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The US and EU need a new roadmap to solve the Serbia-Kosovo conflict - Emerging 
Europe


Alon Ben-Meir Centre for Global Affairs, NYU

12–15 minutes

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It is naïve to assume that given the current geopolitical conditions in the 
Balkans and the psychological dimension of the conflict between Kosovo and 
Serbia that a resolution to their conflict can be found unless the EU and the 
US develop a clearly articulated cost-and-benefit strategy cushioned by a 
realistic process of reconciliation.

The recent demonstrations following municipal elections in the three 
Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo, and the events that followed, 
strongly suggest how raw the nerves are between Prime Minister Albin Kurti and 
ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, as well as between Kurti and Serbia’s President 
Aleksandar Vučić. They demonstrate how far apart they remain, and how 
distrustful they are of each other.

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The unfortunate developments that occurred before and after the demonstrations 
include: the dispatch of police by Kurti to quell the demonstrations; Kurti’s 
refusal to sign off on the Association of Serb Municipalities; Vučić’s refusal 
to sign the Franco-German agreement even though he agreed verbally to abide by 
its provisions; Vučić’s call on Kosovar Serbs to boycott the elections and 
“resist the occupation”; and his dispatch of a Serbian military contingency to 
the border with Kosovo. 

The violent flareup that ensued, in which 30 KFOR peacekeepers were injured, 
prompted intense criticism by the EU and the US of Kurti’s misguided action.


The psychological dimension


To maintain stability in the Balkans and make tangible progress in the 
negotiations between the two sides, the EU and the US must consider the factors 
that continue to weigh heavily on the thinking and attitudes of both Vučić and 
Kurti. 

First, there is a need to understand and address the psychological dimension of 
the conflict that continues to haunt them. Second, there should be a clear 
framework that spells out the cost and benefit if they negotiate in good faith 
and deliver on the promised concessions they make. And finally, the EU must 
demonstrate their keenness to facilitate the process of integration and spell 
out what Vučić and Kurti would gain to advance their integration into the EU, 
to which both strongly aspire.

Before delving deeper, it is necessary to have a better grasp of the character 
of these two leaders, their strength and weakness, what they want to achieve, 
and how they want to be perceived by their own publics, their allies, and their 
foes.

Kurti is a nationalist for whom Kosovo’s independence is sacrosanct and cannot 
under any circumstances be compromised. This explains his resistance to the 
Association of Serb Municipalities and their potential implications for 
Kosovo’s territorial integrity. Even though he was imprisoned during the war, 
he was well aware of the atrocities and war crimes committed by Serbia against 
Albanian Kosovars and he still suffers from psychological scars the war 
inflicted on him and his countrymen. He resents Vučić’s continuing refusal to 
account for thousands of missing Albanian Kosovars believed to be buried in 
mass graves.

Moreover, Kurti does not trust Vučić to deliver on any promises he makes, which 
explains his reluctance to follow through on commitments he made, including 
several of the provisions in the Franco-German plans. He still has an 
anti-American streak from the time he was in the opposition, albeit he 
recognises the indispensable role of the US as the guardian of Kosovo’s 
security and independence.

Vučić has a no less complicated personality and set of hang-ups. He is a 
nationalist to the core who plays at the public sentiment. He staunchly refuses 
to recognise Kosovo’s independence as he stated in his appearance on Happy TV: 
“The Serbian leadership will not sign a capitulation, will not support the 
membership of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo in the United Nations, and 
will not recognise its independence.” 

He hardly ever negotiates in good faith, as was demonstrated by his first 
accepting the Franco-German plan in Ohrid, North Macedonia on March 18 but then 
refusing to sign it, which he in fact stated weeks in advance. “As for signing 
something [in Ohrid],” he said, “I’m not planning anything.” He consistently 
encouraged ethnic Serbs in Kosovo to defy the central government as he called 
on them to boycott the elections and not abide the authorities in Prishtina.

Moreover, although he professes to seek integration into the EU, he does not 
share Western values. He is authoritarian, and a denier of war crimes committed 
by the Serbian army against Albanian Kosovars. He has maintained close ties 
with Russia, Serbia’s traditional Slavic ally, especially because Belgrade 
still depends heavily on Russia for military hardware and training and because 
there are strong religious ties between the Serbian and Russian Orthodox 
Churches. He relies on Moscow’s opposition to Kosovo’s independence in the UN 
and is fearful of Putin’s ire should he toe the Western line, particularly now 
as the Ukraine war is raging. Finally, he refused to join the sanctions against 
Russia, and is unlikely to change his position as long as Putin is in power.


What the EU should do


The EU with the full support of the US should develop a new strategy that would 
induce both Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate and accept the eventuality of mutual 
recognition through a process of reconciliation and intermediate agreements in 
which both countries develop a vested interest. The EU needs to provide a clear 
horizon for both Kosovo and Serbia based on reciprocity and a full adherence to 
any agreed-upon issue.

In dealing with Kurti, the EU must first make it clear that integration into 
the bloc is a process that requires full cooperation with the EU and full 
adherence to the rules and agreements that bind the EU together. By dispatching 
the police to northern Kosovo in an extremely sensitive context and time 
without consultation with the EU, he ignored the advice of the EU to reduce the 
tension and maintain calm, which suggests to the EU that he is not a reliable 
partner.

