flight 119338 seabios real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119338/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 17 guest-stop fail REGR. vs. 115539
Tests which did not
flight 119237 libvirt real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119237/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-raw 11 guest-start fail REGR. vs. 119049
Tests which did not
On Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:02:35 +0100
Yessine Daoud wrote:
> Hello,
>
>I tried to debug the issue and this what I found:
>the HVM boot takes some time at the following section
>(qemu/pc-bios/optionrom/linuxboot.S)
>/* Load kernel and initrd */
flight 119217 xen-unstable real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119217/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
build-armhf-pvopsbroken
branch xen-unstable
xenbranch xen-unstable
job test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64
testid xen-boot
Tree: linux git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git
Tree: linuxfirmware git://xenbits.xen.org/osstest/linux-firmware.git
Tree: qemu
On Fri, 16 Feb 2018, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Today's linux-next merge of the xen-tip tree got a conflict in:
>
> drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c
>
> between commit:
>
> a9a08845e9ac ("vfs: do bulk POLL* -> EPOLL* replacement")
>
> from Linus' tree and commit:
>
> 1e7dbff356e5
branch xen-4.7-testing
xenbranch xen-4.7-testing
job build-i386
testid xen-build
Tree: qemuu git://xenbits.xen.org/qemu-xen.git
Tree: xen git://xenbits.xen.org/xen.git
*** Found and reproduced problem changeset ***
Bug is in tree: xen git://xenbits.xen.org/xen.git
Bug introduced:
Hi all,
Today's linux-next merge of the xen-tip tree got a conflict in:
drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c
between commit:
a9a08845e9ac ("vfs: do bulk POLL* -> EPOLL* replacement")
from Linus' tree and commit:
1e7dbff356e5 ("pvcalls-front: introduce a per sock_mapping refcount")
from the
flight 119201 linux-linus real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119201/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-i386-libvirt 7 xen-boot fail REGR. vs. 118324
Hi all,
This series changes the initialization of two virtual registers to make
sure they match the value of the underlying physical cpu.
It also disables cpus different from the boot cpu, unless a newly
introduced command line option is specified. In that case, it explains
how to setup the
On big.LITTLE systems not all cores have the same midr. Instead of
initializing the vpidr to the boot cpu midr, set it to the value of the
midr of the pcpu where the vcpu will run.
This way, assuming that the vcpu has been created with the right pcpu
affinity, the guest will be able to read the
Update the documentation of the hmp-unsafe option to explain how to use
it safely, together with the right cpu affinity setting, on big.LITTLE
systems.
Also update the warning message to point users to the docs.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini
CC: jbeul...@suse.com
CC:
On big.LITTLE systems not all cores have the same ACTLR. Instead of
reading ACTLR and setting v->arch.actlr in vcpu_initialise, which is run
always on pcpu 0, do it later on the same pcpu where the vcpu will run.
This way, assuming that the vcpu has been created with the right pcpu
affinity, the
From: Julien Grall
From: Julien Grall
Xen does not properly support big.LITTLE platform. All vCPUs of a guest
will always have the MIDR of the boot CPU (see arch_domain_create).
At best the guest may see unreliable performance (vCPU switching between
On Thu, 15 Feb 2018, Julien Grall wrote:
> Xen does not properly support big.LITTLE platform. All vCPUs of a guest
> will always have the MIDR of the boot CPU (see arch_domain_create).
> At best the guest may see unreliable performance (vCPU switching between
> big and LITTLE), at worst the guest
flight 119258 seabios real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119258/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 17 guest-stop fail REGR. vs. 115539
Tests which did not
Hi all,
These are the minutes of the meeting we had earlier this week. Thank you
all for attending!
