On 7/10/2019 8:29 AM, Sean Mullan wrote:
I think we should modify the description of the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms property to state that named groups can also be restricted. For example:

diff -r a7b9d6d4940e src/java.base/share/conf/security/java.security
--- a/src/java.base/share/conf/security/java.security   Thu Jun 20 09:35:41 2019 -0700 +++ b/src/java.base/share/conf/security/java.security   Wed Jul 10 11:21:32 2019 -0400
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@
 # when using SSL/TLS/DTLS.  This section describes the mechanism for disabling  # algorithms during SSL/TLS/DTLS security parameters negotiation, including  # protocol version negotiation, cipher suites selection, peer authentication
-# and key exchange mechanisms.
+# and key exchange mechanisms, and named groups.
  #
 # Disabled algorithms will not be negotiated for SSL/TLS connections, even
  # if they are enabled explicitly in an application.

This should also be in the CSR.

I updated CSR for the java.security update.

Also, in the CSR you list all the different signature algorithms that could be disabled, but you use the TLS names, and not the standard JCE names. I found this a bit confusing, since if you added those exact TLS names to jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms, I don't think it will work, or if it does we need additional changes to the jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms definition - and maybe that is what we should do?  Also, I don't think it is possible to disable individual RSASSA-PSS algorithms, I think you can just disable all or none of them because the parameters are specified separately and not part of the standard JCE name. Similar to other algorithms - how would I just disable ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 and nothing else? Is that an issue?

Yes, it is an issue now. The AlgorithmConstraints is able to accept parameters, but the current jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms property cannot. That's also why I used the TLS names (ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, etc) rather than standard names (SHA256withECDSA, RSASSA-PSS).

I agree with you that it is confusing. The use of rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 may be fine, but the name "dsa_sha256" rather then "SHA256withDSA" could be confusing.

I was planned to add TLS signature algorithms into the standard names, as we will do for the named groups. But it looks like a duplicate of the crypto Signature algorithms.

It is an option to support crypto Signature algorithm with the specific parameters, for example "SHA256withECDSAofSECP256R1", "SHA256withRSASSA-PSS". I don't like it as a provider need to enum all known parameters.

Maybe, we can introduce something new in jdk.tls.disabledAlgorithms. For example, "signature_algorithm with parameters" ("SHA256withECDSA with Secp256R1", "RSASSA-PSS with SHA256"). However, it does not sound generic or simple.

We may want to introduce new system property or APIs to customize the signature algorithms of TLS connections. Using the TLS signature algorithms is an acceptable option to me, but it is far from satisfied because the duplication with the crypto Signature algorithm.

Let's discuss the issue more.  Any feedback are welcome!

Thanks,
Xuelei

Thanks,
Sean


On 7/9/19 12:43 PM, Xuelei Fan wrote:
Hi,

Could I get the following update reviewed?

webrev: http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~xuelei/8226374/webrev.01/
CSR:    https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8227445

During handshaking, the selection of signature algorithms was not checked with the algorithm constraints.  Then the available signature algorithms may be ignored if a restricted algorithm get selected.  The connection should be able to be established as there are available algorithms.

Within this update, more algorithm constraints checking are introduced in the signature algorithms and named groups code.

The significant changes are in NamedGroup.java and SignatureScheme.java, in order to introduce the checking and algorithm parameters and specs.

Note that the following JDK 13 review thread was close out.

https://mail.openjdk.java.net/pipermail/security-dev/2019-July/020348.html

I targeted this enhancement to JDK 14, and come up with a CSR request.

Thanks,
Xuelei

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