Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 5/6] x86/vvmx: correctly report vvmcs size

On 30/10/2018 08:06, Tian, Kevin wrote: >> From: Sergey Dyasli [mailto:sergey.dya...@citrix.com] >> Sent: Friday, October 12, 2018 11:28 PM >> >> The size of Xen's virtual vmcs region is 4096 bytes. Correctly report >> it to the guest in case when VMCS shad

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/4] x86/vvmx: Don't handle unknown nested vmexit reasons at L0

On 26/10/2018 10:10, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 26/10/2018 10:05, Sergey Dyasli wrote: >> >> On 25/10/2018 16:39, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> This is very dangerous from a security point of view, because a missing >>> entry >>> will cause L2's action to be

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/4] x86/vvmx: Don't handle unknown nested vmexit reasons at L0

On 25/10/2018 16:39, Andrew Cooper wrote: > This is very dangerous from a security point of view, because a missing entry > will cause L2's action to be interpreted as L1's action. > > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper > --- > CC: Sergey Dyasli > CC: Jan Beulich > CC: Wei

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/4] x86/vvmx: INVVPID instructions should be handled at by L1

user_regs *regs, > case EXIT_REASON_VMXOFF: > case EXIT_REASON_VMXON: > case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT: > +case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID: > case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV: > /* inject to L1 */ > nvcpu->nv_vmexit_pending = 1; Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasli

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/boot: enable NMIs after traps init

nable NMIs during cpu_init() and during __start_xen() for BSP. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- v2: - Added enable_nmis() to __start_xen() for BSP - Added comments as per Andrew's suggestion CC: Jan Beulich CC: Andrew Cooper CC: Wei Liu --- xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: make bootscrub happen in idle-loop

On 12/10/18 14:40, Jan Beulich wrote: On 09.10.18 at 17:21, wrote: >> --- a/xen/common/page_alloc.c >> +++ b/xen/common/page_alloc.c >> @@ -161,8 +161,42 @@ string_param("badpage", opt_badpage); >> /* >> * no-bootscrub -> Free pages are not zeroed during boot. >> */ >> -static bool_t

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 2/6] x86/vvmx: correct vmfail() usage for vmptrld and vmclear

Calling vmfail_valid() is correct only if vvmcx is valid. Modify functions to use vmfail() instead which performs the necessary check. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 6/6] x86/vvmx: fix I/O and MSR bitmaps mapping

only: 1. During the first nested vmentry 2. After L1 has changed an appropriate vmcs field 3. After nvmx_purge_vvmcs() was previously called Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 104 +++- 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 37

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 4/6] x86/vvmx: add VMX_INSN_VMCLEAR_WITH_VMXON_PTR errno

And make nvmx_handle_vmclear() return the new errno in case the provided address is the same as vmxon region address. While at it, correct the return value for not-4KB-aligned case and for invalid physaddr. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c| 23

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 0/6] x86/vvmx: various fixes

These were found by running nested VMX tests from kvm-unit-tests. Sergey Dyasli (6): x86/vvmx: introduce vvmcx_valid() x86/vvmx: correct vmfail() usage for vmptrld and vmclear x86/vvmx: add VMX_INSN_VMPTRLD_WITH_VMXON_PTR errno x86/vvmx: add VMX_INSN_VMCLEAR_WITH_VMXON_PTR errno x86

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 5/6] x86/vvmx: correctly report vvmcs size

The size of Xen's virtual vmcs region is 4096 bytes. Correctly report it to the guest in case when VMCS shadowing is not available instead of providing H/W value (which is usually smaller). Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 8 1 file changed, 8 insertions

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 3/6] x86/vvmx: add VMX_INSN_VMPTRLD_WITH_VMXON_PTR errno

And make nvmx_handle_vmptrld() return the new errno in case the provided address is the same as vmxon region address. While at it, correct the return value for not-4KB-aligned case. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c| 10 -- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 1/6] x86/vvmx: introduce vvmcx_valid()

As a convenient helper function and refactor the code to use it. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 17 - xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/nestedhvm.h | 5 + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: make bootscrub happen in idle-loop

scrubbing during allocation (unless MEMF_no_scrub was provided). Use the new 'idle' option as the default one. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- v1 --> v2: - dropped comment about performance - changed default to 'idle' - changed type of opt_bootscrub to enum - restored __initdata for opt_bootsc

[Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm/page_alloc: add bootscrub=idle cmdline option

that the allocator will return scrubbed pages by doing eager scrubbing during allocation (unless MEMF_no_scrub was provided). Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- CC: Andrew Cooper CC: Boris Ostrovsky CC: George Dunlap CC: Jan Beulich CC: Julien Grall CC: Tim Deegan --- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm/page_alloc: always scrub pages given to the allocator

