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[EWB Interview] Vuksanović: Chinese influence in Serbia will grow after the 
pandemic - European Western Balkans


Nikola Burazer

12-16 minutes

  _____  

Although the COVID-19 pandemic began in China, this country was seen as one of 
the few potential sources of assistance to vulnerable countries today due to 
the fact that it was the first to control the infection. The President of 
Serbia Aleksandar Vučić said while introducing the state of emergency that 
China is “the only one who can help Serbia,” and in the meantime, Chinese 
doctors and help have begun to arrive both to Serbia and EU member states. We 
talked about China-Serbia relations and Chinese foreign policy during the 
pandemic with Vuk Vuksanović, PhD candidate at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE), and an expert on China’s influence in the Western 
Balkans.

European Western Balkans: When the state of emergency was introduced, Serbian 
President Aleksandar Vučić said that China was the only country that could help 
Serbia, and called President Xi Jinping his “brother” and a “friend of Serbia”. 
How do you perceive these messages? Are they addressed to China, citizens of 
Serbia or the European Union?

Vuk Vuksanović: I would say that they are addressed to all three parties, to 
the domestic public, to China as well as to the European capitals. On the one 
hand, it is evident that Vučić is trying to achieve certain internal points by 
promoting himself as the one who will succeed in making Serbia a credible 
partner of all these great powers, and China is especially popular.

Vučić has previously referred to China as Serbia’s most certain and most 
reliable friend. It has now become popular with both the Chinese and Serbian 
side, that phrase about “steel” friendship and partnership between Serbia and 
China. That rhetoric is very striking on the one hand, but has now become even 
stronger.

China has now seized a good opportunity here, but there was also an aspect of 
necessity. Serbia simply accepted Chinese aid because there really was no one 
else who could help in such an energetic way. China has good motives to help 
affected countries, such as Serbia, to repair its damaged image because of the 
way the pandemic erupted.

EWB: How are the messages sent by President Vučić perceived in China, first of 
all by Chinese leadership, but also the citizens? Is it really welcomed there 
in the way that Serbian media presented it, as a message from an important 
friendly country?  

VV: I would say that China has embraced this with open arms, because they now 
need to engage in a very broad campaign in the field of public diplomacy and 
soft power instruments in order to be able to repair the image of China, which 
is obviously very seriously damaged.

This crisis was caused by China covering up information about the severity of 
the initial situation and the epidemic that had arisen in Wuhan, and 
consequently this threatened on the one hand the question of the credibility 
and capabilities of the ruling Communist Party. Also, we have a whole series of 
analyses that talk about whether this could jeopardize other projects, such as 
the “Belt and Road” initiative.

China reacted very quickly with the announcements, but also with measures. We 
see even some other small but important indicators such as WEIBO accounts set 
up by the Government and the Ministry, which received a large number of 
supporters and a large number of donations from Chinese citizens. The Chinese 
certainly responded quickly, but they had their calculations for why they did 
it, but of course, evidently, Serbia has set itself up as a country which 
China’s foreign policy elite counts on. It is all a product of these 
intertwined factors.

EWB: We have heard that China has helped the EU itself, especially the 
countries most affected by the pandemic. How can the support that has been 
promised and that came to Serbia be compared to the support that comes to EU 
countries?

VV: It all depends, we can never know the concrete figures because it is 
constantly changing, I believe, certainly, given the differences in size and 
wealth and the fact that Italy is still a much larger and richer EU Member 
State, much more severely affected by this pandemic than Serbia, that it is 
most likely to receive more assistance. It is more or less part of the same 
package.

China, on the one hand, works to control the damage that has occurred. On the 
other hand, it is still trying to get something out of this bad situation by 
trying to gain additional political points in Europe and among the EU Member 
States, thus trying to eventually expand the number of friendly countries. But 
also among countries on the road to the EU like Serbia.

Employees at the Belgrade Airport, now closed for commercial flights; Photo: 
Tanjug / Zoran Žestić 

EWB: How important do you think Serbia and the Western Balkans are to China? 
There is sometimes the impression here that this is a key region of Chinese 
influence in Europe, but we are aware of other major examples in EU Member 
States. How important, compared to them, are the Western Balkans and Serbia in 
this regard to China and Chinese foreign policy?

VV: They are certainly important. Serbia is perceived as a kind of bridge or an 
open door for China towards Europe. Of course, the main goal in China’s whole 
project is the European Union and, above all, countries like Germany.

But the Western Balkans certainly plays a role because of their geography, as 
their entire infrastructure has to pass through the Balkans. Of course, Serbia 
and the Western Balkans have also proven to be potentially useful as a way to 
test China’s soft power, but also as a way for China to test some of its 
individual branches of industries, such as construction and telecommunications.

For them, Serbia and the Balkans are very useful as a way to test how far they 
can go in their efforts to conquer the markets of European countries. Western 
Balkans, despite its small size, still has a surprising degree of Chinese 
attention.

EWB: Do you expect China’s influence to be greater in the Western Balkans 
region after this crisis is over, considering how China is positioned here 
today and how it is perceived?

VV: We can’t talk about the whole region yet because we still have to see how 
China will treat other countries. There is talk of some packages of relevant 
medical products that China will send to North Macedonia, but we still have to 
look at how it will behave towards the whole region.

