Glenn Faden wrote:
> Bart,
>
> In general I don't think that the existing RBAC implementation is the
> right architecture for implementing restrictive environments. The
> original goal was to configure administrative roles, not to confine
> ordinary users. However, I agree with your suggestion making it
> configurable whether the values of AUTHS_GRANTED and PROFS_GRANTED are
> appended to the respective lists. The keyword use_defaults may be
> misleading since all the rest of the default in policy.conf would still
> apply.
>
> A more extensible approach would be a list of which default settings to
> ignore, e.g.
>
> ignore_defaults=auths,profs
>
> however, right now I can't see any other defaults currently in
> policy.conf that should be ignored.
>
> The FMAC project, http://opensolaris.org/os/project/fmac/ , is
> specifically goaled to address the issue of restricting the individual
> applications that a user can execute, and what resources those
> applications have access to. I think that any further enhancement to
> the existing RBAC implementation should take into account how it could
> be merged with the evolving FMAC architecture. Ultimately we want to
> combine these two implementations in a compatible way so that the
> customer can benefit from both features.
>
> --Glenn
>
I was about to reply, when I saw that Glenn already made all the points
I would have. So I'll just say +1.
Scott
--
Scott Rotondo
Principal Engineer, Solaris Security Technologies
President, Trusted Computing Group
Phone/FAX: +1 408 850 3655 (Internal x68278)
