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Moscow’s fight against the “enemies of Orthodoxy” in the Balkans


Julia Petrovskaya

10-13 minutes

  _____  

 

With the help of local friends and pro-Kremlin media, the Russian Orthodox 
Church has launched a propaganda campaign in the Balkans, writes Julia 
Petrovskaya.

Protests and disputes in Montenegro over a new law on religion have raged for 
two months, and show no sign of stopping. The new law paves the way for the 
state to appropriate most of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s property in the 
country. In contrast to outraged officials in Belgrade, the Russian authorities 
have refrained from getting involved publicly in this debate. However, the 
Russian Orthodox Church, state media, and media linked to the church have been 
waging a full-throated campaign to discredit both the law itself and the regime 
of President Milo Djukanović.

This media campaign is reminiscent of others conducted by Russian actors 
towards Montenegro, such as during the 2016 parliamentary elections and on the 
eve of Montenegro’s entry into NATO. This campaign, like those, involves 
familiar politicians and “analysts” on the Balkans who are closely associated 
with the Russian authorities and their propaganda machine. Their methods and 
arguments have not changed significantly. The only difference is that this time 
the Russian Orthodox Church has spearheaded the campaign and set the tone. It 
has strongly supported <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5555471.html>  the 
Serbian Orthodox Church’s condemnation of the law, and drew parallels between 
Montenegro and the church schism over Ukraine.

The Montenegrin law “On the Freedom of Religion” allows for the seizure and 
transfer to state ownership of property and land used by religious communities 
if they belonged to the state before December 1, 1918, or if there are no 
documents proving their registration as church property (as is frequently the 
case for most ancient shrines and holy places.)

For its part, the Russian government has only officially reacted to this 
situation in Montenegro on one occasion. In a statement 
<https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3988667>
  at the end of December, the Russian Foreign Ministry focused on “the 
possibility of seizing 650 religious sites from the Serbian Orthodox Church 
with the prospect of their transferral to the schismatic and unrecognised 
‘Montenegrin Orthodox Church,’” as well as the attempt to completely expunge 
the Serbian Orthodox Church from Montenegro. According to Moscow, this attempt 
has given the church question in Montenegro a new international significance. 
At the same time, Russian diplomacy is quite visibly moving away from secular 
rhetoric, now explicitly pointing to “the importance of maintaining the 
centuries-old foundations, unity, and solidarity of the Orthodox world.”

Meanwhile, Moscow did not say anything about the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (ECHR) refusal to ban Montenegro from applying the new law until a 
decision was reached by the country’s Constitutional Court or unless an 
agreement was brokered with the Serbian Orthodox Church. It seems as though the 
leading international role on the latter issue has been assumed by the Russian 
Orthodox Church. So in late January, Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, the 
head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations, met 
with the Montenegrin ambassador to Russia 
<http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5584431.html>  Ramiz Bašić. On February 
17-18, Hilarion then traveled to Belgrade, where he spoke not only with senior 
figures in the Serbian Orthodox Church, but also met with Serbia’s Minister of 
Innovation and Technological Development Nenad Popović. Although Popović’s 
position is the furthest removed from church issues, he is the preferred point 
of contact for visitors from Moscow given his conveniently pro-Russian 
positions.

During his meeting with Hilarion, Popović described 
<http://srpskanarodnapartija.rs/ministar-popovic-i-mitropolit-ilarion-ruska-pravoslavna-crkva-pruza-najvecu-podrsku-pravoslavnim-vernicima-u-crnoj-gori/>
  the events in Montenegro as “part of the old scenario to weaken the Serbian 
and Russian peoples: the only peoples to have preserved the independence, 
freedom, and strength of the Orthodox faith.” At the same time, the minister 
tied the church issue to the activities of NATO, which supposedly aims to 
establish complete control over the Balkans.

The minister and businessman Nenad Popović owns the company ABS Electro 
<http://www.abselectro.com/company/> , which unites several Russian electrical 
and engineering firms. As mentioned earlier, Popović is a consistent and 
stalwart supporter of the “Russian World.” In 2014, he founded the pro-Kremlin 
Serbian People’s Party. This national-conservative movement opposes 
<http://srpskanarodnapartija.rs/program/>  Serbia’s EU and NATO integration and 
advocates its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) instead. The 
Serbian People’s Party has even managed to enter parliament, and contested the 
2016 elections as part of a coalition led by the ruling Serbian Progressive 
Party of President Aleksandar Vučić.

