foreignpolicy.com 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/16/ukraine-europe-eu-accession-expansion-russia-balkans-backfire/>
  


The EU’s Membership Plan for Ukraine Could Easily Backfire


Paul Hockenos

10–12 minutes

  _____  

On Nov. 8, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen officially 
recommended 
<https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-adopts-2023-enlargement-package-recommends-open-negotiations-ukraine-and-moldova-grant-2023-11-08_en>
  that Ukraine and Moldova open membership negotiations with Brussels soon, 
upon fulfilling certain criteria. The move is both an expression of commitment 
to Ukraine and a shot across Russia’s bow. Indeed, EU officials are betting 
that by anchoring Eastern Europeans—Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the Western 
Balkans and eventually Georgia, too—ever more solidly in the EU, it can lift 
them out of the precarious no-man’s-land between the EU and Russia, and thus 
stabilize the EU’s eastern borders. The best way to expand Europeans’ peace and 
prosperity, according to 
<https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ukraine-eu-beitritt-von-der-leyen-selenskij-1.6298451?reduced=true>
  von der Leyen, is to lock all liberal-minded states from the Baltics to the 
Balkans into the institutions and structures of democratic Europe. “Enlargement 
is a vital policy for the European Union,” she said. “Completing our union is 
the call of history. … We all win.”

But the gambit could backfire if Brussels proves as uneven as it has in the 
Western Balkans, where the enlargement process has ground on for 20 years 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_03_163> —and even 
triggered a backlash in countries that have become frustrated and disappointed 
as a result of unfulfilled promises despite many years of imperfect but 
hard-won reforms. These unfortunate countries not only remain outside of the 
EU, but some are run by national populists who are moving in the other 
direction and forging alliances with the EU’s geopolitical rivals, including 
Russia and Turkey. Given the complexities of integrating the likes of Ukraine 
and Moldova, it’s easy to imagine them experiencing the same treatment from the 
EU—and rousing the same kind of backlash in response.

In the early 2000s, the EU opened the enlargement process to all of the Western 
Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia. But two decades later, only Croatia has joined—the 
blame for which lies at the feet both of the aspiring countries and the EU 
itself. An array of internal issues and bilateral spats between the countries 
have obstructed them from fulfilling all of the obligations of membership, 
including standards of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Serbia has 
long-standing rule of law and corruption issues that have become worse after 
initially getting better, and its fraught relationship with Kosovo complicates 
its status all the more. Likewise, Kosovo has Serbia blocking its way, as well 
as the fact that several EU states refuse to recognize its independence. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is highly unstable 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/bosnia-constitution-high-representative-united-states-disaster/>
 , the postwar peace accords having divided a country that mostly observes the 
peace but can’t move forward with reform.

The fact that Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia are basically ready to 
go 
<https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/22/how-close-are-the-western-balkans-to-joining-the-european-union>
 —and have been for years now—illustrates that much of the problem lies with 
the EU itself. In the wake of accepting Romania and Bulgaria (2007) and Croatia 
(2013), many member states expressed “enlargement fatigue” and felt that 
consolidation, not enlargement, was the order of the day—most vocally France, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands. Of course, in light of the nightmare of the EU’s 
trials with authoritarian Poland 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/rule-of-law-law-and-justice-pis-party-european-commission-takes-poland-to-court-over-eu-law-violations/>
  and Hungary 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220909IPR40137/meps-hungary-can-no-longer-be-considered-a-full-democracy>
 , which threw wrenches in its workings, every EU country is wary of new 
members whose patchy democratic credentials might cause them to do the same. 
Nor is enlargement a popular stance: In France and Germany, just 35 percent and 
42 percent 
<https://ip-quarterly.com/en/what-europe-thinks-about-eu-enlargement>  of 
respondents, respectively, desire enlargement. In Austria, just 29 percent. 
Rubbing salt in the wounds, French President Emmanuel Macron has called for a 
European Political Community 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/06/world/europe/macron-european-political-community.html>
  for like-minded non-EU states that fall short of membership benchmarks (and 
any interested EU countries)—a purgatory of sorts for loser nations.