On 01/10/18 12:13, Jan Beulich wrote: On 01.10.18 at 11:58, wrote: >> Having the allocator return unscrubbed pages is a potential security >> concern: some domain can be given pages with memory contents of another >> domain. This may happen, for example, if a domain voluntarily releases >>

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm/page_alloc: always scrub pages given to the allocator

On Mon, 2018-10-01 at 14:54 +0100, George Dunlap wrote: > On 10/01/2018 02:44 PM, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > On Mon, 2018-10-01 at 07:38 -0600, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > > > On 01.10.18 at 15:12, wrote: > > > > > > > > On 01/10/18 12:13, Jan

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm/page_alloc: always scrub pages given to the allocator

On Mon, 2018-10-01 at 07:38 -0600, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > On 01.10.18 at 15:12, wrote: > > > > On 01/10/18 12:13, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > > > On 01.10.18 at 11:58, wrote: > > > > > > > > Having the allocator return unscrubbed pages is a potential security > > > > concern: some domain

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm/page_alloc: always scrub pages given to the allocator

On Mon, 2018-10-01 at 07:38 -0600, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > On 01.10.18 at 15:12, wrote: > > > > On 01/10/18 12:13, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > > > On 01.10.18 at 11:58, wrote: > > > > > > > > Having the allocator return unscrubbed pages is a potential security > > > > concern: some domain

[Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm/page_alloc: always scrub pages given to the allocator

to return scrubbed pages to a caller unless MEMF_no_scrub flag was provided. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- CC: Andrew Cooper CC: Boris Ostrovsky CC: George Dunlap CC: Jan Beulich CC: Julien Grall CC: Tim Deegan --- docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 3 ++- xen/common/page_alloc.c

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 3/3] x86: Clean up the Xen MSR infrastructure

On Wed, 2018-09-12 at 11:23 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 12/09/18 10:46, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > On Wed, 2018-09-12 at 10:12 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > > On 12/09/18 09:29, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > > > On Tue, 2018-09-11 at 19:56 +0100, Andrew Coope

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/msr: Dispatch Xen and Viridian MSRs from guest_{wr, rd}msr()

eviewed-by: Kevin Tian > Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant > --- > CC: Jan Beulich > CC: Wei Liu > CC: Roger Pau Monné > CC: Sergey Dyasli > > v3: > * Split out of previous series. Retain appropriate R-by's > v4: > * Retain switch() for interpretin

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 3/3] x86: Clean up the Xen MSR infrastructure

On Wed, 2018-09-12 at 10:12 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 12/09/18 09:29, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > On Tue, 2018-09-11 at 19:56 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > > Rename them to guest_{rd,wr}msr_xen() for consistency, and because the > > > _regs > >

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 3/3] x86: Clean up the Xen MSR infrastructure

86EMUL_* return values. > > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper > --- > CC: Jan Beulich > CC: Wei Liu > CC: Roger Pau Monné > CC: Sergey Dyasli > > v3: > * Clean up after splitting the series. > --- > xen/arch/x86/msr.c

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/viridan: Clean up Viridian MSR infrastructure

ed-off-by: Andrew Cooper > Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant > --- > CC: Jan Beulich > CC: Wei Liu > CC: Roger Pau Monné > CC: Sergey Dyasli > > v3: > * Clean up after splitting the series. Retain appropriate R-by's > --- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c

Re: [Xen-devel] x86 Community Call - Wed Aug 15, 14:00 - 15:00 UTC - Agenda items

On Mon, 2018-08-13 at 02:54 -0600, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > On 13.08.18 at 09:46, wrote: > > > > proposed topics so far: > > * 4.10+ changes to Xen's memory scrubbing: discussion of the changes > > that made to it in recent versions of Xen (4.10+) - Christopher > > * Project

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm/page_alloc: correct first_dirty calculations during block merging

he block is scrubbed. > > > > > > Add the missing piece of logic and slightly update the comment for > > > the predecessor case to better capture the code's intent. > > > > > > Fixes 1a37f33ea613 ("mm: Place unscrubbed pages at the end of pagelist") &

[Xen-devel] [PATCH] mm/page_alloc: correct first_dirty calculations during block merging

tent. Fixes 1a37f33ea613 ("mm: Place unscrubbed pages at the end of pagelist") Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli --- CC: Andrew Cooper CC: George Dunlap CC: Jan Beulich CC: Julien Grall CC: Wei Liu CC: Boris Ostrovsky --- xen/common/page_alloc.c | 8 +++- 1 file changed, 7 in