Popović received 
<http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102135450>  
the Order of Friendship in Moscow in 2010 in recognition for his great 
contributions to economic and cultural cooperation between Russia and Serbia. 
He has also received numerous religious awards and participates 
<http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5587181.html>  in all events in Belgrade 
linked to the Russian Orthodox Church.

The “old scenario,” according to which the West is undermining the Russian and 
Serbian peoples, has not only been raised by Popović.

Since the end of December, the situation in Montenegro has become an important 
topic in the Russian media landscape. It is discussed and written about in 
state and conservative, Orthodox mass media outlets as well as Russian 
publications with a Balkan or Balkan-watching readership (such as Sputnik and 
Balkanist). The most widely cited interviewees are Metropolitan Amfilohija, 
head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro, and secular critics of the 
Djukanović regime who try to present the Montenegrin leader 
<https://rg.ru/2020/02/03/milo-dzhukanovich-stanovitsia-nerukopozhatnym-na-balkanah.html>
  as utterly odious and openly call 
<http://www.stoletie.ru/tekuschiiy_moment/u_dzhukanovicha_jedinstvennyj_vyhod__ujti_v_otstavku_783.htm>
  for his resignation.

A small glimpse at the headlines reveals the dramatic tone many Russian 
publications take in describing these events: “Atheist president pushes 
Montenegro towards a Ukrainian-style schism 
<https://www.vesti.ru/videos/show/vid/822965/#/video/https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vgtrk.com%2Fiframe%2Fvideo%2Fid%2F1983129%2Fstart_zoom%2Ftrue%2FshowZoomBtn%2Ffalse%2Fsid%2Fvesti%2FisPlay%2Ftrue%2F%3Facc_video_id%3D822965>
 ,” “The last vestiges of unity between the southern Slavs are being destroyed 
<https://russian.rt.com/world/article/703652-chernogoriya-cerkovnyi-raskol-zakon>
 ,” “An open war against Orthodoxy around the world 
<https://balkanist.ru/idyot-otkrytaya-vojna-protiv-pravoslaviya-vo-vsem-mire-serbskij-ekspert-prokommentiroval-krizis-v-chernogorii/>
 ,” “The USA uses the mafia to wipe out canonical Orthodoxy in Montenegro 
<https://tsargrad.tv/articles/ssha-rukami-mafii-likvidirujut-kanonicheskoe-pravoslavie-v-chernogorii_232549>
 .”

These strident denunciations are often accompanied by inaccurate or 
unverifiable information, such as the statement 
<https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/7711437>  made by the Russian state 
media network TASS that Djukanović’s supporters were handed out “€20 each” for 
taking part in a rally. And while emotional predictions, including even 
bloodshed 
<https://balkanist.ru/rozhdestvo-v-chernogorii-mozhet-obernutsya-krovoprolitiem/>
 , have not come to pass, they remain an integral part of a campaign whose aim 
is to whip up uncertainty and fear.

The author of these fanciful and gloomy forecasts is Igor Damjanović, a 
pro-Russian Montenegrin columnist who is an important commentator for Russia’s 
state- and church-aligned media. TASS describes 
<https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/7429209>  Damjanović as a “political 
scientist,” though it is not possible to find any open source information about 
his education or qualifications in the field — unlike, however, his photographs 
posing with the Head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=10220991580881148&set=pb.1290576117.-2207520000>
  or the Russian Foreign Ministry’s press secretary Maria Zakharova 
<https://dfcme.me/besmrtni-puk-crne-gore/> .

