Thanks Dan for the review. Please see in-line.
> usr/src/uts/common/net/pfkeyv2.h
>   
Since you are the author of RFC 2367, wanted to cross check the 
assignment of value "1"
to *MD5* algorithm.

#define SADB_AALG_MD5 1

The openbsd header file for instance has it defined to be

#define SADB_AALG_MD5 249

(http://fxr.watson.org/fxr/source/net/pfkeyv2.h?v=OPENBSD#L275)

> usr/src/cmd/cmd-inet/usr.sbin/ipsecutils/ipsecconf.c
>
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
> No.   Location        Sev.    Comment
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> DM-1  Lines 839-43    T2      What if I specify TCP_SIG w/o MD5?  Does the
>                               known_algs[] matrix handle this off-the-map
>                               case properly now?
>   
It's mandatory to specify the algorithm type *MD5* when using 
ipsecconf(1M). If it's
not specified no TCP signature policy will be applied and an error 
message will be displayed
> usr/src/cmd/cmd-inet/usr.sbin/ipsecutils/ipseckey.c
>
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
> No.   Location        Sev.    Comment
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> DM-2  parseauthstr()  T4      Do you handle escape characters or anything
>                               else bizarre?  Or does ipseckey(1M)'s parser
>                               do that trick for you?
>   
Only printable ascii characters are allowed as part of the keyword 
*authstring*. Code valuse
from 33 to 126, and no control characters are allowed.

Further *add* subcommand of ipseckey can be used only in an interactive 
mode. In an interactive
mode none of the special characters need to be escaped ($, \, &, !, |, 
et al) as shell would not interpret
them. If these characters need to be part of the authstring they can be 
entered as is in interactive mode.
> usr/src/uts/common/Makefile.files
>
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
> No.   Location        Sev.    Comment
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> DM-3  General         T1      You're not up to date -- I see that Mark
>                               Powers's putback isn't reflected in your own
>                               gate code yet.
>   
Yes. I just did a bringover and there were no conflicts.
>
> usr/src/uts/common/inet/ip/keysock.c
>
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
> No.   Location        Sev.    Comment
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> DM-4  keysock_strip() T2      Can you make sadb_strip() subsume this
>                               function or vice-versa?  It'll involve making
>                               either keysock dependent on ipsecah or
>                               vice-versa, however.  I can be convinced why
>                               it's not a good idea to collapse the two, but
>                               it will take some convincing.
>   
Yes. Made sadb_strip() global. Removed keysock_strip() from keysock.c. 
Used sadb_strip()
in keysock_pfkey_reply() in keysock.c. For this I had to make *keysock* 
dependent on *ipsecah*
as *ipsecah* module contains sadb functions.
> DM-5  line 2460       E4      Clarify the comment some more (mention
>                               tcpsig_sa() is called by keysock_passdown(),
>                               e.g.).
>   
Added.
>
> usr/src/uts/common/inet/ip/spd.c
>
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
> No.   Location        Sev.    Comment
> ------- --------------- ------- 
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> DM-6  Line 3203       E3      self-encap implies AH or ESP, so don't
>                               check for it here and clarify the comment to
>                               be more authoritative than an XXX one.
>   
Have added the following comment.

/*
* If only TCP signature protection is requested, then the
* incoming/outgoing packets will not be encrypted so
* allow_clear should be B_TRUE else it should be B_FALSE
*/

regards
~Girish

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