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 10/13] x86/domctl: Implement XEN_DOMCTL_get_cpumsr_policy

On Tue, 2018-07-03 at 21:55 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > From: Sergey Dyasli > > This finally (after literally years of work!) marks the point where the > toolstack can ask the hypervisor for the current CPUID configuration of a > specific domain. > > Also extend xen-

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/3] x86/msr: Use the architectural layout for MSR_{MISC_ENABLES, PLATFORM_INFO}

ield to move > the cpuid_faulting field to its appropriate position. > > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper > --- > Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasli -- Thanks, Sergey ___ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/3] x86/msr: Drop {MISC_ENABLES, PLATFORM_INFO}.available

> /* 0x0140 MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES */ > struct { > -bool available; /* This MSR is non-architectural */ > bool cpuid_faulting; > } misc_features_enables; > }; Could you add comments saying that those 2 MSRs are always available for all gu

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 for 4.7] x86/cpuid: fix raw FEATURESET_7d0 reporting

Commit 62b1879693e0 ("x86: further CPUID handling adjustments") added FEATURESET_7d0 reporting but forgot to update calculate_raw_featureset() function. As result, the value reported by xen-cpuid contains 0. Fix that by properly filling raw_featureset[FEATURESET_7d0]. Signed-off-

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v9 3/9] xen/x86: support per-domain flag for xpti

boot "xpti=dom0=0" > parameter will achieve that. > > Move the xpti boot parameter handling to xen/arch/x86/pv/domain.c as > it is pv-domain specific. > > Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com> > Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> >

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v8 3/9] xen/x86: support per-domain flag for xpti

Hi Juergen, 2 small requests from me below. On Wed, 2018-04-18 at 10:30 +0200, Juergen Gross wrote: > Instead of switching XPTI globally on or off add a per-domain flag for > that purpose. This allows to modify the xpti boot parameter to support > running dom0 without Meltdown mitigations. Using

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 5/5] x86/msr: handle VMX MSRs with guest_rd/wrmsr()

-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> --- v5 --> v6: - Moved VMX MSRs case to the read-only block in guest_wrmsr() - Added Reviewed-by --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 -- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 2/5] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into HVM_max domain policy

by guest_rd/wrmsr(). Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> --- v5 --> v6: - Replaced !cpu_has_vmx check with !hvm_max_cpuid_policy.basic.vmx - Added a TODO reminder - Added brackets around bit or expressions --- xen/arch/x86/ms

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 1/5] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs definitions and populate Raw domain policy

ue_ctls blocks. Add calculate_raw_vmx_policy() which fills Raw policy with H/W values of VMX MSRs. Host policy will contain a copy of these values (for now). Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> --- v5 --> v6: - Removed "_bits" and "_based" from union names - Removed &qu

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 4/5] x86/msr: update domain policy on CPUID policy changes

changes availability of VMX MSRs based on domain's nested virt settings. If it's enabled, then the domain receives a copy of HVM_max vmx policy with allowed CR4 bits adjusted by CPUID policy. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@c

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 3/5] x86/cpuid: update signature of hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits()

With the new cpuid infrastructure there is a domain-wide struct cpuid policy and there is no need to pass a separate struct vcpu * into hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits() anymore. Make the function accept struct domain * instead and update callers. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 0/5] VMX MSRs policy for Nested Virt: part 1

3,4 and 5 - Other changes are provided on per-patch basis Sergey Dyasli (5): x86/msr: add VMX MSRs definitions and populate Raw domain policy x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into HVM_max domain policy x86/cpuid: update signature of hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits() x86/msr: update domain policy on CPUID pol

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 2/5] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into HVM_max domain policy

On Wed, 2018-03-21 at 20:46 +, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 28/02/2018 16:09, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > + > > +dp->vmx.pinbased_ctls.allowed_0.raw = VMX_PINBASED_CTLS_DEFAULT1; > > +dp->vmx.pinbased_ctls.allowed_1.raw = VMX_PINBASED_CTLS_D

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 1/5] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs definitions and populate Raw domain policy

On Wed, 2018-03-21 at 19:52 +, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 28/02/18 16:09, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > > > +struct { > > +/* 0x0480 MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC */ > > +union { > > +uint64_t

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] pv_console: remove unnecessary #ifdefs

. Remove them. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> --- Compile tested with aarch64 compiler. --- xen/drivers/char/console.c | 12 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/console.c b/xen/drivers/char/console.c index 1210

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] vvmx: fixes after CR4 trapping optimizations

a <jun.nakaj...@intel.com> > Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.t...@intel.com> > Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> > Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> > Cc: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> > --- > I've manually tested and AFAICT this fixes the os