Damjanović made his debut in Russian-language media in 2014 with a forceful 
article entitled “Crimea is not Kosovo 
<http://www.iarex.ru/articles/46895.html> ,” which began with a reference to 
the “terror of Kyiv’s fascist minority.” He was later introduced in various 
capacities, as the coordinator of an anti-NATO project, an analyst, and an 
independent journalist. He played an active role in the campaign against 
Djukanović before the 2016 elections, which in Russia was most prominently 
conducted by Tsargrad, an ultra-conservative television channel associated with 
the Orthodox millionaire Konstantin Malofeev. In addition, Damjanović is an 
organiser of the “Immortal Regiment” marches in Montenegro, for which the 
Russian government even presented him with a letter of thanks 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=218240825434626&set=a.215240895734619>  
for furthering patriotic education among the youth. Nevertheless, in the 
Balkans these parades are often regarded more as an instrument of Kremlin 
propaganda, alongside events held by the Night Wolves, a pro-Russian Orthodox 
biker group, or the Balkan Cossack Army. A big admirer of these initiatives is 
Boro Djukić, who served as Russia’s honorary consul in Montenegro from 2014 to 
2018. Djukić is an important fixture in Russian state media reports from the 
Balkans and  helps organise meetings with Metropolitan Amfilohija. Djukić also 
likes to be photographed in costumes bearing Russian symbols 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=338928740223541&set=ecnf.100023192536952>  
and brandishing Russian-made weapons 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=445378776245203&set=ecnf.100023192536952> 
; he is acquainted 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=208197046630045&set=pb.100023192536952.-2207520000..&type=3>
  with Alexander Zaldostanov (known as “Surgeon”), the leader of the Night 
Wolves, and has presented awards 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=255070585276024&set=pb.100023192536952.-2207520000>
  to dubious Balkan “Cossacks.”

It was presumably Djukić who stood behind the creation of the pro-Kremlin 
conservative party “True Montenegro” in 2018, which has serious support from 
the Russian media <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4910917> . Like 
Damjanović, in recent years Marko Milačić has become a go-to interviewee for 
Russian state media reports on the situation in Montenegro. Both men provide 
clear support for the ongoing protests on their social media pages. In Moscow, 
Milačić seems to be considered a promising political leader. For example, he 
was among the politicians invited to dine with Vladimir Putin 
<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2023487947738548&set=t.100002320862725&type=3>
  during the Russian president’s visit to Belgrade in 2019. He is acquainted 
with senior members of Russia’s ruling party United Russia, such as Sergey 
Zheleznyak and Pyotr Tolstoy. Zheleznyak, with Milačić’s assistance, also tried 
<https://er.ru/news/160574/>  to get the leaders of the opposition Democratic 
Party off the hook after they became implicated 
<https://www.ridl.io/ru/balkany-investicii-v-naprjazhennost/>  in the 2016 coup 
attempt which, according to the Montenegrin prosecutor’s office, was prepared 
with the associate of the Russian security services.

Russian media also take great pains to ensure that the positions of the 
convicted Democratic Front leaders regarding the church law are publicly known, 
furthering their influence in the protest movement. Leaders of the opposition 
conservative coalition never miss an opportunity to emphasise 
<https://balkanist.ru/chernogorskij-oppozitsioner-aresty-i-repressii-dolzhny-byli-zapugat-narod-no-na-ulitsy-vyhodit-vse-bolshe-grazhdan/>
  Russia’s perceived positive role in the Balkans, as the defender of the Serbs 
and their holy places. They use the current protests 
<https://rg.ru/2020/02/29/milan-knezhevich-amerikanskij-posol-neformalno-pravit-chernogoriej.html>
  as a stage for amplifying anti-NATO propaganda, accusing the alliance of 
occupying Montenegro and turning the country into a colony. The activity of 
these pro-Kremlin actors against the backdrop of mass protests has been 
characterised by some experts on the Balkans as a case of Russian “hybrid 
operations.” 
<http://www.rtcg.me/vijesti/politika/267731/litije-su-poseban-dio-hibridnog-rata.html?fbclid=IwAR1zoKqE4SRor5vckTdxxm_cfvBIgRT5dhtw6U0bpSxr-yfV-x6f--iJIJs>
 

It is not yet clear how the dispute between the Montenegrin authorities and the 
Serbian Orthodox Church will be settled. What is clear is that for Russia, it 
has become an opportunity to launch yet another anti-western and anti-Ukrainian 
propaganda offensive.


Photo: Scanpix


 

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