Cheers,
Stefano
Attendees: Stefano Stabellini, Julien Grall (ARM), Artem Mygaiev (EPAM),
Mirela Simonovic (Aggios), Davorin Mista (Aggios), Christopher Clark,
Andrii Anisov (EPAM), Rich
flight 119280 xtf real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119280/
Perfect :-)
All tests in this flight passed as required
version targeted for testing:
xtf 548224fe4256ea02669f106fe8b3297a22e6b4ad
baseline version:
xtf
branch xen-4.7-testing
xenbranch xen-4.7-testing
job build-i386-xsm
testid xen-build
Tree: qemuu git://xenbits.xen.org/qemu-xen.git
Tree: xen git://xenbits.xen.org/xen.git
*** Found and reproduced problem changeset ***
Bug is in tree: xen git://xenbits.xen.org/xen.git
Bug introduced:
On 02/15/2018 08:57 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 15/02/18 16:25, Roger Pau Monne wrote:
>> There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly
>> by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is
>> already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used
On 02/15/2018 06:50 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 09.02.18 at 12:01, wrote:
>> @@ -563,13 +563,19 @@ void svm_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int
>> cr)
>> case 3:
>> vmcb_set_cr3(vmcb, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[3]);
>> if (
flight 119295 xen-unstable-smoke real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119295/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 13 migrate-support-checkfail never pass
test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm
On 15/02/18 16:25, Roger Pau Monne wrote:
> There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly
> by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is
> already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used when
> running in non-root mode, but taking an
On 14/02/18 19:26, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> this small series introduces a per socket refcount to increase the
> efficiency on socket release operations, and makes releasing passive
> sockets safe.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Stefano
>
>
> Changes in v3:
> - remove pointless initializers
>
>>> On 15.02.18 at 17:59, wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 03:05:03AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> >>> On 14.02.18 at 11:30, wrote:
>> > Tables related to devices in use by Xen (or not available to Dom0)
>> >
>> > HPET, DMAR, IVRS, WAET, CSRT, BOOT,
On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 03:05:03AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>> On 14.02.18 at 11:30, wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > After the comments on the ACPI whitelisting patch for PVH Dom0 I've
> > decided to post the list of ACPI tables that I've used to create the
> > current
On 15/02/18 16:03, Jan Beulich wrote:
> The stub is within reach from the .text section, so there's no point
> using an indirect call here. This has the added benefit of there no
> longer being two sufficiently different approaches, breaking one of
> which people may not even notice.
>
>
>>> On 09.02.18 at 12:01, wrote:
> @@ -563,13 +563,19 @@ void svm_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int
> cr)
> case 3:
> vmcb_set_cr3(vmcb, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[3]);
> if ( !nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain) )
> -
There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly
by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is
already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used when
running in non-root mode, but taking an expensive vmexit in order to
do so.
xenalyze
flight 119195 linux-arm-xen real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119195/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt 14 saverestore-support-checkfail like 116992
test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 14
The stub is within reach from the .text section, so there's no point
using an indirect call here. This has the added benefit of there no
longer being two sufficiently different approaches, breaking one of
which people may not even notice.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
---
Hello,
I tried to debug the issue and this what I found:
the HVM boot takes some time at the following section
(qemu/pc-bios/optionrom/linuxboot.S)
/* Load kernel and initrd */
read_fw_blob_addr32_edi(FW_CFG_INITRD) (ramdisk about 3M takes ~~7.s)
read_fw_blob_addr32(FW_CFG_KERNEL) (vmlinuz about
On 15/02/18 13:10, Wei Liu wrote:
> I wrote these patches sometime ago to explore PCID and INVPCID. I haven't
> thought through whether how to use both in Xen yet. But seeing Juergen laid
> out
> his thought on PCID and INVPCID I think some of the patches can be useful.
>
> I had done some
Xen does not properly support big.LITTLE platform. All vCPUs of a guest
will always have the MIDR of the boot CPU (see arch_domain_create).
At best the guest may see unreliable performance (vCPU switching between
big and LITTLE), at worst the guest will become unreliable or insecure.
This is
Julien,
On 15.02.18 17:02, Julien Grall wrote:
Add the detection and runtime code for ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
Reviewed-by: Volodymyr Babchuk
---
Changes in v3:
- Add the missing call to smc
Hi Julien,
On 15.02.18 17:02, Julien Grall wrote:
The new SMC Calling Convention (v1.1) allows for a reduced overhead when
calling into the firmware, and provides a new feature discovery
mechanism. See "Firmware interfaces for mitigating CVE-2017-5715"
ARM DEN 00070A.
Signed-off-by: Julien
Hi Jan,
On 15/02/18 09:03, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 14.02.18 at 15:17, wrote:
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -1000,6 +1000,16 @@ supported only when compiled with XSM on x86.