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] vvmx: fixes after CR4 trapping optimizations

On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 16:19 +, Roger Pau Monne wrote: > Commit 406817 doesn't update nested VMX code in order to take into > account L1 CR4 host mask when nested guest (L2) writes to CR4, and > thus the mask written to CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK is likely not as > restrictive as it should be. > >

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 1/5] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs definitions and populate Raw domain policy

ue_ctls blocks. Add calculate_raw_vmx_policy() which fills Raw policy with H/W values of VMX MSRs. Host policy will contain a copy of these values (for now). Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> --- v4 --> v5: - Clarified the reason for splitting MSRs into 5 blocks - Added raw field into

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 5/5] x86/msr: handle VMX MSRs with guest_rd/wrmsr()

-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> --- v4 --> v5: - New msr availability helpers are used --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 -- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c| 178 - xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 35 xen/in

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 3/5] x86/cpuid: update signature of hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits()

With the new cpuid infrastructure there is a domain-wide struct cpuid policy and there is no need to pass a separate struct vcpu * into hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits() anymore. Make the function accept struct domain * instead and update callers. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 4/5] x86/msr: update domain policy on CPUID policy changes

() which changes availability of VMX MSRs based on domain's nested virt settings. If it's enabled, then the domain receives a copy of HVM_max vmx policy with allowed CR4 bits adjusted by CPUID policy. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> --- v4 --> v5: - Removed _do

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 2/5] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into HVM_max domain policy

by guest_rd/wrmsr(). Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> --- v4 --> v5: - Macros are removed and now supported bitmask is used to derive policy - Added vmx_clear_policy() helper --- xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 134 + 1 file cha

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 0/5] VMX MSRs policy for Nested Virt: part 1

separately - Combined the next 2 patches into 1 Sergey Dyasli (5): x86/msr: add VMX MSRs definitions and populate Raw domain policy x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into HVM_max domain policy x86/cpuid: update signature of hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits() x86/msr: update domain policy on CPUID policy chan

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] x86/msr: add Raw and Host domain policies

on X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULTING. Finally, derive HVM/PV max domain policies from the Host policy. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> --- v2: - Moved *dp into a narrower scope in probe_cpuid_faulting() - Changes to how Host/pv/hvm domain policies are calculated --- xen/arch/x

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] x86/msr: add Raw and Host domain policies

On Fri, 2018-02-16 at 11:38 +, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 16/02/18 11:31, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > On Fri, 2018-02-16 at 04:06 -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > > > On 16.02.18 at 11:33, <sergey.dya...@citrix.com> wrote: > > > > > > >

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] x86/msr: add Raw and Host domain policies

On Fri, 2018-02-16 at 04:06 -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > On 16.02.18 at 11:33, wrote: > > > > On Thu, 2018-02-15 at 06:33 -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > > > On 08.02.18 at 11:23, wrote: > > > > > > > > uint64_t val; > > > > +

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] x86/msr: add Raw and Host domain policies

On Thu, 2018-02-15 at 06:33 -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > On 08.02.18 at 11:23, wrote: > > > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c > > @@ -118,9 +118,18 @@ void (* __read_mostly ctxt_switch_masking)(const > > struct vcpu *next); > >

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] x86/msr: add Raw and Host domain policies

On Thu, 2018-02-08 at 11:21 +, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Thu, Feb 08, 2018 at 10:23:21AM +0000, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > +static void __init calculate_host_policy(void) > > +{ > > +struct msr_domain_policy *dp = _msr_domain_policy; > > + > >

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v1] x86/msr: add Raw and Host domain policies

Raw policy contains the actual values from H/W MSRs. Add PLATFORM_INFO msr to the policy during probe_cpuid_faulting(). Host policy might have certain features disabled if Xen decides not to use them. For now, make Host policy equal to Raw policy. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC v1 57/74] x86/pv-shim: shadow PV console's page for L2 DomU

On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 09:28 -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > On 09.01.18 at 16:43, wrote: > > > > On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 02:13 -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > > > On 04.01.18 at 14:06, wrote: > > > > > > > > +size_t consoled_guest_rx(void) > > >

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC v1 57/74] x86/pv-shim: shadow PV console's page for L2 DomU

On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 02:13 -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: > > > > On 04.01.18 at 14:06, wrote: > > +size_t consoled_guest_rx(void) > > +{ > > +size_t recv = 0, idx = 0; > > +XENCONS_RING_IDX cons, prod; > > + > > +if ( !cons_ring ) > > +return 0; > > + > > +

<    1   2   3