Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 07/11] nospec: enable lfence on Intel

2019-01-27 Thread Norbert Manthey
On 1/24/19 23:29, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 23/01/2019 11:57, Norbert Manthey wrote: >> While the lfence instruction was added for all x86 platform in the >> beginning, it's useful to not block platforms that are not affected >> by the L1TF vulnerability. Therefore, the lfence instruction should

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 07/11] nospec: enable lfence on Intel

2019-01-24 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 23/01/2019 11:57, Norbert Manthey wrote: > While the lfence instruction was added for all x86 platform in the > beginning, it's useful to not block platforms that are not affected > by the L1TF vulnerability. Therefore, the lfence instruction should > only be introduced, in case the current CPU

[Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v4 07/11] nospec: enable lfence on Intel

2019-01-23 Thread Norbert Manthey
While the lfence instruction was added for all x86 platform in the beginning, it's useful to not block platforms that are not affected by the L1TF vulnerability. Therefore, the lfence instruction should only be introduced, in case the current CPU is an Intel CPU that is capable of hyper threading.