Control Xens use of the APEI Hardware
One of the major improvement of SMCCC v1.1 is that it only clobbers the
first 4 registers, both on 32 and 64bit. This means that it becomes very
easy to provide an inline version of the SMC call primitive, and avoid
performing a function call to stash the registers that woudl otherwise
be
Xen is printing the same way the PSCI version for 0.1, 0.2 and later.
The only different is the former is hardcoded.
Furthermore PSCI is now used for other things than SMP bring up. So only
print the PSCI version in psci_init.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
Reviewed-by:
SMCCC 1.1 offers firmware-based CPU workarounds. In particular,
SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 provides BP hardening for variant 2 of XSA-254
(CVE-2017-5715).
If the hypervisor has some mitigation for this issue, report that we
deal with it using SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, as we apply the hypervisor
The function SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 will be called by the guest for
hardening the branch predictor. So we want the handling to be as fast as
possible.
As the mitigation is applied on every guest exit, we can check for the
call before saving all the context and return very early.
For now, only
32-bit domain is able to select the instruction (ARM vs Thumb) to use
when boot a new vCPU via CPU_ON. This is indicated via bit[0] of the
entry point address (see "T32 support" in PSCI v1.1 DEN0022D). bit[0]
must be cleared when setting the PC.
At the moment, Xen is setting the CPSR.T but never
This will make easier to know whether BP hardening has been enabled for
a CPU and which method is used.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
Reviewed-by: Volodymyr Babcuk
---
Changes in v3:
- Add Volodymyr's reviewed-by
Changes in v2:
Currently, the behavior of do_common_cpu will slightly change depending
on the PSCI version passed in parameter. Looking at the code, more the
specific 0.2 behavior could move out of the function or adapted for 0.1:
- x0/r0 can be updated on PSCI 0.1 because general purpose registers
are
Now that we've standardised on SMCCC v1.1 to perform the branch
prediction invalidation, let's drop the previous band-aid. If vendors
haven't updated their firmware to do SMCCC 1.1, they haven't updated
PSCI either, so we don't loose anything.
This is aligned with the Linux commit 3a0a397ff5ff.
Add the detection and runtime code for ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
---
Changes in v3:
- Add the missing call to smc #0.
Changes in v2:
- Patch added
---
xen/arch/arm/arm64/bpi.S| 13 +
A bunch of PSCI functions are not prefixed with static despite no one is
using them outside the file and the prototype is not available in
psci.h.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
Reviewed-by: Volodymyr Babchuk
---
Changes in v2:
-
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
Reviewed-by: Volodymyr Babchuk
---
Changes in v2:
- Add Volodymyr's reviewed-by
---
xen/include/asm-arm/smccc.h | 16 ++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git
The new SMC Calling Convention (v1.1) allows for a reduced overhead when
calling into the firmware, and provides a new feature discovery
mechanism. See "Firmware interfaces for mitigating CVE-2017-5715"
ARM DEN 00070A.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
---
Changes in v3:
PSCI 1.0 added the error return PSCI_INVALID_ADDRESS. It is used to
indicate the entry point address is known to be invalid.
In Xen case, this error could be returned when a 64-bit vCPU is using a
Thumb entry address.
For PSCI 0.1 implementation, return PSCI_INVALID_PARAMETERS instead.
PSCI 1.0 and later allows the SMCCC version to be (indirectly) probed
via PSCI_FEATURES. If the PSCI_FEATURES does not exist (PSCI 0.2 or
earlier) and the function return an error, then we considered SMCCC 1.0
is implemented.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
---
Changes in
From the specification, the PSCI call MIGRATE_INFO_TYPE will return an
int32_t. Update the function return type to match it.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall
Cc: mirela.simono...@aggios.com
---
Changes in v3:
- Patch added
---
xen/arch/arm/vpsci.c | 2 +-
1 file
flight 119270 xen-unstable-smoke real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119270/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-libvirt 13 migrate-support-checkfail never pass
test-arm64-arm64-xl-xsm
flight 119227 xen-4.6-testing real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119227/
Failures :-/ but no regressions.
