Dear all,
This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html), namely to avoid
touching memory from the hypervisor speculatively that would not be touched
without speculation. To block speculative execution on Intel
Hi,
Please don't send the next version in reply-to a random e-mail from the previous
version. Instead you should create a new thread to make things easier for review.
Cheers,
--
Julien Grall
___
Xen-devel mailing list
Dear all,
This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative
Dear all,
This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative
On 1/24/19 22:05, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 23/01/2019 11:51, Norbert Manthey wrote:
>> Dear all,
>>
>> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
>> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
>> execution on Intel hardware, an
On 28/01/2019 10:56, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 28.01.19 at 09:47, wrote:
>> On 28/01/2019 09:28, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 23.01.19 at 12:51, wrote:
This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in
the
XSA-289
>>> On 28.01.19 at 09:47, wrote:
> On 28/01/2019 09:28, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 23.01.19 at 12:51, wrote:
>>> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in
>>> the
>>> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block
>>> speculative
>>>
On 28/01/2019 09:28, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Jürgen,
>
On 23.01.19 at 12:51, wrote:
>> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
>> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
>> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence
Jürgen,
>>> On 23.01.19 at 12:51, wrote:
> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
> that selected
On 23/01/2019 11:51, Norbert Manthey wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
> XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
> execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
>
Dear all,
This patch series attempts to mitigate the issue that have been raised in the
XSA-289 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html). To block speculative
execution on Intel hardware, an lfence instruction is required to make sure
that selected checks are not bypassed. Speculative
11 matches
Mail list logo
