Hey Hans,

Thanks for your input on this!

Can you elaborate on this attack a bit more?  What would the MITM gain by
sending a fake "valid" response, when the OP actually sent "invalid" (or
vice versa)?  

Also, why is the assoc step harder to MITM?  Isn't there a DH computation on
both the direct verification step and the association step?

Thanks!

David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Granqvist, Hans [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 3:03 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
> [email protected]
> Subject: RE: [OpenID] OpenId Association Timeout Recommendations
> 
> A MITM can easily change any is_valid value since those responses are
> unprotected.
> 
> There is a MITM attack on the association step, but it is much harder, as
> it
> requires DH computation and state keeping for later authentication steps.
> There are also DH variants that are more resilient to MITM attacks (SRP
> anyone? ;), and such can be added as mechanisms to the protocol.
> 
> In reality Direct Verification is useless. Very few RPs use secure
> channels.
> The message floats unprotected through the network of tubes.
> 
> Direct verification gives an attacker an incredibly simple way to
> downgrade
> the protocol without either the OP nor the RP being any wiser.
> 
> What attacker wouldn't love that?
> 
> Hans
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ________________________________
> 
>       From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>       Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 11:30 AM
>       To: Granqvist, Hans; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
> [email protected]
>       Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenId Association Timeout Recommendations
> 
> 
>       Hans,
> 
>       Using the direct verification is not a "less secure mode".
> Association handles provide a way to reduce the cost of verification by
> eliminating one set of messages from the flow.  However, the association
> is established using the same basic message exchange as the verification
> itself, and so is neither more or less secure.
> 
>       Terry
> 
> 
> 
>       -----Original Message-----
>       From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>       To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [email protected]
>       Sent: Mon, 5 Feb 2007 11:13 AM
>       Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenId Association Timeout Recommendations
> 
> 
>       > I'm wondering if anyone has an opinion on a "recommended"
>       > association timeout for OpenId OP/RP implementations?
> 
>       David,
> 
>       There is a slight problem with shared secrets in the OpenID
>       authentication protocol.
> 
>       Generally you want to make the lifespan of shared secrets as short
>       as possible to reduce risk.
> 
>       However, according to the OpenID protocol, when the RP uses an
> expired
>       association handle, the OP should proceed as if no association
> handle
>       was provided, which will then lead to the obvious security risks(*)
>       related with direct verification:
>       <http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0-
> 11.html#check_auth>
> 
>       That's the Catch-22:  You will want the shared secret to live for
>       a short time, but you don't want to risk reducing the authentication
>       flow into a less secure mode.
> 
>       One way to implement a more secure OP is to refuse some
>       security reductions of the protocol:
> 
>       * require valid associations, and
>       * respond with negative assertion (should the assertion be
>         invalid)
> 
>       AFAIK, the language of the spec, with MAYs and SHOULDs, lets you do
>       this and still remain compliant.
> 
> 
>       -Hans
> 
>       (*) meaning the fact that the OP responds whether the signature
>       was okay with an unsigned yes/no
> 
> 
>       >
>       > I think it takes something like 2^80 operations to brute
>       > force SHA1 (the least secure OpenId HMAC Association type).
>       > Supposedly, in 2005 SHA1 was "sort of" broken by a Chinese
>       > researcher (see here:
>       > http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html
>       ) but according to Bruce Schneier, HMAC is not affected by this >
>       development (only digital signatures are).
>       >
>       > All that to say, it seems like it would still take a long
>       > time to brute force an SHA1 association (SHA256 even longer),
>       > so I'm wondering what people's thoughts are where OpenId
>       > implementation should set this number by default.
>       >
>       > For example, one of the most popular Java OpenId 2.0
>       > implementations currently uses a 30 minute expiration.  What
>       > about 3 days?  7 days? Longer?
>       >
>       > I guess I'm trying to figure out where the "balance between
>       > security and convenience" decision should be made.
>       >
>       > Thanks for your input!
>       >
>       > David
>       >
>       > _______________________________________________
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>       > http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/general
>       >
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