Second, since the EU and the US are the guardians of Kosovo’s security and 
independence, Kurti must demonstrate greater trust in their judgment as neither 
wants to compromise Kosovo’s independence and territorial integrity. Kurti 
should sign off on the Association of Serb Municipalities without any further 
delay. In addition, he should begin to implement the Franco-German accord and 
put Vučić rather than himself on the defensive.

Third, as a prospective EU member, Kurti should demonstrate considerable 
sensitivity regarding the West’s concerns over the stability of the Balkans, 
especially now due to the war in Ukraine and Putin’s determination to do 
everything he can to destabilize the region and engage the West in another 
volatile front.

Fourth, however distrustful Kurti is of Vučić, he must learn to deal with him 
and demonstrate to the EU that he will always negotiate in good faith. He 
should not allow any failure in the negotiating process to be attributed to him 
while enhancing his credibility with the EU, which is central to advancing 
Kosovo’s integration.

Fifth, Kurti ought to pay far greater attention to his domestic affairs. He 
ought to progressively meet the EU’s socio-economic, educational, cultural, and 
human rights standards. He should weed out corruption, encourage foreign 
investments, create jobs to prevent the brain drain which is hampering Kosovo’s 
growth and progress, invest in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and 
housing, and tend to the needs of the poor, especially children.

Since Kurti has cast Kosovo’s fate with the EU, he must now demonstrate that 
Prishtina is worthy of EU membership, because, regardless of when that might 
happen, its voice will be equal to that of France, Germany, Italy, and every 
other member state. This will be an incredible feat for Kosovo, which also 
carries an awesome responsibility. His standing with the EU and the US is 
currently questionable; the burden is on him to prove that he is trustworthy 
and has the leadership quality, the acumen, and the skills to live up to the 
call of the hour.

The EU on its part should offer Kosovo a framework for its prospective 
integration by reciprocating Pristina’s commitment to follow EU guidelines and 
condition the process of integration to the progress that Kosovo makes on all 
fronts. 

The areas where Kosovo wants to realise important gains and where the EU and 
the US can play a critical role include: membership in international 
organisations; recognition of its independence by the five EU states that have 
not yet recognised Kosovo—Romania, Cyprus, Greece, Spain, and Slovakia; opening 
a dialogue with the EU in connection with the integration process; exerting 
pressure on and/or persuading Vučić to fully implement the Franco-German 
agreement, which is central to the reconciliation process between the two 
countries.


Vučić must restore his credibility


In dealing with Vučić, the EU is fully aware that unlike Kurti, by virtue of 
his connection to Putin, Vučić is not as free to act transparently to advance 
Serbia’s integration with the EU. But given Serbia’s aspiration to become an EU 
member state, he has to come around and accept the inevitability of coexistence 
with an independent Kosovo.

Vučić must stop defying and denying Kosovo’s independence publicly, knowing 
that its independence is irreversible. He must stop instigating ethnic Serbs in 
Kosovo to rebel against Prishtina as he has recently done following the 
elections in the three Serb-dominated municipalities.

He should slowly and gradually distance himself from Russia and be reminded of 
Moscow’s growing international isolation, its military failures in Ukraine, and 
its much-diminished global stature and power; it is becoming an uncertain ally 
on whom he cannot depend.

Moreover, Vučić should actively persuade the Serbs in the north of Kosovo to 
return to the institutions and play a constructive role to stabilise the area. 
He should sign and fully adhere to the Franco-German agreement to enhance his 
credibility, which presently is in tatters. 

Vučić should also should take steps to normalise relations with Kosovo by 
reaching interim agreements regarding water distribution from Lake Ujmani and 
mining at Trepça Mine, expanding trade, and encouraging cultural ties, student 
exchanges, and more.

Although these activities do not constitute recognition of Kosovo, they will 
prepare the Serbian public psychologically for such an eventuality, especially 
once Putin departs the political scene.

In return, the EU should offer Serbia a roadmap that would lead to full 
integration and open up a dialogue towards that end. The EU should also develop 
and agree on a quid pro quo so that Vučić will know what he might receive in 
return for any concession he makes. This includes compliance to the provision 
of any accord, verbal or otherwise, especially the Franco-German agreement 
which is crucial to bring an end to the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo.

Since for the EU and the US, solving the Serbian-Kosovar conflict is critical 
to the stability of the Balkans, they should change the dynamic of the conflict 
between Belgrade and Prishtina by offering a roadmap to integration with the EU 
that both countries aspire for.

It is now up to Vučić and Kurti to either squander the prospect of becoming an 
integral part of the European community, or work together, seize the 
opportunity, and enjoy the growth, prosperity, and security accorded to all 
member states of the EU.

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Photo: Aleksandar Vučić (left) and Albin Kurti (right) meet with the EU’s Josep 
Borrell and Miroslav Lajčák in Brussels in May. © 
<https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/permalink/p161866>  European Union 
<https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/permalink/p161866> 

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