Allen,

I guess tying the nonce to the browser's IP address would be sufficent, although if there's a MITM, the attacker presumably controls the IP address as well.

Shibboleth has offered similar matching of client IP address to assertion and IP address to SP/RP session for a long time. We've found the first impractical and the second pretty useful. Matching an RP-installed authentication request nonce with an IP address would be consistent with the consistentAddress functionality.

I would certainly describe it as easier to grab an assertion or session cookie than hijack another machine's IP address.

Note that if the value of checkAddress is set to "false", this has a slightly negative impact on the security of the SP. This security feature checks the user's IP address at the SP and compares it with the IP address used at the IdP. If they don't match, an error is thrown. This rather strict security feature can cause problems for users behind proxies or for users with IPv6 addresses. Therefore, this setting is deactivated per default. To compensate the slightly reduced security the consistentAddress feature is activated
        in the default configuration.
The consistentAddress feature is available as of version 1.3c for the <Sessions> element. It defaults to true when not present and ensures that once a session cookie is issued to a client, any further use of that session cookie must be from a client with the same network address. This raises the bar for session hijackers to the level of network address spoofing, which may or may not be simple to do, but is definitely harder than stealing cookies and relies on a different set of attacking skills. On the other hand the consistentAddress may also cause problems for users whose IP changes during the session (e.g. for AOL users or for users behind proxies
        which have multiple IP addresses).

https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/SHIB/AddressChecking

It's a neat feature, so thanks Andrew,
Nate.
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