
> >> For the same reason that allocating a struct irq_desc for each
> >> possible LPI is not an option, having a struct pending_irq for each LPI
Hi Stefano,
as just mentioned in my last reply, I missed that email last time. Sorry
for that.
Replying to the comments that still apply to the new drop ...
On 28/10/16 02:04, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Wed, 28 Sep 2016, Andre Przywara wrote:
>> For the same reason that allocating a struct
Hi,
I have an example attached below where I believe that libxl_physinfo_to_json()
does not return all of the correct output. physinfo.c is the C program that
outputs the json string. physc.out is the output that I recieved. physgo.out
is the output I get using the golang bindings I'm creating
On 12/01/17 12:13, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Below is a draft of a design document for PVHv2 CPU hotplug. It should cover
> both vCPU and pCPU hotplug. It's mainly centered around the hardware domain,
> since for unprivileged PVH guests the vCPU hotplug mechanism is already
> described
On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Andre Przywara wrote:
> On 05/01/17 22:10, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > On Thu, 22 Dec 2016, Andre Przywara wrote:
> >> Upon receiving an LPI, we need to find the right VCPU and virtual IRQ
> >> number to get this IRQ injected.
> >> Iterate our two-level LPI table to find
On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Pooya.Keshavarzi wrote:
> > The other issue I heard about was some root file system corruptions after
> > two or three re-boots we haven't observed in the native Linux case. The
> > plan was to do some further analysis, first, before we blame Xen regarding
> > this, though.
Dario Faggioli writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] Xen 4.8 + Linux 4.9 + Credit2 = can't
bootup"):
> Anyway, we should have some multi-socket boxes on OSSTest, AFAICR.
I think we do but I haven't got a systematic way of answering that
question other than by manual eyeballing of the spec sheets.
IF there
On Thu, 12 Jan 2017, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 11:29:44AM -0800, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > These are the minutes I took during the call:
> >
> > Xen PV Drivers Lifecycle document ready to be committed.
> >
> > Common Pitfalls for new PV protocols:
> > - 32 vs 64 fields
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 11:46:04AM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On 12/5/16 4:25 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > I am sending eleventh version of multiboot2 protocol support for
> > legacy BIOS and EFI platforms. This patch series release contains
> > fixes for all known issues.
> >
> >
On 01/11/2017 06:36 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> The following commit:
>
> commit 72a9b186292d98494f26cfd24a1621796209
> Author: KarimAllah Ahmed
> Date: Fri Aug 26 23:55:36 2016 +0200
>
> xen: Remove event channel notification through Xen PCI platform device
>
>
Dario Faggioli writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] Xen 4.8 + Linux 4.9 + Credit2 = can't
bootup"):
> Maybe it's me misremembering/saying stupid things, but I recall that at
> some point we were testing some of the recent and in development Linux
> branches in OSSTest.
We used to, but no-one fixed any of
Hi Stefano,
On 05/01/17 21:36, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Thu, 22 Dec 2016, Andre Przywara wrote:
>> For the same reason that allocating a struct irq_desc for each
>> possible LPI is not an option, having a struct pending_irq for each LPI
>> is also not feasible. However we actually only need
On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Ian Campbell writes ("Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] libxl: Add explicit cast to
> libxl_psr_cat_set_cbm"):
>> On Tue, 2016-01-19 at 14:06 +, Ian Jackson wrote:
>> > * XEN_DOMCTL_PSR_CAT_OP_SET_L3_* (public/domctl.h)
>> >
On 12/01/17 17:51, Igor Druzhinin wrote:
> Eliminate memory leaks introduced several years ago by cleaning the queue
> resources which are allocated on XenBus connection event. Namely, queue
> structure array and pages used for IO rings.
> vif->lock is used to protect statistics gathering agents
> Ahh! found it. This is a side effect of starting to generate the dom0
> policy in Xen.
>
> Can you try this patch?
