Re: [Xen-devel] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization

2017-08-16 Thread Christopher Lameter
On Wed, 16 Aug 2017, Ingo Molnar wrote: > And we'd do this for _EVERY_ function call in the kernel. That kind of crap is > totally unacceptable. Ahh finally a limit is in sight as to how much security hardening etc can reduce kernel performance. ___

Re: [Xen-devel] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization

2017-07-19 Thread Christopher Lameter
On Tue, 18 Jul 2017, Thomas Garnier wrote: > Performance/Size impact: > Hackbench (50% and 1600% loads): > - PIE enabled: 7% to 8% on half load, 10% on heavy load. > slab_test (average of 10 runs): > - PIE enabled: 3% to 4% > Kernbench (average of 10 Half and Optimal runs): > - PIE enabled: 5%

Re: [Xen-devel] [kernel-hardening] Re: x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization

2017-08-25 Thread Christopher Lameter
On Thu, 17 Aug 2017, Boris Lukashev wrote: > Is the expectation then to have security functions also decrease size > and operational latency? Seems a bit unrealistic if so. > 1-2% performance hit on systems which have become at least several > hundred % faster over recent years is not a