> -Original Message-
> From: Xen-devel [mailto:xen-devel-boun...@lists.xenproject.org] On Behalf
> Of George Dunlap
> Sent: 05 November 2018 18:07
> To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini ; Wei Liu
> ; Konrad Wilk ; Andrew Cooper
> ; Tim (Xen.org) ; George Dunlap
> ; Ross Lagerwall ;
> Julien Grall ; Jan Beulich ;
> Anthony Perard ; Ian Jackson
>
> Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/6] SUPPORT.md: Add qemu-depriv section
>
> Signed-off-by: George Dunlap
> ---
> Changes since v3:
> - Moved from the qemu-depriv doc patches.
> - Reword to include the possibility of having a non-dom0 "devicemodel"
> domain which may want to be protected
> - Specify `Linux dom0` as the currently-tech-supported window
>
> CC: Ian Jackson
> CC: Wei Liu
> CC: Andrew Cooper
> CC: Jan Beulich
> CC: Tim Deegan
> CC: Konrad Wilk
> CC: Stefano Stabellini
> CC: Julien Grall
> CC: Anthony Perard
> CC: Ross Lagerwall
> ---
> SUPPORT.md | 20
> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md
> index 4f203da84a..1f0f5857a7 100644
> --- a/SUPPORT.md
> +++ b/SUPPORT.md
> @@ -525,6 +525,26 @@ Vulnerabilities of a device model stub domain
> to a hostile driver domain (either compromised or untrusted)
> are excluded from security support.
>
> +### Device Model Deprivileging
> +
> +Status, Linux dom0: Tech Preview, with limited support
> +
> +This means adding extra restrictions to a device model in order to
> +prevent a compromised device model from attack the rest of the domain
s/attack/attacking/
Paul
> +it's running in (normally dom0).
> +
> +"Tech preview with limited support" means we will not issue XSAs for
> +the _additional_ functionality provided by the feature; but we will
> +issue XSAs in the event that enabling this feature opens up a security
> +hole that would not be present without the feature disabled.
> +
> +For example, while this is classified as tech preview, a bug in libxl
> +which failed to change the user ID of QEMU would not receive an XSA,
> +since without this feature the user ID wouldn't be changed. But a
> +change which made it possible for a compromised guest to read
> +arbitrary files on the host filesystem without compromising QEMU would
> +be issued an XSA, since that does weaken security.
> +
> ### KCONFIG Expert
>
> Status: Experimental
> --
> 2.19.1
>
>
> ___
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
> https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
___
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