Intel/AMD HVM/PV 64/32bit all look good. So
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky
___
Xen-devel mailing list
Eliminate memory leaks introduced several years ago by cleaning the queue
resources which are allocated on XenBus connection event. Namely, queue
structure array and pages used for IO rings.
vif->lock is used to protect statistics gathering agents from using the
queue structure during cleaning.
flight 104142 qemu-mainline real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104142/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm 11 guest-start fail REGR. vs. 104106
Regressions
On 12/5/16 4:25 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I am sending eleventh version of multiboot2 protocol support for
> legacy BIOS and EFI platforms. This patch series release contains
> fixes for all known issues.
>
> The final goal is xen.efi binary file which could be loaded by EFI
> loader,
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 01:35:39PM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote:
> This is v7 of the patches to add CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL for arm64. This is
> a simple reordering of patches from v6 per request of Will Deacon for ease
> of merging support for arm which depends on this series.
>
> Laura Abbott (11):
>
On 12/01/17 16:37, Jan Beulich wrote:
> While VEX.R and VEX.X are guaranteed to be 1 in compatibility mode,
> VEX.B can be encoded as zero, but would be ignored by the processor.
Really? That is unfortunate.
It would have been far more helpful for this to raise #UD, like the
other prohibited
On Mon, 2017-01-02 at 07:15 +, Michael Schinzel wrote:
> Good Morning,
>
I'm back, although, as anticipate, I can't be terribly useful, I'm
afraid...
> You can see, in default Xen configuration, the most important thing
> at read performance test -> 2414.92 MB/sec <- the used cache is half
>
On Thu, 2017-01-12 at 11:22 -0500, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 01/12/2017 07:50 AM, Dario Faggioli wrote:
> > I don't think we do that any longer, and that may be part of the
> > reason
> > why we missed this one?
>
> I believe you needed to be on a multi-socket system to catch this
> bug.
>
On 12/01/17 16:12, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 12.01.17 at 16:04, wrote:
>> On 12/01/17 14:02, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> Furthermore I think we have another issue with writes: If the write
>>> faults, the FSW (or MXCSR, albeit there only for instructions we don't
>>>
>>> On 12.01.17 at 17:28, wrote:
> On 12/01/17 14:58, Paul Durrant wrote:
>> Since injection works on a remote vCPU, and since there's no
>> enforcement of the subject vCPU being paused, there's a potential race
>> between the producing and consuming sides. Fix this by
While VEX.R and VEX.X are guaranteed to be 1 in compatibility mode,
VEX.B can be encoded as zero, but would be ignored by the processor.
Since we emulate instructions in 64-bit mode, we need to force the
bit to 1 in order to not act on the wrong {X,Y,Z}MM register.
We must not, however, fiddle
On Thursday 2017-01-12 16:52, Nicolas Dichtel wrote:
>Le 09/01/2017 à 13:56, Christoph Hellwig a écrit :
>> On Fri, Jan 06, 2017 at 10:43:59AM +0100, Nicolas Dichtel wrote:
>>> Regularly, when a new header is created in include/uapi/, the developer
>>> forgets to add it in the corresponding
Le 12/01/2017 à 17:28, Jan Engelhardt a écrit :
> On Thursday 2017-01-12 16:52, Nicolas Dichtel wrote:
>
>> Le 09/01/2017 à 13:56, Christoph Hellwig a écrit :
>>> On Fri, Jan 06, 2017 at 10:43:59AM +0100, Nicolas Dichtel wrote:
Regularly, when a new header is created in include/uapi/, the
On 12/01/17 14:58, Paul Durrant wrote:
> Since injection works on a remote vCPU, and since there's no
> enforcement of the subject vCPU being paused, there's a potential race
> between the producing and consuming sides. Fix this by leveraging the
> vector field as synchronization variable.
>
>
>>> On 12.01.17 at 15:58, wrote:
> The definitions of HVM_IOREQSRV_BUFIOREQ_* have to persist as they are
> already in use by callers of the libxc interface.
