On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 10:35 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote: > A ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED gets called > from process switching code. This precludes the use of audit, > as the locking is incompatible. Don't do audit in the PTRACE_MODE_SCHED > case. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> > --- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 340fc30ad85d..ffa95bcab599 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -422,7 +422,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct > *tracer, > struct task_smack *tsp; > struct smack_known *tracer_known; > > - if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) { > + if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0 && > + (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) == 0) {
If you ORed PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT into the flags when calling the security hook, you could drop this patch, right? _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list [email protected] To unsubscribe, send email to [email protected]. To get help, send an email containing "help" to [email protected].