But when it comes to Serbia, I believe that Chinese influence will certainly 
grow after this crisis. It is a paradox, one might expect that it could decline 
after such a pandemic that originated from China, however, China reacted very 
quickly and took advantage of the inaction of the western and all other players 
and made an additional plus for themselves in Belgrade.

I would say that of all the global powers, China is certainly the most 
impactful at this stage. Despite traditional russophilia, we see that in all 
this chaos, from coronavirus, to Putin’s preoccupation with the new Russian 
constitution, Russia is hardly mentioned. But Russia is most likely waiting in 
the Security Council to see what happens. There is almost no European Union. 
Washington will be mentioned the moment the Kosovo dispute becomes current 
again, but we will see if anyone can thoroughly deal with the Kosovo dispute in 
the context of this pandemic crisis.

For now, I would say that China is certainly the most striking and visible of 
all the vectors in Serbian foreign policy, at least when it comes to the great 
powers.

EWB: Could these statements by Vučić be seen as a kind of announcement of 
Serbia’s foreign policy turn after this crisis has passed, in terms of 
strengthening partnership with China and turning its back on EU integration?  

VV: It’s a much more complicated question than it might seem at first glance. 
It is the style of the Serbian foreign policy elite to send such bombastic 
statements, however we have also seen that they know how to adapt depending on 
the situation and depending on which foreign interlocutor they are 
communicating with at that particular moment. This is changing very often, 
which we can also see in the way that the pro-government media change very 
often.

China is currently here for the simple reason that Europe is not there. Europe 
is there with money, trade and some projects, but realistically, in terms of a 
serious political presence, a serious strategy or a serious attempt to 
influence Serbian foreign policy, Europe is simply not there in an appropriate 
way.

China is nothing but an integral part of that broader vacuum package existing 
in the Balkans, which is tactically and opportunistically filled by non-Western 
players. And China is most impactful at this point.

EWB: Do you expect that China will help Serbia, as a key country in the Balkans 
and as a key partner of China in the region, more meaningfully in order to show 
that China has a recipe for other countries? Can we hope that China’s 
assistance is crucial to solving the crisis?   

VV: We can certainly hope. I believe that Belgrade would accept EU assistance 
with open arms, that is, it would primarily accept its assistance, but simply 
this time this was accepted because there is no other. In this respect, we can 
only hope that this will have a positive effect. I would say that in any case, 
from the point of view of the most elemental common sense, at this point, it is 
the priority of all priorities.

EWB: When we consider that the EU is hit the hardest by coronavirus, and on the 
other hand, we have the fact that Serbia is a negotiating country, can this 
justify the absence of the EU in the region or the lack of strong messages 
being sent? Does this show that the EU does not care about Serbia and the 
Western Balkans or that the EU cannot cope with the crisis it is facing?

VV: If the EU wants to impose itself as a geopolitical actor, as a global power 
as members of the Brussels foreign policy elite, as well as pan-European 
political voices often say, it must certainly perform much better. All that has 
been shown until now is just another in a series of failures.

Since 2008 and the financial crisis, Europe has not shown itself in the best 
light in the field of monetary union, institutional reform, neither in foreign 
and security policy. And this will further weaken the EU, as it shows that its 
mechanisms for political cooperation and the formulation of political 
instruments and responses are clearly not working.

Second, this also shows that selfish national interests continue to dominate 
over any pan-European sentiment and formulation.

Third, we see that the EU is not only unable to take care of itself, it is also 
unable to care of its backyard. Because if it does not show adequate attention 
to its neighboring region for which the EU nominally claims that it will be a 
part of the EU, then it cannot realistically promote itself as a relevant 
global player. Of course, someone else will take advantage of it, because 
international politics abhors vacuum.

EWB: The prevailing narrative in recent years when it comes to China’s 
influence in the region is that it is one potentially detrimental influence 
because of opening up space for corruption. Considering such a crisis at the 
moment and China’s ability to help the region economically and in other ways, 
how justified is the narrative that Chinese influence is above all harmful?

VV: We saw a statement by Aleksandar Vučić saying that Serbia was forced to 
acquire certain medical devices due to shortages and urgency, even in the 
global gray (semi-black) market. This crisis will certainly force many states 
to throw some old rulebooks out the window.

But if we were to look at this independently, a propos the story about the 
influence of China opening up the space for corruption, I would say that there 
is this fundamental problem. The issue of corruption and the question of the 
declining rule of law in the Western Balkans are not the product of Chinese 
practices. It is first and foremost a product of the actions of local actors 
and local political circumstances.

However, China has, in a paradoxical way, profited from such a state of 
declining rule of law, and is in some way helping the process indirectly. The 
situation where there are no adequate legal mechanisms for audit or adequate 
screening, suits China really well, that it is enough for China to knock on one 
door and get the green light for any project based solely on political blessing 
from one relevant person or one relevant power center. China is thus profiting 
from the illiberal political environment in the Western Balkans.

China is indirectly assisting such a process of erosion of the rule of law for 
the simple reason that it gives political elites who are destroying the rule of 
law system in the Western Balkans the opportunity to somehow still allow 
capital inflows and promote themselves before their voters as people who are 
able to deliver certain benefits to their public. Of course, China does not do 
this for the purpose of deepening the decline of the rule of law, but 
indirectly, the way China does business helps such a situation.

 

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