Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/hvm: Handle x2apic MSRs via the new guest_{rd, wr}msr() infrastructure

2018-09-10 Thread Roger Pau Monné
On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 06:58:35PM +, Andrew Cooper wrote: > Dispatch from the guest_{rd,wr}msr() functions. The read side should be safe > outside of current context, but the write side is definitely not. As the > toolstack has no legitimate reason to access the APIC registers via this > int

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/hvm: Handle x2apic MSRs via the new guest_{rd, wr}msr() infrastructure

2018-03-13 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 07.03.18 at 21:59, wrote: > On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 06:58:35PM +, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> Dispatch from the guest_{rd,wr}msr() functions. The read side should be > safe >> outside of current context, but the write side is definitely not. As the >> toolstack has no legitimate reason t

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/hvm: Handle x2apic MSRs via the new guest_{rd, wr}msr() infrastructure

2018-03-07 Thread Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 06:58:35PM +, Andrew Cooper wrote: > Dispatch from the guest_{rd,wr}msr() functions. The read side should be safe > outside of current context, but the write side is definitely not. As the > toolstack has no legitimate reason to access the APIC registers via this > int

[Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/hvm: Handle x2apic MSRs via the new guest_{rd, wr}msr() infrastructure

2018-03-07 Thread Andrew Cooper
Dispatch from the guest_{rd,wr}msr() functions. The read side should be safe outside of current context, but the write side is definitely not. As the toolstack has no legitimate reason to access the APIC registers via this interface (not least because whether they are accessible at all depends on