theguardian.com
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/may/12/our-man-richard-holbrooke-and
-the-end-of-the-american-century-review>  


Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century by George
Packer – review


Julian Borger

8-10 minutes

  _____  

Near the start of his account of ending the Bosnian conflict, Richard
Holbrooke
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/14/richard-holbrooke-obituary> ,
arguably the most famous US diplomat since the cold war, describes a freak
tragedy that almost destroyed the peace mission at its launch. At that time,
anyone entering the besieged capital of Sarajevo by road had to cross Mount
Igman on a dirt track that was exposed in parts to Serb anti-aircraft guns
capable of cutting a car to shreds. In August 1995, an armoured vehicle
carrying Holbrooke’s diplomatic and military aides drove off the side
<https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/20/world/3-us-diplomats-killed-in-bosnia.ht
ml>  of the Igman road and plunged down the mountain.

Robert Frasure, a senior state department negotiator, Joseph Kruzel, a
Pentagon official, and Nelson Drew, an air force colonel who had been
assigned by the White House, were killed along with their young French
military driver.

Holbrooke, the US special envoy, and Lt Gen Wesley Clark, the top military
man on the mission, were in a Humvee driving ahead of the doomed vehicle.
They survived and, according to Holbrooke’s version of events in his memoir,
To End a War, these two leaders took charge of the situation and performed
heroically. They scrambled down towards the wreckage until the mined
hillside started exploding around them, at which point they lowered Clark on
a rope to the victims while Holbrooke tended to the wounded.

Here was the apotheosis of an American ideal: men of vision and peace, but
also men of action. Great men of history. Except key elements of the story
turn out not to be true.

In Our Man, a deeply researched, compelling biography of Holbrooke, American
journalist George Packer tracks down the lesser-known players on Mount Igman
that day, who Holbrooke had erased from history. It was these men who slid
down the mountain and prised open the doors of the burning vehicle.
Holbrooke stayed on the road, complaining about being left alone in a
dangerous spot.

The feats ascribed to Clark were actually performed by Lt Col Randall Banky,
the US liaison officer at UN headquarters. His role was dismissed in
Holbrooke’s book with a single line: “Colonel Banky had disappeared.”
Confronted by Banky years later while on a book tour, Holbrooke tried once
more to blame the other man for abandoning him. It was only when cornered by
the awkward facts that Holbrooke relented and promised to correct the
account in a later edition. He never did.

Such duplicity and narcissism are constant themes of Our Man. “You will have
heard that he was a monstrous egotist,” Packer writes near the beginning.
“It’s true. It’s even worse than you’ve heard.”

Holbrooke regularly betrayed those closest to him in some of the worst ways
imaginable. He propositioned the wife of his best friend, Anthony Lake, and
Lake’s consequent disgust for him distorts US foreign policymaking for a
generation, as the two men rise up the ranks of successive Democratic
administrations. Yet taken in its entirety, Packer’s detailed, graceful
account of Holbrooke is not unsympathetic. It shows him, for all his
vanities and insecurities, dedicating most of his life to grappling with how
the US could and should do the right thing in the world.

Holbrooke’s telling of the Igman incident may have been bogus, but the claim
of his memoir’s title was not. More than any other individual, he ended the
killing in Bosnia in late 1995, sequestering the warring leaders in a bleak
air force base in Dayton, Ohio, until they compromised.

Our Man is not just a portrait of a fascinating historical figure, it is a
contemplation of a half century of US foreign and security policy and its
most intractable challenges: counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention
and nation-building. Holbrooke’s appetites, aspirations and flaws were
echoes of the nation’s. “The best about us was inseparable from the worst,”
Packer argues. “Our feeling that we could do anything gave us the Marshall
Plan and Vietnam, the peace at Dayton and the endless Afghan war. Our
confidence and energy, our reach and grasp, our excess and blindness – they
were not so different from Holbrooke’s.”

Packer strives, and mostly manages, to shrug off the heavier conventions of
biographies of the good and the great. It is hard not to be thankful to a
biographer who begins an early chapter: “Do you mind if we hurry through the
early years? There are no mysteries here that can be unlocked by nursery
school.”

We do find out that his father was Abraham Golbraich, a Polish Jew, who
chose an anglicised version of the family name from the Manhattan telephone
directory. His mother, Gertrude Moos, had fled Germany with her family when
the Nazis took power.

The young Holbrooke would have become a journalist had the New York Times
not passed him over for an entry-level job. Instead, he was persuaded to sit
the foreign service exam by the father of a high-school classmate, Dean
Rusk, who became secretary of state under John F Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.

Holbrooke was sent to Vietnam in 1963, knowing little of the country
(“That’s always been the weak spot of our foreign service – other
countries”) and his experience as a rural affairs officer trying to win
hearts and minds in the Mekong delta shaped his beliefs and instincts. He
learned you cannot defeat an insurgency by bombing the population,
especially if you don’t belong there. That lesson would slip the mind of
some future administrations. “Why do Americans keep falling in love with
counterinsurgency?” Packer asks. “Because we’re obviously no good at it.”

Fifty years after his time building ill-fated “strategic hamlets” for the
people of the Mekong, Holbrooke found himself in the middle of another
quagmire, as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He was so
absorbed by the parallels that Barack Obama, who had no time for his grand
nostalgic oratory, sent word he didn’t want to hear another word about
Vietnam.

The paradox, as Packer points out, was that the real lesson of Vietnam was
one word: “Don’t”. But had Holbrooke applied it, he would have been out of a
job. He needed to feel he was at the centre of events and he kept going,
trying to make things work in Afghanistan that had failed in Vietnam, until
the end. In December 2010, during a meeting with secretary of state Hillary
Clinton, Holbrooke’s aorta burst and surgery could not save him.

Packer writes that his subject “lived as if the world needed an American
hand to help set things right”. He came from an era when that hand almost
invariably belonged to “unsentimental, supremely self-assured white
Protestant men… who all knew one another and knew how to get things done,”
men who “didn’t take a piss without a strategy”.

Even the most well-meaning among them, such as Holbrooke, seldom managed to
disentangle policy from their own ambitions, prejudices and petty rivalries.
Our Man is a reminder that, in a world where such men are consistently put
in the driving seat of world events, it should be no surprise that the most
disastrous mistakes are the ones most often repeated.

Julian Borger is the Guardian’s world affairs editor. 

• Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century by George
Packer is published by Jonathan Cape (£25). To order a copy go to
guardianbookshop.com
<https://guardianbookshop.com/our-man-9781910702925.html?utm_source=editoria
llink&utm_medium=merch&utm_campaign=article>  or call 0330 333 6846. Free UK
p&p over £15, online orders only. Phone orders min p&p of £1.99

 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"SERBIAN NEWS NETWORK" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/senet.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/senet/03b301d508d5%244b248b00%24e16da100%24%40gmail.com.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to