>
> Suggested-by: Jan Beulich
> Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant
> --
>
On 01/12/2017 07:50 AM, Dario Faggioli wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-01-04 at 22:13 -0500, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>> On 01/04/2017 09:10 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jan 04, 2017 at 08:52:03PM -0500, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
>>> wrote:
I was trying to bootup on an 30 CPU machine (15
On 12/01/17 15:50, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 01/12/2017 10:31 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 12/01/17 15:22, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
case 0x8001:
-c &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_e1c];
-d &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_e1d];
+c = p->extd.e1c;
>>>
>>> On 12.01.17 at 16:04, wrote:
> On 12/01/17 14:02, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Furthermore I think we have another issue with writes: If the write
>> faults, the FSW (or MXCSR, albeit there only for instructions we don't
>> emulate yet) register may have been updated
According the code around the assert:
movzbl %r14b, %esi 41 0f b6 f6
cmp %esi, %eax 39 f0
jle ... 7e 02
ud2 <0f> 0b
mov %rbx, %rdi 48 89 df
callq ... e8 51 20 00 00
mov $0x810, %eaxb8 10 08 00 00
so I think one is 0x38 %eax, the other is
flight 104144 ovmf real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/104144/
Perfect :-)
All tests in this flight passed as required
version targeted for testing:
ovmf b494cf96e70f8640acd9288951be39a0f714f2be
baseline version:
ovmf
Le 09/01/2017 à 13:56, Christoph Hellwig a écrit :
> On Fri, Jan 06, 2017 at 10:43:59AM +0100, Nicolas Dichtel wrote:
>> Regularly, when a new header is created in include/uapi/, the developer
>> forgets to add it in the corresponding Kbuild file. This error is usually
>> detected after the
On 1/12/17 6:50 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 02:20:15PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
>> On 1/11/17 1:47 PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 02:51:27PM -0600, Doug Goldstein wrote:
On 1/9/17 7:37 PM, Doug Goldstein wrote:
> On 12/5/16 4:25 PM, Daniel
This is a follow-up of commit cfd8983f03c7b2 ("x86, locking/spinlocks:
Remove ticket (spin)lock implementation"). The static_key structure
paravirt_ticketlocks_enabled is now removed as it is no longer used.
A simple build and boot test was done to verify it.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long
On 01/12/2017 10:31 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 12/01/17 15:22, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>>> case 0x8001:
>>> -c &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_e1c];
>>> -d &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_e1d];
>>> +c = p->extd.e1c;
>> This appears to crash guests Intel, at least for
On 1/12/17 6:18 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
So as an aside, IMHO this is where the series should end and the next
set of patches should be a follow on.
>>>
>>> Hmmm... Why? If you do not apply rest of patches then MB2 does not
>>> work on all EFI platforms.
>>>
>>> Daniel
>>
>> So I
Hi,
On 01/03/2017 12:33 PM, Dirk Behme wrote:
> On 20.12.2016 19:01, Julien Grall wrote:
>> Hi Andrii,
>>
>> On 20/12/2016 19:00, Andrii Anisov wrote:
>>> Sorry for the mess,
>>>
>>> I mean the xen-swiotlb issue on renesas board:
>>>
Bosch: problem with xen-swiotlb. It does not work properly
On 12/01/17 14:58, Paul Durrant wrote:
> ...as a set of hypercalls to be used by a device model.
>
> As stated in the new docs/designs/dm_op.markdown:
>
> "The aim of DMOP is to prevent a compromised device model from
> compromising domains other then the one it is associated with. (And is
>
On 12/01/17 15:22, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
>> case 0x8001:
>> -c &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_e1c];
>> -d &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_e1d];
>> +c = p->extd.e1c;
> This appears to crash guests Intel, at least for dom0.
Is this a PVH dom0? I can't see from this
> case 0x8001:
> -c &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_e1c];
> -d &= pv_featureset[FEATURESET_e1d];
> +c = p->extd.e1c;
This appears to crash guests Intel, at least for dom0.
p->extd.e1c is 0x3 and bit 1 is reserved on Intel.
