Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/Intel: hide CPUID faulting capability from guests

2016-09-19 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:jbeul...@suse.com] > Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 2:32 PM > > We don't currently emulate it, so guests should not be misguided to > believe they can (try to) use it. > > For now, simply return zero to guests for platform MSR reads, and only > accept (by

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/Intel: hide CPUID faulting capability from guests

2016-09-16 Thread Kyle Huey
On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:32 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: > We don't currently emulate it, so guests should not be misguided to > believe they can (try to) use it. > > For now, simply return zero to guests for platform MSR reads, and only > accept (by discarding) writes of zero. If

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/Intel: hide CPUID faulting capability from guests

2016-09-16 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 16.09.16 at 11:46, wrote: > On 16/09/16 07:32, Jan Beulich wrote: >> We don't currently emulate it, so guests should not be misguided to >> believe they can (try to) use it. >> >> For now, simply return zero to guests for platform MSR reads, and only >> accept

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/Intel: hide CPUID faulting capability from guests

2016-09-16 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 16/09/16 07:32, Jan Beulich wrote: We don't currently emulate it, so guests should not be misguided to believe they can (try to) use it. For now, simply return zero to guests for platform MSR reads, and only accept (by discarding) writes of zero. If ever there will be bits we can safely

[Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/Intel: hide CPUID faulting capability from guests

2016-09-16 Thread Jan Beulich
We don't currently emulate it, so guests should not be misguided to believe they can (try to) use it. For now, simply return zero to guests for platform MSR reads, and only accept (by discarding) writes of zero. If ever there will be bits we can safely expose to guests, let's handle them by white