On 4/15/13 1:38 PM, Xuelei Fan wrote:
Do you want to file a simple enhancement request (CCC)?
Why CCC? This is all internal.
Yes, it is optional. I think, now it can accept unbound principal in
server side, it is an enhancement. It would be nice to have the
community and SQE know the improvement.
I consider it to be a natural benefit of
http://ccc.us.oracle.com/8001104. The release note will mention SASL,
GSS-API, JAAS, TLS all.
. KerberosClientKeyExchangeImpl.java
------------------------------------
Do you want to check the return value to make sure it is non-null or
empty? Otherwise, it is possible to run into NPE when using the
serverKeys.
188 KerberosKey[] serverKeys = AccessController.doPrivileged(
An IOException will be thrown if the principal is not matched. I think
we need to reserve the behavior.
I see.
Webrev updated
http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~weijun/8005523/webrev.01/
3 changes:
1. Pass AccessControlContext instead of Handshaker (so Handshaker can be
protected again).
2. New IOE when there is no keys for princ in ServiceCreds
3. Enhance findkey in KerberosClientKeyExchangeImpl to include the logic
of 7197159: accept different kvno if there no match.
4. Smaller change in SSL.java the test. Add a case instead of change to all.
Thanks
Max
If the returned serverKeys is empty (it won't be null), line 208 will
return a null and line 213 will throw the IOE. Is that enough?
The exception message will be confusing if the check is done in line 208
and 213. I like to show principal mismatch message when using bound
principals.
Xuelei
Is it possible to add a new test for the unbound krb5 in TLS?
It's already there. Note the "principal=*" in the updated SSL.java test.
Maybe I can provide 2 test cases, one bound, one unbound.
Thanks
Max
Thanks,
Xuelei
On 4/1/2013 9:16 PM, Weijun Wang wrote:
Ping again.
On 3/14/13 4:42 PM, Weijun Wang wrote:
Hi Xuelei
You might know that krb5 now supports unbound acceptor, which means if
you set "principal=*" in an acceptor's JAAS login config file, it can
serve as any service. The acceptor would read initiator's request, find
out what the intended service name is, and then find a key for it from
its keytab file.
Currently TLS's krb5 ciphersuites must know the service principal at
the
beginning, it uses the info to read keys and then wait for incoming
requests. This must be changed if it also want to be "unbound".
I have a primitive patch here
http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~weijun/8005523/webrev.00
You can see it gets a ServiceCreds instead of KerberosKey at the
beginning. This ServiceCreds encapsulates keytabs and JAAS settings,
and
it can be used to find keys for any service name later.
The fix is quite ugly. Especially, I make Handshaker public and pass it
to KerberosClientKeyExchangeImpl so that its context can be used to
check permissions. Is this necessary? I mean, is the context any
different from the one inside KerberosClientKeyExchangeImpl?
Thanks
Max