The lack of a clear path or concrete timeline has brought momentum on demanding 
reforms to a standstill and, in some countries, even reversed it. Many of the 
Western Balkan countries now have potent political forces in their midst that 
dismiss the EU as hypocritical and its benchmarks as counterproductive. The 
loss of momentum toward membership has initiated a vicious cycle, argued a 
report 
<https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-05/230525_Bergmann_Enlargement_Conundrum.pdf?VersionId=KKNz_l_WvRMhyzZooQEuHY8Kn0qEIe9K>
  by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank based in 
Washington, D.C. It stated: “Stalled reform efforts contribute to slow economic 
growth, which in turn justifies skepticism within the European Union about 
future enlargement. With membership more of a distant or unachievable prospect, 
public attention and political focus [in the Balkans] shift toward other areas, 
making it harder to justify policies required to align with the EU acquis. 
Thus, greater political space is created for populist candidates or for 
political leaders to cater to EU competitors, such as China or Russia.”

Today, the region is rife with the detritus of the EU’s failures. There is no 
better example than Serbia, which applied for EU membership in 2009 and since 
2012 has been a candidate for accession—languishing in the waiting room, as it 
is called. Reforms according to the acquis communautaire have lurched forward 
only to slide back again. While some critics attribute this to the Serbs’ lack 
of effort and illiberal political culture, others say the complicated country 
would have fared much better with a firmer helping hand from Brussels.

>From 2017 until earlier this week, the right-wing nationalist Aleksandar 
>Vucic, a onetime ally of former Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, served 
>as president, a post from which he pledged alliance to the EU reform process 
>on one day and then praised Russian President Vladimir Putin the next. 
>Although the Serbia of today is a different animal than the one of 20 years 
>ago, largely as a result of the EU processes, it has been slow to address the 
>tough reforms addressing organized crime, rule of law violations, corruption, 
>and judicial independence. This year, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
>Switzerland, Vucic said 
><https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-vucic-davos-world-economic-forum-european-union-membership/>
> , in words that almost every regional leader could utter: “We are not as 
>enthusiastic as we used to be, in a way that European Union is not that 
>enthusiastic about us as we thought it was.” He said he was “pessimistic” 
>about Serbia entering the EU any time soon.

Belgrade’s disillusionment has made it open to overtures from Russia. Moscow 
bolsters 
<https://www.clingendael.org/publication/russian-influence-serbia-bosnia-and-herzegovina-and-montenegro>
  radical nationalist parties 
<https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/the-serbian-orthodox-church-and-extreme-right-groups-a-marriage-of-convenience-or-organic-partnership>
  and the Orthodox Church, as well as Milorad Dodik 
<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-meets-bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-hails-rise-trade-2023-05-23/>
 , the Serbian nationalist former co-president of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
terms of geopolitics, Serbia has undermined the Euro-Atlantic sanctions regime 
against wartime Russia. Not only does it refuse to implement trade and 
financial sanctions, but it also imports 
<https://balkaninsight.com/2023/11/15/serbia-signs-natural-gas-deal-with-azerbaijan/>
  Russian natural gas. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation is much the 
same.

The EU’s rationale in taking this monumental step with Ukraine and Moldova 
makes sense on a number of levels. Ukraine has staked its very existence on 
identifying as a liberal democracy; ultimately, it is the chief reason behind 
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine and his disinclination to 
relent. A proper democracy aligned with Western Europe rather than Russia 
undermines the stripe of illiberal, authoritarian state that Russia and its 
satellites embody and want to perpetuate. Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity in 
2014 and tenacious defense of its territory since the Russian invasion in 2022 
underscore how serious Ukraine is about its commitment to becoming a 
Western-style democracy. And this striving has been recognized by the 
Euro-Atlantic alliance in the form of military and humanitarian aid, 
international diplomatic engagement, and in June 2022 the award 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ukraine/>  of EU 
candidate status.

But Ukraine and Moldova will soon have to embark on the tough economic reforms 
the EU requires—and the challenge of doing so at a time of war. “This is why 
the European Commission cannot run the process of Ukraine’s accession in the 
same way for the Western Balkans,” argued Vessela Tcherneva of the think tank 
European Council on Foreign Relations. “As a country at war, Ukraine’s 
accession must contain bold and coherent political messaging and larger amounts 
of funding linked to its reconstruction.”

This recipe must apply to the Western Balkans as well, since the EU can’t leave 
it festering while granting perks and revamped processes to Ukraine and 
Moldova. The EU hasn’t lost the Western Balkans yet, but it could, were it not 
to make amends now. This would mean, among other things, increasing 
pre-accession EU funds and providing early access to certain policy areas. Most 
experts agree that a Ukraine at peace and backed wholeheartedly by Brussels 
could make the grade. Essential is that Ukraine’s reform-minded politicians can 
convince its citizenry that the hard slog to get there is worth the effort.

 

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