On 14.09.2023 21:49, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 14/09/2023 11:01 am, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 13.09.2023 22:27, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> There is a corner case where e.g. an NMI hitting an exit-to-guest path after
>>> SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_* would have run the entire NMI handler *after* the VERW
>>> flu
On 14/09/2023 11:01 am, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 13.09.2023 22:27, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> There is a corner case where e.g. an NMI hitting an exit-to-guest path after
>> SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_* would have run the entire NMI handler *after* the VERW
>> flush to scrub potentially sensitive data from uarc
On 13.09.2023 22:27, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> There is a corner case where e.g. an NMI hitting an exit-to-guest path after
> SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_* would have run the entire NMI handler *after* the VERW
> flush to scrub potentially sensitive data from uarch buffers.
>
> In order to compensate, issue VE
There is a corner case where e.g. an NMI hitting an exit-to-guest path after
SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_* would have run the entire NMI handler *after* the VERW
flush to scrub potentially sensitive data from uarch buffers.
In order to compensate, issue VERW when exiting to Xen from an IST entry.
SPEC_CTRL
