Re: [Security] TLS Certificates Verification

[Jonathan Schleifer]

Am 19.08.2008 um 14:13 schrieb Eric Rescorla:

Yes, I've noticed we're all using that.

We do. For example, all Gajim users do by default. This is why I'm *STRONGLY* against introducing yet another protocol. We already have working implementations.

Hmm... Is this the most recent version?
http://www.xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0116.html


are already in TLS includes:

- Support for ECC
- Support for RSA
- Any form of session resumption
- An extensions framework
- Support for AEAD ciphers
- A PAKE mode.


the actual traffic. Maybe I'm just reading the wrong document.

I've just skimmed it, but the list of things it appears to be missing that Oh, yeah, is there some writeup of how the stanzas are actually protected once you've established the keys? I see how you negotiate the *encryption* algorithm but not the integrity algorithm and I don't see how you use either to protect

This is just the negotiation. ESessions consists of multiple XEPs. I don't know which of the negotiation XEPs was the simpliefied one. But IIRC, there was RSA support for public keys (but I won't guarantee it).

Look, I'm not trying to sell TLS to XMPP; it doesn't matter to me much
what XMPP does. But if you want to provide a solution that users will

assess what functionality you want the system to provide and *then*
ask how it can best be provided, rather than starting with a given
protocol and say "prove to me it's not good enough".

actually find tolerable, it seems to me that it would be good to actually

--
Jonathan

IMO, ESessions is already tolerable. We should fix the remaining issues instead of inventing the wheel again with yet another protocol. And while TLS for end-to-end is talk about the future, ESessions is already here and implemented.

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