Tests which are failing intermittently (not blocking):
test-xtf-amd64-amd64-2 49 xtf/test-hvm64-lbr-tsx-vmentry fail in 119187 pass
in 119227
On 15/02/18 13:05, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 02/15/2018 02:36 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> One thing I note however is that patch 2 and 3 both turn on intercepts
>> and have no way of turning them back off. This appears to be consistent
>> with the Intel side of things, but it is suboptimal for
Hi Philippe,
On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 09:23:52AM -0300, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
>
> Can I add your R-b tag once fixed? Respin will be:
>
> +xenstore_write_int(dom, "memory/target", ram_size / K_BYTE);
> +xenstore_write_int(vm, "memory", ram_size / M_BYTE);
> +
>>> On 15.02.18 at 13:35, wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 05:34:26AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> >>> On 15.02.18 at 13:10, wrote:
>> > Provide the functions needed for different modes.
>>
>> Do we really need all of these? Let's not have dead code sit
On 02/15/2018 05:22 AM, Alexandru Isaila wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> This series provides a skeleton for enabling vm_events on SVM. For the
> first step, the MSR, CR, Breakpoint and GuestRequest have been tested
> and added to the capabilities list.
>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky
On 02/15/2018 02:36 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> One thing I note however is that patch 2 and 3 both turn on intercepts
> and have no way of turning them back off. This appears to be consistent
> with the Intel side of things, but it is suboptimal for the guest when
> an introspection agent
For mitigation of Meltdown the current L4 page table is copied to the
cpu local root page table each time a 64 bit pv guest is entered.
Copying can be avoided in cases where the guest L4 page table hasn't
been modified while running the hypervisor, e.g. when handling
interrupts or any hypercall
On 15/02/18 10:22, Alexandru Isaila wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> This series provides a skeleton for enabling vm_events on SVM. For the
> first step, the MSR, CR, Breakpoint and GuestRequest have been tested
> and added to the capabilities list.
Ok - this series is looking much clearer now. Thanks.
On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 05:34:26AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >>> On 15.02.18 at 13:10, wrote:
> > Provide the functions needed for different modes.
>
> Do we really need all of these? Let's not have dead code sit around
> and risk it becoming stale.
>
They will be needed
>>> On 15.02.18 at 13:10, wrote:
> Provide the functions needed for different modes.
Do we really need all of these? Let's not have dead code sit around
and risk it becoming stale.
Jan
___
Xen-devel mailing list
>>> On 15.02.18 at 13:10, wrote:
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
> @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
> #define cpu_has_avx2boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2)
> #define cpu_has_smepboot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)
>
On 15/02/18 12:24, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 12:15:56PM +, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 15/02/18 12:10, Wei Liu wrote:
>>> Provide the functions needed for different modes.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Wei Liu
>>> ---
>>> xen/include/asm-x86/invpcid.h | 61
>>>
On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 12:15:56PM +, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 15/02/18 12:10, Wei Liu wrote:
> > Provide the functions needed for different modes.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Wei Liu
> > ---
> > xen/include/asm-x86/invpcid.h | 61
> >
On 02/15/2018 08:00 AM, Alan Robinson wrote:
> Hi Philippe,
>
> On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 01:29:00AM -0300, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
>> From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
>> Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 30/30] xen: use the BYTE-based definitions
>> List-Id: Xen developer discussion
On 15/02/18 12:10, Wei Liu wrote:
> Provide the functions needed for different modes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wei Liu
> ---
> xen/include/asm-x86/invpcid.h | 61
> +++
> 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu
---
xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c | 22 ++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c
index 8a7a76b8ff..e4ea4f3297 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c
+++
I wrote these patches sometime ago to explore PCID and INVPCID. I haven't
thought through whether how to use both in Xen yet. But seeing Juergen laid out
his thought on PCID and INVPCID I think some of the patches can be useful.
I had done some benchmark on the speed in one of my older branch by
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu
---
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 7 +++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index ac530ece2c..89e42865a4 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -1701,6 +1701,13 @@ void __init
Provide the functions needed for different modes.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu
---
xen/include/asm-x86/invpcid.h | 61 +++
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-x86/invpcid.h
diff --git
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu
---
xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
index 55b696ed07..db8072279d 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
+++
branch xen-unstable
xenbranch xen-unstable
job test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win10-i386
testid xen-boot
Tree: linux git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git
Tree: linuxfirmware git://xenbits.xen.org/osstest/linux-firmware.git
Tree: qemu
Hi Juergen,
Sorry for huge delay. It looks that I am recovering slowly and
probably I will have more time for reviews.
On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 02:46:42PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> This patch series adds support for booting Linux as PVH guest.
