Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/msr: further correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD

On 17/04/18 13:45, Jan Beulich wrote: On 17.04.18 at 14:30, wrote: >> On 17/04/18 12:41, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> Following commit a6aa678fa3 ("x86/msr: Correct the emulation behaviour >>> of MSR_PRED_CMD") we may end up writing the low bit with the wrong >>> value.

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/msr: further correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD

On 17/04/18 13:41, Jan Beulich wrote: > Following commit a6aa678fa3 ("x86/msr: Correct the emulation behaviour > of MSR_PRED_CMD") we may end up writing the low bit with the wrong > value. While it's unlikely for a guest to want to write zero there, we > should still permit (this without incurring

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/msr: further correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD

>>> On 17.04.18 at 14:30, wrote: > On 17/04/18 12:41, Jan Beulich wrote: >> Following commit a6aa678fa3 ("x86/msr: Correct the emulation behaviour >> of MSR_PRED_CMD") we may end up writing the low bit with the wrong >> value. While it's unlikely for a guest to want to

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/msr: further correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD

On 17/04/18 12:41, Jan Beulich wrote: > Following commit a6aa678fa3 ("x86/msr: Correct the emulation behaviour > of MSR_PRED_CMD") we may end up writing the low bit with the wrong > value. While it's unlikely for a guest to want to write zero there, we > should still permit (this without incurring

[Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/msr: further correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD

Following commit a6aa678fa3 ("x86/msr: Correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD") we may end up writing the low bit with the wrong value. While it's unlikely for a guest to want to write zero there, we should still permit (this without incurring the overhead of an actual barrier).