Hi Mike, thank you for your comments and feedback. I have a few
comments and questions inline:
On 11/06/2017 05:25 PM, Michael StJohns wrote:
On 11/3/2017 4:59 PM, Jamil Nimeh wrote:
Hello all,
This is a review request for the draft of a new Key Derivation API.
The goal of this API will be to provide a framework for KDF
algorithms like HKDF, TLS-PRF, PBKDF2 and so forth to be publicly
accessible. We also plan to provide an SPI that let 3rd parties
create their own implementations of KDFs in their providers, rather
than trying to force them into KeyGenerators, SecretKeyFactories and
the like.
Rather than stuff this email full of the specification text (since it
is likely to get quite a few iterations of comments and
comments-to-comments), I have placed the API both in simple text form
and as a Javadoc at the following locations:
spec: http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~jnimeh/reviews/kdfspec/kdfspec.01.txt
javadoc: http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~jnimeh/reviews/kdfspec/javadoc.01/
They're both the same content, just use whichever is friendlier for
your eyes.
In addition, I have opened up the JEP as well:
https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8189808
Thanks to those who have contributed to very early internal drafts of
this so far, and thanks in advance to those who will be contributing
comments going forward.
--Jamil
Most of the following suggestions (and please take them as such
regardless of any directive language) represent things I've had to do
manually that I'd really prefer to do in a real key derivation API. A
few are related to how to keep things securely stored in an HSM.
Add a .reset() method to KeyDerivation. Call this to clear the state
of the KDF.
Add an .initialize(List<DerivationParameterSpec>, SecretKey
masterSecret) method. Remove the argument to deriveKey and
deriveKeys. This plays with the stuff to follow, but basically, a KDF
may need all of the per-key derivation input to calculate the total
length of the output key stream as an internal input to the KDF before
ever emitting a single key. Also - how exactly were you planning on
keying the KDF? I guess you could pass that in in the
KeyDerivation.getInstance() call or as part of the algorithmParameter
but.... probably makes more sense to keep the KDF instance key-free to
allow for reuse.
Well, let's get the easy one out of the way. As you suspected I planned
to pass the SecretKey in via AlgorithmParameterSpec. The three classes
unfortunately didn't show that. Maybe on the next iteration I can put
an HkdfParameterSpec in there just as a sample so folks can see that
where the key comes in. The reason I went that way was because the goal
was to provide all algorithm paramters at instantiation time, and the
SecretKey was just another input. I don't know if just making the KDF
key-free would be enough for reuse, at least not for all cases.
Thinking about HKDF and TLS 1.3 for instance, the key is the same for a
collection of keys (like the client and server app traffic master keys
that come from the master secret, for instance) - what changes are the
other inputs to HKDF.
One issue that came up on an early internal rev of the API was that we
didn't want to separate instantiation and initialization, so all the
inputs to the KDF now come in at getInstance time through
AlgorithmParameterSpecs, rather than doing getInstance/init/... like
KeyAgreement does. I wonder if it would be OK to still have an init
(and a reset as you wanted) method so we can provide new inputs
top-to-bottom into the KDF object. All the getInstance forms would stay
more or less the same, so there's no way to make a KDF object without it
being in an initialized state. But when you need new inputs you don't
have to make a new object. I like being able to reuse the object and
reset it to its starting state. I don't know if the folks that brought
up the instance/init issue would have a problem with that. I think
we're still adhering to the spirit of what they wanted to see since
getInstance still gives you a fully initialized object.
That's a bit different than what you're talking about with your
initialize method, I kinda birdwalked a bit. Let me ask a couple
questions: When you proposed initialize(), were you envisioning that
applications would always need to call it before derive*? Or did you
really mean "may" and an implementation would have to go back and
generate more material if they exhausted everything they knew about?
Given your changes to deriveKey(s) it looked more like you intended to
know the total length up-front, since there's no other way to say some
arbitrary next key is of a specific length with no argument to deriveKey[s].