>
> Similar to i386/xen and x86_64/xen platforms
On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 02:46:50PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Support platform i386/xenpvh in configure.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper
Daniel
___
Xen-devel mailing list
On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 02:46:49PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Add xenpvh support to grub-install.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper
Daniel
___
Xen-devel mailing list
On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 02:46:48PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Suppor mkimage for xenpvh.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross
> ---
> include/grub/util/mkimage.h | 3 ++-
> util/grub-mkimage32.c | 1 +
> util/grub-mkimage64.c | 1 +
> util/grub-mkimagexx.c |
On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 02:46:47PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Add the modifications to the build system needed to build a xenpvh
> grub.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper
Daniel
On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 02:46:46PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Add all the grub-core code needed for Xen PVH guest support. This
> includes:
>
> - The new PVH entry point of grub
> - PVH specific initialization code
> - machine specific header files
> - modifications in Xen specific code to work
On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 02:46:45PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Initialize the grant tab in a dedicated function. This will enable
> using it for PVH guests, too.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross
> ---
> grub-core/kern/xen/init.c | 35 +--
> 1
On 14/02/18 19:14, Mirela Simonovic wrote:
Hi Julien,
Hi,
On 02/13/2018 12:44 AM, Julien Grall wrote:
On 12/02/2018 23:16, Mirela Simonovic wrote:
Hi Julien,
Hi,
On 02/12/2018 10:41 PM, Julien Grall wrote:
On 12/02/2018 20:12, Mirela Simonovic wrote:
Hi Julien,
Hi Mirela,
From: Andrii Anisov
Introduce per-vcpu scheduler operations permission verification.
As long as Xvcpuinfo are in fact scheduler configuration manipulations
there is no need to introduce specific access vectors.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Anisov
---
On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 04:19:27PM -0800, ls00...@yahoo.com wrote:
> Hi all:
> I am using arm64 ( hikey) to test for xen.
> After struggling for two week, I was able to build and install everything
> on the target, xen and dom0 kernel boots up ok.
> However, when I try to use “xl
This commit implements the breakpoint events for svm.
At the moment, the Breakpoint vmexit is not forwarded to the monitor
layer.
This patch adds the hvm_monitor_debug call to the VMEXIT_EXCEPTION_BP.
Also, the Software Breakpoint cap is moved from the Intel arch to the
common part of the code.
At this moment there is no function to enable msr interception on svm.
This patch implements this function and moves the mov to msr monitor
event
form the Intel arch side to the common capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Isaila
Acked-by: Tamas K Lengyel
The CR_INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE intercept is out of the vmcb->_cr_intercepts
so the AMD arch can't intercept CR events.
This patch implements the CR intercept by adding the flag on a
write_ctrlreg event. The monitor write ctrlreg event is moved from the
Intel side to the common capabilities side.
We
Hi all,
This series provides a skeleton for enabling vm_events on SVM. For the
first step, the MSR, CR, Breakpoint and GuestRequest have been tested
and added to the capabilities list.
Cheers,
Alexandru Isaila
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>>> On 14.02.18 at 17:23, wrote:
> The current XPTI implementation isolates the directmap (and therefore a lot
> of
> guest data), but a large quantity of CPU0's state (including its stack)
> remains visible.
>
> Furthermore, an attacker able to read .text is in a
>>> On 14.02.18 at 11:30, wrote:
> Hello,
>
> After the comments on the ACPI whitelisting patch for PVH Dom0 I've
> decided to post the list of ACPI tables that I've used to create the
> current whitelist, together with other tables that I've not yet added.
>
> Allowed
On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 01:28:52AM -0300, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
> It ease code review, unit is explicit.
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann
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>>> On 14.02.18 at 18:02, wrote:
> 2018-02-14 16:37 GMT+08:00 Jan Beulich :
> On 14.02.18 at 08:15, wrote:
>>> 2018-02-13 23:26 GMT+08:00 Jan Beulich :
>>> On 13.02.18 at 16:15,
flight 119206 seabios real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/119206/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ws16-amd64 17 guest-stop fail REGR. vs. 115539
Tests which did not
On Mi, 2018-02-14 at 19:11 +, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 14/02/18 18:22, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> >
> > On 14/02/18 16:10, Alexandru Stefan ISAILA wrote:
> > >
> > > On Lu, 2018-02-12 at 15:54 +, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 12/02/18 15:08, Alexandru Isaila wrote:
> > > > >
> > > >
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