On Tuesday, January 05, 2016 11:12:33 PM Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
> Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about
> 10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark.  It turns out that the call
> to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below
> the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be
> removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original
> performance.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++--------
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Applied to selinux#stable-4.5, thank you.  As soon as I can get a kernel built 
and tested I'll send this up to James.

> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 40e071a..f8110cf 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -273,11 +273,6 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode
> *inode, return 0;
>  }
> 
> -static void inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode)
> -{
> -     __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
> -}
> -
>  static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode
> *inode) {
>       return inode->i_security;
> @@ -3277,19 +3272,19 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
> *file, int mask) {
>       struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
>       struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
> -     struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
> +     struct inode_security_struct *isec;
>       u32 sid = current_sid();
> 
>       if (!mask)
>               /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
>               return 0;
> 
> +     isec = inode_security(inode);
>       if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
>           fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
>               /* No change since file_open check. */
>               return 0;
> 
> -     inode_security_revalidate(inode);
>       return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
>  }
> 
> @@ -3595,7 +3590,6 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const
> struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy.
>        * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
>        */
> -     inode_security_revalidate(file_inode(file));
>       return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
>  }

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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