Hi David/John -
I would submit that you're trying too hard to make your life simple! :-)
Cipher.wrap/unwrap are the correct methods.
For example:
Cipher kem = Cipher.getInstance
("ECIES/GCM-128-64/KDF-SP800-108-COUNTER-SHA256");
kem.init (Cipher.WRAP_MODE, pubkey);
byte[] opaqueEncapsulatedKey = kem.wrap (someOtherKey);
The "opaqueEncapsulatedKey" would contain the data needed by the unwrap
function - specifically a) the ecies ephemeral public key, b) the fact
that the derived key is a GCM key of length 128 and that the GCM tag is
64 bytes long, c) the KDF, d) (optional) any mixins other than defaults
required by the KDF - which would be passed in a parameter blob during
init. Cipher would NOT return the underlying generated secret used to
wrap the key. Just the public part of the key pair used to do the ECDH
operation against the passed in public key. In the RSA case, the
wrapped encrypting secret would be an opaque data blob and would be part
of the data passed to the unwrap function.
If you want a key generated for other purposes, then the right thing is
using a KDF and a Key agreement function in tandem. Strangely the KDF
appears in the javacard API for 3.1, but not in the JCE/JDK API.
"What's the difference between a bureaucrat and an engineer? A
bureaucrat takes small solvable pieces and combines them into one
insoluble mass."
In this case, Java provides a number of flexible primitives that can be
combined as needed. In this case, the underlying Cipher implementation
would wrap key agreement and kdf and cipher (GCM) instances. It should
return UnsupportedOperationException for all operations execept
wrap/unwrap and the appropriate init methods.
Later, Mike
On 8/19/2022 6:38 PM, David Hook wrote:
Hi Mike,
KEMs can be used for key wrapping - we've actually implemented support
for this too. But they are not actually key wrapping ciphers.
Here's a simple example of using Kyber for key wrapping in BC:
SecretKey key =new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes,"AES");
w1.init(Cipher.WRAP_MODE, kp.getPublic(),new KEMParameterSpec("AES-KWP"));
byte[]data =w1.wrap(key);
Cipher w2 =Cipher.getInstance(algorithm,"BCPQC");
w2.init(Cipher.UNWRAP_MODE, kp.getPrivate(),new KEMParameterSpec("AES-KWP"));
Key k =w2.unwrap(data,"AES",Cipher.SECRET_KEY);
The behavior in this case is in line with what is given in RFC 5990 for the RSA
KEM. How it works is by using the key generated
by the KEM to create an AES-KWP key, which is then used to wrap keyBytes. The
shortcoming is it means you have to generate the
secret key separately.
This is the problem though - a KEM can actually be used to generate a secret
key for other purposes. For example, where
someone is trying to implement a hybrid KAS scheme. But there is currently no
mechanism in the Java APIs for being able to
take advantage of this directly, hence our use of the KeyGenerator class and
other people's attempts to make use of the KeyAgreement
class. The Cipher.wrap() returns a byte[] - to be used with a KEM for secret
generation it would also have to return the
generated secret (I would probably also argue that passing a public key to wrap
in order to generate an encapsulation of a
generated encrypted secret was not the correct use of the API either, but the
fact remains a byte[] is not really going to cut it).
If you have any further questions, please feel free to ask. For what it is
worth, I have been developing providers for the JCE/JCA since
the late 90's and am actually one of the people responsible for the
introduction of the existing wrap/unwrap API in the Cipher class.
Thanks,
David
On 20/8/22 07:53, Mike StJohns wrote:
Hi This implemented as part of Javax.crypto.Cipher. See the Java doc for the
wrap and unwrap methods.
Mike
Sent from my iPad
On Aug 19, 2022, at 12:56, John Gray<john.g...@entrust.com> wrote:
We are starting to make use of the new PQ algorithms adopted by NIST for
prototyping and development of standards. In particular we are working on a
composite KEM standard:
See:https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-kem/
However, there is no KEM interface in the JCA (which make sense because these
are new algorithms, although RSA-KEM has been out since 2010).
I can add one into our toolkit (and I think David may have already added on
into BC), but I assume at some point there will be an official one added in
Java and likely it won't be identical to what we do even if it is very close,
which would cause backwards compatibility pain... Perhaps we could
collaborate on extending the JCA to support KEM? Essentially it requires
methods.
ss, ct := encapsulate(PublicKey)
ss := decapsulate(PrivateKey, ct)
-ss is a shared secret (could come back as a Java SecretKey if you wanted as it
would usually be used to derive something like an AES afterwards)
-ct is a Cipher Text (a byte array would make sense)
-Public and Private Keys would use the regular public and private key interface.
-An object holding the ss and ct from the encapsulate() method could be
returned, with accessor methods to get the ss and ct. It could be called
'EncapsulatedKEMData' for example.
Likely you would want a new type of KEM crypto object (like you have for
Signature, MessageDigest, Cipher, Mac, SecureRandom, KeyAgreement.. etc).
Calling it KEM would seem to make sense. 😊 It could also use similar
calling patterns and have a KEM.initKEM(keypair.getPublic()) or
KEM.initKEM(keypair.getPrivate()), and then you would just call
KEM.encapsulate() or KEM.decapsulate(ct).
Then algorithms could be registered in providers as usual:
put("KEM.Kyber","com.blah.Kyber")
put("KEM.compositeKEM","com.entrust.toolkit.crypto.kem.compositeKEM")
Then the above methods (encapsulate and decapsulate) could be defined in that
new object type. Then we would be able to make use of it and not have to
worry about incompatibility issues down the road...
Cheers,
John Gray
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