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Serbia’s Decoupling From Russia BY 6-7 minutes _____ erbia seems to be preparing to distance itself from Russia. The Balkan nation has still not joined anti-Russian sanctions, although Belgrade’s recent moves suggest that the country could soon officially “pick a side” in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Ever since Russia launched the invasion of Ukraine, Serbia has been attempting to maintain its neutral stance regarding a war that has already brought many changes to the existing global order. The southeastern European country has condemned <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/02/serbia-backs-un-resolution-condemning-russian-attack-on-ukraine/> Russia’s actions, although it refused <https://tass.com/world/1418337?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com> to impose sanctions on Moscow. In other words, Belgrade has been trying to balance <https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/serbias-difficult-ukraine-balancing-act> its aspirations to join the European Union with its close political and energy ties to the Kremlin. Now that Russia has been isolated and its positions in the international arena significantly weakened, Serbia likely cannot continue doing business as usual with its nominal strategic partner <https://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/foreign-policy/bilateral-cooperation/russia> . Politically, Belgrade can still count on Russia’s support regarding Kosovo – a territory that unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, and has been recognized as an independent state by most Western countries - although not by four EU member states: Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Slovakia. However, according to Serbian Aleksandar Vucic <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/vucic-putins-statements-pressures-serbia-to-recognise-kosovo/> , for Belgrade things have changed for the worse after Russian leader Vladimir Putin used the Kosovo precedent to justify <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68287> Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic. During his meeting with the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on April 26, the Russian President said that in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine, the people of Crimea had “acted in practically the same way as the people living in Kosovo - they made a decision on independence.” Talking about Kosovo’s unilaterally declared independence, Putin stressed that the Donbas republics can enjoy the same right without permission from Ukraine’s central government and declare their sovereignty “since the precedent has been created.” In response to Putin’s statements, several pro-government tabloids in Serbia published <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/04/28/putin-stabbed-a-knife-into-serbias-back-tabloids-turn-against-russian-president-for-the-first-time/> front pages with highly critical headlines about the Russian leader, claiming that he “stabbed a knife into Serbia’s back”. Even President Vucic seems to have changed his rhetoric regarding Putin. “We are now in a problem because the West will call on Serbia to head quickly toward recognizing Kosovo so that they can tell Putin that the Donbas and Kosovo are not about the same issue”, Vucic stressed <https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2022&mm=05&dd=07&nav_id=113659> . It is therefore unsurprising that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz openly said <https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-scholz-serbia-kosovo-talks/31834659.html> that recognition of Kosovo – something that Germany did a long time ago – will be part of the future agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. In the mid-term, the West will likely pressure Serbia to recognize Kosovo, and also to join anti-Russian sanctions. The Balkan nation, completely surrounded by NATO and EU members, does not seem to have much room for political maneuvers. Quite aware of such a difficult position, Serbian authorities have already hinted that the country will de facto be on the Western side in a new Cold War geopolitical battle against Russia. Even though Serbia declared military neutrality <https://cfsp.rs/2019/10/07/military-neutrality-of-the-republic-of-serbia/> in 2007, Croatian media <https://www.balkansec.net/post/hrvatski-mediji-vojna-oprema-za-ukrajinu-tranzitira-kroz-ma%C4%91arsku-hrvatsku-i-srbiju> reported that Belgrade allowed railroad transport of non-combat military equipment for Ukraine to cross Serbian territory. The train reportedly entered Croatia from Hungary on April 23, and then continued through Serbia to Romania. Such an action, however, did not raise concerns in Moscow, although some reports suggest <https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/ukrainian-forces-using-serbian-weapons/> that Serbia also supplied weapons to Ukraine. Besides providing open support to the war-torn nation, the West also seems to expect Serbia to reduce its energy ties with Moscow. Russia’s energy giant Gazprom and its subsidiary Gazpromneft own 56.15% of the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS), and that is something that has become a headache <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/05/03/russian-owned-oil-company-becomes-headache-for-serbia/> for the Balkan country. Although Vucic said <https://tass.com/economy/1448113> that Belgrade will not nationalize NIS, Serbian authorities seem to be looking for a way to diminish Russian influence in the nation’s energy sector. “We have to defend energy stability at all costs, even at the cost of changing the ownership structure of NIS. We would not be taking anything away from anyone, but we have to take care of ourselves,” said <http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/zorana-mihajlovic-srbija-mora-da-odbrani-energetsku-stabilnost-cak-i-po-cenu-promene-vlasnistva-u-nis-u.html> Zorana Mihajlovic, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Mining and Energy, pointing out that “the war in Ukraine has changed and is yet to change Serbia”. According to reports <https://www.rtv.rs/sr_ci/ekonomija/aktuelno/azerbejdzanski-sokar-zainteresovan-za-preuzimanje-nis-a_1331697.html> , the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) is interested in buying out NIS’ controlling stake, and has been in contact with both Gazprom and the government of Serbia. Such a purchase seems realistic, given that Serbia is already building the gas interconnector <https://eurasianet.org/southeast-europe-looks-to-azerbaijan-to-replace-russian-gas> with neighboring Bulgaria, which would connect the two countries to Azerbaijan’s gas producers. The interconnector, which is expected to be completed by October 2023, will also enable Serbia and other countries from the region to access various sources of gas through the Southern Gas Corridor and the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal near Alexandroupolis, Greece. In other words, they will try to achieve diversification from Russian gas. The problem, however, is that it is still highly uncertain whether gas from Azerbaijan can completely replace Russian energy, at least in the short-term. In 2023, Azerbaijan is expected to supply European countries with 11 billion cubic meters <https://asiatimes.com/2022/03/gas-rich-azerbaijan-a-russia-ukraine-war-winner/> of natural gas, which cannot satisfy European needs, given that presently the EU imports 169 billion cubic meters <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/russia-ukraine-europe-energy-supply-crisis/> of gas from Russia. Serbia, for its part, due to its geographical position, will almost certainly share Europe’s energy and political fate, whatever it may be. -- http:www.antic.org --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "SERBIAN NEWS NETWORK" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/senet/008401d869d8%243c028480%24b4078d80%24%40gmail.com.
