RE: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2023-08-23 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Andrew Cooper > Sent: Thursday, April 6, 2023 5:53 AM > > At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator was genuinely broken. > It > would load arbitrary values into %rip and putting a check here probably was > the best stopgap security fix. It should have been reverted following

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2023-08-23 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 23/08/2023 2:31 pm, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Wed, Aug 23, 2023 at 12:56:48PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 23/08/2023 12:15 pm, Roger Pau Monné wrote: >>> On Wed, Apr 05, 2023 at 10:52:45PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator was

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2023-08-23 Thread Roger Pau Monné
On Wed, Aug 23, 2023 at 12:56:48PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 23/08/2023 12:15 pm, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Wed, Apr 05, 2023 at 10:52:45PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >> At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator was genuinely broken. > >> It > >> would load arbitrary

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2023-08-23 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 23/08/2023 12:15 pm, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Wed, Apr 05, 2023 at 10:52:45PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator was genuinely broken. >> It >> would load arbitrary values into %rip and putting a check here probably was >> the best stopgap

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2023-08-23 Thread Roger Pau Monné
On Wed, Apr 05, 2023 at 10:52:45PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator was genuinely broken. It > would load arbitrary values into %rip and putting a check here probably was > the best stopgap security fix. It should have been reverted following c/s

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2023-04-06 Thread Jan Beulich
On 05.04.2023 23:52, Andrew Cooper wrote: > At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator was genuinely broken. It > would load arbitrary values into %rip and putting a check here probably was > the best stopgap security fix. It should have been reverted following c/s > 81d3a0b26c1

RE: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2020-10-23 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Jan Beulich > Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 4:10 PM > > On 19.10.2020 18:12, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > On 19/10/2020 10:09, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On 16.10.2020 17:38, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >>> On 15/10/2020 09:01, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 14.10.2020 15:57, Andrew Cooper wrote: >

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2020-10-20 Thread Jan Beulich
On 19.10.2020 18:12, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 19/10/2020 10:09, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 16.10.2020 17:38, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> On 15/10/2020 09:01, Jan Beulich wrote: On 14.10.2020 15:57, Andrew Cooper wrote: > Running with corrupt state is every bit an XSA as hitting a VMEntry

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2020-10-19 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 19/10/2020 10:09, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 16.10.2020 17:38, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 15/10/2020 09:01, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> On 14.10.2020 15:57, Andrew Cooper wrote: On 13/10/2020 16:58, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 09.10.2020 17:09, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> At the time of XSA-170,

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2020-10-19 Thread Jan Beulich
On 16.10.2020 17:38, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 15/10/2020 09:01, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 14.10.2020 15:57, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> On 13/10/2020 16:58, Jan Beulich wrote: On 09.10.2020 17:09, Andrew Cooper wrote: > At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator really was broken,

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2020-10-16 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 15/10/2020 09:01, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 14.10.2020 15:57, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 13/10/2020 16:58, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> On 09.10.2020 17:09, Andrew Cooper wrote: At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator really was broken, and would allow arbitrary non-canonical

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2020-10-15 Thread Jan Beulich
On 14.10.2020 15:57, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 13/10/2020 16:58, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 09.10.2020 17:09, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator really was broken, and >>> would allow arbitrary non-canonical values to be loaded into %rip. This was >>>

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2020-10-14 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 13/10/2020 16:58, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 09.10.2020 17:09, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator really was broken, and >> would allow arbitrary non-canonical values to be loaded into %rip. This was >> fixed after the embargo by c/s 81d3a0b26c1 "x86emul:

Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"

2020-10-13 Thread Jan Beulich
On 09.10.2020 17:09, Andrew Cooper wrote: > At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator really was broken, and > would allow arbitrary non-canonical values to be loaded into %rip. This was > fixed after the embargo by c/s 81d3a0b26c1 "x86emul: limit-check branch > targets". > > However,