On Wed, 2017-07-12 at 20:27 -0400, Chris PeBenito wrote: > On 07/12/2017 05:38 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 12, 2017 at 9:26 AM, Stephen Smalley <s...@tycho.nsa.gov > > > wrote: > > > On Tue, 2017-07-11 at 17:00 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 4:25 PM, Stephen Smalley <s...@tycho.nsa > > > > .gov> > > > > wrote: > > While I think splitting the NNP/nosuid transition restrictions > > might > > be a good idea under the new policy capability, I'm not sure it is > > worth the cost of a "process2" object class. > > > > With that in mind, let's do two things with this patch: > > > > * Mention the nosuid restrictions in the patch description. It > > doesn't need much text, but something would be good so we have > > documentation in the git log. > > > > * Let's pick a new permission name that is not specific to NNP or > > nosuid. IMHO, nnpnosuid_transition is ... less than good. > > Unfortunately, I'm not sure I'm much better at picking names; how > > about "protected_transition"? "restricted_transition"? > > "enable_transition"? "override_transition"? > > I vote for nnp_transition anyway. "No New Privileges" encompasses > nosuid in my mind. If the two perms had been separated I would have > been inclined to allow both every time one of them was needed, to > make > sure no one was surprised by the behavior difference.
I agree; I'll keep it as nnp_transition and just document it in the patch description.
