On Tue, 23 May 2023 14:00:30 GMT, Sean Mullan <mul...@openjdk.org> wrote:

>> We found several more cases of passwords and encoded keys not cleared that 
>> were addressed in out Iteration # 2 commit. These cases were both in Java 
>> and native code. We still have doubts about the effectiveness and need for 
>> these actions, but prefer to have the discussion on a different channel.
>> 
>> We also found that invalid keys (not starting with the name "PBE") passed to 
>> PBES2Core::engineInit or P11PBECipher::engineInit were being cleared and 
>> this could be unexpected to the caller. This is related to my comment 
>> [here](https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/pull/12396#discussion_r1199513839). 
>> For these cases, we decided not to invoke ::getEncoded and not to clean. As 
>> said, we have concerns about these undocumented mutations to objects passed 
>> by argument.
>> 
>> No test regressions observed in jdk/com/sun/crypto/provider or 
>> jdk/sun/security/pkcs11.
>
> @martinuy I am adding a CSR requirement for this issue. In this Enhancement, 
> you are adding support for new algorithms in a JCE provider. This type of 
> change requires a CSR as you are adding support for algorithms that can be 
> used by applications and not just inside the JDK, thus it is a type of 
> exported interface of JDK scope. For an example of a similar issue, see 
> [JDK-8274174](https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8274174). The CSR should 
> also include details about any behavioral changes or differences that affect 
> use of the algorithms through the standard JCE APIs.

@seanjmullan @valeriepeng , can you please take a look at the proposed 
[JDK-8308719](https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8308719) CSR?

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PR Comment: https://git.openjdk.org/jdk/pull/12396#issuecomment-1563647821

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