Dave Cridland wrote: > On Fri Aug 29 11:12:35 2008, Dirk Meyer wrote: >> When I want to open a secure connection to you I could ask five >> notary >> servers around the globe (e.g. different XMPP server in a different >> domain). If four out of five report the same fingerprint for you I >> could trust it. If they also report that the fingerprint is the same >> for half a year now, I can be sure it is yours. Ok, it is not 100% >> correct, but an attacker must manipulate many different server to >> fake >> your key and an attacker can not know which notary servers I will >> ask. > > How are you asking them, though? via XMPP?
I have no idea. I only saw the paper and posted the link here because it could be usefull. You could contact them using HTTP(S) or use direct XMPP connections. > Presumably, an attacker who subverts your server could in principle > then control the responses you get. In that case the answer must be signed somehow. > An alternate plan might involve your client contacting the notary > domains directly, and using CA-based trust, but that raises the > interesting question of who would want to run a Notary server. That could be the solution: a notary server may have s signed certificate. As example some XMPP servers could be notary server. They already have a signaed certificate. But maybe this is all too complicated and will not work. Dirk -- Isn't air travel wonderful? Breakfast in London, dinner in New York, luggage in Brazil.