I haven't traced it yet to exact place
On 12/01/17 14:02, Jan Beulich wrote:
> FPU insns writing to memory must not touch memory if they latch #MF (to
> be delivered on the next waiting FPU insn). Note that inspecting FSW.ES
> needs to be avoided for all FNST* insns, as they don't raise exceptions
> themselves, but may instead be
This patch removes the need for handling HVMOP restarts, so that
infrastructure is removed.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' argument of
xc_hvm_set_mem_type() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice the
value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan
The handle type passed to the underlying shadow and hap functions is
changed for compatibility with the new hypercall buffer.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' parameter of
xc_hvm_track_dirty_vram() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice
the value passed was always
Since injection works on a remote vCPU, and since there's no
enforcement of the subject vCPU being paused, there's a potential race
between the producing and consuming sides. Fix this by leveraging the
vector field as synchronization variable.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
This patch introduces code to handle DMOP continuations.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' argument of
xc_hvm_modified_memory() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice the
value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich
Following on from the design submitted by Jennifer Herbert to the list [1]
this series provides an implementation of __HYPERCALL_dm_op followed by
patches based on Jan Beulich's previous HVMCTL series [2] to convert
tools-only HVMOPs used by device models to DMOPs.
[1]
... HVMOP_set_pci_link_route
These HVMOPs were exposed to guests so their definitions need to be
preserved for compatibility. This patch therefore updates
__XEN_LATEST_INTERFACE_VERSION__ to 0x00040900 and makes the HVMOP
defintions conditional on __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ less than that value.
...as a set of hypercalls to be used by a device model.
As stated in the new docs/designs/dm_op.markdown:
"The aim of DMOP is to prevent a compromised device model from
compromising domains other then the one it is associated with. (And is
therefore likely already compromised)."
See that file
The definitions of HVM_IOREQSRV_BUFIOREQ_* have to persist as they are
already in use by callers of the libxc interface.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant
--
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich
Cc: Ian Jackson
On 12/01/17 14:15, Jan Beulich wrote:
> ... affecting PUSHF, POPF, CLI, and STI.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper
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On 12/01/17 14:15, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Considering that we surface MPX to HVM guests, instructions we emulate
> should also correctly deal with MPX state. While for now BND*
> instructions don't get emulated, the effect of branches (which we do
> emulate) without BND prefix should be taken care
... rather than various smaller scope ones.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper
---
v2: Re-base over PUSHF adjustment in earlier patch.
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@
- don't accept LOCK for DR accesses (it's undefined in the manuals)
- only accept LOCK for CR accesses when the respective feature flag is
set (which would not normally be the case for Intel)
- add (rather than or) 8 when LOCK is present; real hardware #UDs
when both REX.W and LOCK are
On 12/01/17 14:13, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 12.01.17 at 15:02, wrote:
>> I did make get_cpu_vendor() quite a lot better than it was previously,
>> but it is still searching a loop. For the extra 3 bytes of data, I
>> still think pre-calculating the values is worth
... affecting PUSHF, POPF, CLI, and STI.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
---
v5: Add PUSHF adjustment. mode_pvi() -> mode_vif().
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@ -433,6 +433,8 @@ typedef union {
#define CR0_EM(1<<2)
Considering that we surface MPX to HVM guests, instructions we emulate
should also correctly deal with MPX state. While for now BND*
instructions don't get emulated, the effect of branches (which we do
emulate) without BND prefix should be taken care of.
No need to alter XABORT behavior: While
>>> On 12.01.17 at 15:02, wrote:
> I did make get_cpu_vendor() quite a lot better than it was previously,
> but it is still searching a loop. For the extra 3 bytes of data, I
> still think pre-calculating the values is worth it.
Well, as said, the question isn't the
1: conditionally clear BNDn for branches
2: support VME and PVI
3: use switch()-wide local variable 'cr4'
4: improve CR/DR access handling
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
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On 12/01/17 13:40, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 12.01.17 at 13:32, wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
>> @@ -78,12 +78,11 @@ static void update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
>> switch ( ctl->input[0] )
>> {
>> case 0:
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