If you did want the total length of all keys/data/objects to be supplied
before derivation, what if we were to supply that to the getInstance
calls? A similar idea was put forth internally, but we decided to hold
off on it and wait for some feedback from the field. So if we were to
go this route then getInstance calls might look like this:
public static KeyDerivation getInstance(String alg,
AlgorithmParameterSpec params, List<DerivationParameterSpec> deriveParams);
public static KeyDerivation getInstance(String alg, String provider,
AlgorithmParameterSpec params, List<DerivationParameterSpec> deriveParams);
public static KeyDerivation getInstance(String alg, Provider provider,
AlgorithmParameterSpec params, List<DerivationParameterSpec> deriveParams);
You end up with a ready-to-use KDF right from the get-go.
If we're going that route though, *and* we try to make it reusable, then
we have to specify both KDF parameters and derivation parameters in an
initialize call. If reusability isn't all that important then we don't
have reset and initialize and you just make a new KDF every time. I
like the former approach better, myself - though I would like to know
how others feel about it.
Rename DerivedKeyParameterSpec to DeriviationParameterSpec and provide
an algorithm name for "IV" or "Cleartext". See below for .deriveData()
I think we could do that. Those don't sound like names that would be a
problem. But maybe we go with an even more generic name like "data" or
"raw". Cleartext sounds too much like plaintext/ciphertext kind of
lingo and IV is use specific.
deriveKey() emits the next key in the sequence using the data stream
to key conversion rules.
deriveKeys() emits as many keys left in the stream to the next data
derivation or the defined end of stream based on the input specs.
deriveKeys(int num) derives the next num keys.
Minor clarification: "...emits as many keys left in the stream to the
next data /*or Object*/ derivation" (I'm asking, not stating, just
making sure I understand what you intended).
Add a .deriveData() with a return class of byte[]. This gets a
portion of the derived data stream in the clear. E.g. an IV.
Add a .deriveObject() with a return class of Object. The returned
object may not be an instance of java.security.Key. This takes the
derived data stream and converts it into the object type specified by
the derivation parameter. In a hardware security module, this might
be a reference to a secured set of data or even an confidential IV.
Again, just want to make sure I understand fully: So in a case where I
want a given output to be an Object, I would provide a
DerivationParameterSpec with an alg of..."Object" (?), a byte length,
and Object-specific parameters provided through the "params" argument to
the DPS?
All of the derive methods throw an InvalidParameterSpecException if
the next derivation parameter doesn't match the calling method (e.g.
trying to deriveData when the parameter spec says emit a key).
Makes sense to me. Are you OK with IllegalStateException when you try
to derive a key after all elements in List<DerivationParameterSpec> have
been previously returned?
In KeyDerivation, change the output class of the deriveKey to
java.security.Key; similar for deriveKeys change the output to
List<Key>. Basically, its possible to use the output of a KDF stream
to derive private keys and this should be supported. It's occasionally
helpful (but not very often) for two devices to share a key pair that
they create through a key agreement process (e.g. two HSMs acting as
backup to each other). Alternately, consider adding a "public KeyPair
deriveKeyPair()" method.
Changing the output to Key makes sense. For the HSM to HSM use case
you're mentioning, that seems better suited to the KeyAgreement API,
wouldn't it?
Consider adding a marker interface javax.crypto.MasterSecret
(subclass of javax.crypto.SecretKey) and using that as class for the
initialize call argument.
Maybe OBE since I'm proposing to pass the secret through the
AlgorithmParameterSpec. If not, I would recommend not subclassing it
from SecretKey. The Secret won't always be a key. For an alg like
PBKDF2 it would be a password.
I'm happy to provide an edited .java file with these proposed changes
- but not until at least next Monday; I'm on travel.
Mike
Let me know your thoughts on this and maybe I can cook up another rev of
the spec/javadoc. Thanks again for the feedback!
--Jamil
