On 11/27/2017 05:50 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 3:04 PM, Daniel Jurgens <[email protected]> wrote:
On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Dan Jurgens <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Daniel Jurgens <[email protected]>

For controlling IPoIB VLANs

Reported-by: Honggang LI <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Honggang LI <[email protected]>
---
  networkmanager.te |    2 ++
  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
[NOTE: resending due to a typo in the refpol mailing list address]

We obviously need something like this now so we don't break IPoIB, but
I wonder if we should make the IB access controls dynamic like the
per-packet network access controls.  We could key off the presence of
the IB pkey and endport definitions: if there are any objects defined
in the loaded policy we enable the controls, otherwise we disable
them.

I think I understand what you're saying Paul, but I'm not clear on the 
mechanism.  Are you referring to the netlabel/IPSEC enable checks? They are 
wrapped up in selinux_peerlbl_enabled.

Basically, yes.  We could add a new variable/function that gates the
access control checks in selinux_ib_pkey_access() and
selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(); the checks would be enabled when
there was Infiniband configuration loaded with the policy.  Without
the IB config loaded, all the checks would end up being just a domain
check against unlabeled_t, which isn't very interesting, so we would
just drop the checks.

As long as it also respects policycap always_check_network, it works for me.

--
Chris PeBenito

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