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Can Serbia Stay Neutral in a Polarized World


RFE/RL staff

11–14 minutes

  _____  

On the sidelines of an economic forum in Vladivostok on September 4, Serbian 
Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin made it clear to Russian President 
Vladimir Putin that Belgrade is a strategic partner and an "ally of Russia."

Putin reciprocated the warmth, offering his greetings to President Aleksandar 
Vucic and then inviting his Serbian counterpart to attend the upcoming BRICS 
summit in the Russian city of Kazan. 

This Slavic show of solidarity, however, didn't sit well with the European 
Union. The next day, EU foreign affairs spokesman Peter Stano said that 
"maintaining or even increasing the ties with Russia during the time of its 
illegal aggression against the Ukrainian people is not compatible with EU 
values."

Vulin's visit to Russia was perhaps even harder for the EU to swallow as there 
have been signs recently that Serbia is moving closer to the bloc. At the end 
of August, Serbia signed a deal with France to replace its aging MiGs with 
Rafale jets. And in July, Serbia signed a deal with the EU to develop a lithium 
mining project to produce batteries for electric cars.

The mixed messages, however, are business as usual for Serbia under Vucic, who 
for his 12 years in power has pursued a multi-vector diplomatic course, 
balancing Serbia's relations with the West, Russia, and China.

Those hoping Serbia's recent business deals were a sign of the country's 
wholehearted embrace of the West might have been disappointed.

Ivan Krastev, who chairs the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and is a 
permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, told RFE/RL 
that the deal with France was not a case of Serbia "simply taking sides once 
and for all."

That was clear when Vucic spoke at a press conference with the French president 
on August 29, he said, "I know that Emmanuel [Macron] would like me to 
introduce sanctions against Russia. But we did not do it, and we are not 
ashamed of our decision."

On the surface, the recent deals with Germany and France may look like a kind 
of "European moment" for Serbia, said Vessela Tcherneva, the deputy director of 
the European Council on Foreign Relations.

"But what makes me a bit skeptical," she told RFE/RL, "is the fact that we know 
that beyond the pure trade relationship and the pure security dimension of 
this, there is also the dimension of democracy and the pro-European forces in 
Serbia. Where does this leave them?" she asked.

Spreading The Wealth

Vucic does not have the outlook or pedigree of a natural, Westernizing 
democrat. In the late 1990s, he served as Serbian information minister in the 
final years of Slobodan Milosevic's regime. He was a high-ranking official in 
the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party, although he distanced himself from 
the party in 2008.

Whereas Milosevic was a pariah internationally, known as the "butcher of the 
Balkans" for his role in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, Vucic has been largely 
cooperative on the world stage, seen by EU and Western powers as indispensable 
and instrumental to stability in the Balkans.

An international third way has always been embedded in Yugoslavia and Serbia's 
DNA. Serbian officials still like to say that Serbia is "the East of the West" 
and "the West of the East." And Vucic's balancing approach has a strong 
precedent in the politics of long-time Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, who was 
one of the founding leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, an alliance of states 
that did not formally side with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Serbia, however, is not as strong as Yugoslavia once was -- and that means 
Vucic's policy requires more flexibility and constant shifting. Vucic is adept 
at sharing the wealth among Serbia's international partners, making sure to 
give all the stakeholders something but, crucially, not giving everything to 
anyone.

In that regard, the EU is Serbia's largest investor, with significant 
infrastructure investments, including 96 million euros ($106 million) in 2024 
for road and rail modernization, in addition to projects supporting Serbia's 
transition to green energy. However, Russia controls Serbia's national oil 
refinery, and China, through its Zijin Mining Group, owns 63 percent of RTB 
Bor, the country's largest mining operation.

Vucic has also opened up Serbia to the Arab world. The United Arab Emirates has 
invested millions of dollars in the vast Belgrade Waterfront urban development, 
although the project has been marred with accusations of corruption.

Not wanting to leave out the United States, in May, Serbia cut a deal with 
Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of former U.S. President and Republican 
presidential nominee Donald Trump, to redevelop the former Yugoslav Defense 
Ministry building in the center of Belgrade. The blackened shell of the 
ministry is iconic in the Serbian capital, destroyed in the U.S.-led NATO 
bombing campaign in 1999.

With the U.S. presidential election in November, many Balkan-watchers have seen 
the deal with Kushner as Serbia preparing for Trump's possible return to the 
White House. In a recent interview with the U.K.'s Financial Times, however, 
Vucic insisted that the deal was purely a "business venture."

As ever, Vucic is hedging his bets. "My friend [Hungarian Prime Minister] 
Viktor [Orban], he is 100 percent on Trump's side, " he told the Financial 
Times. "My friends from Brussels, they are 100 percent on Biden's side. I'm 
not. I'm on the Serbian side waiting for the results." 

The Serbian president has taken a similar approach to Ukraine, by attempting to 
diversify his risks. While refusing to sign up to Western sanctions on Russia, 
Serbia has also provided shells to Ukraine via third parties worth 800 million 
euros ($888 million) since 2022, or one-third of the overall European supply.

Push And Pull

Serbia's relationship with Russia, while complex and laden with history, 
follows Vucic's similar push-and-pull playbook. The two predominantly Slavic 
nations have a historical and spiritual affinity, and Serbia is reliant on 
Russia diplomatically, for example, in blocking the admission to the UN of 
Kosovo, a former Serbian province that declared independence in 2008.

Vucic has tried to keep Russia at arm's length. Just before German Chancellor 
Olaf Scholz's visit to Belgrade on July 19 to sign the deal on lithium, Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksander Grushko visited Vucic in the Serbian capital.

One insider claimed that the meeting was "frosty," according to the the U.K.'s 
Financial Times. "Grushko sat down and started reading a list of 23 complaints, 
including the Kremlin's fury at Belgrade's decision to supply Ukraine with 
munitions," the source told the newspaper. "When Grushko got about halfway 
through the list, Vucic stood up, announced the meeting was over, and walked 
out."

He was similarly cold in his response to receiving the invitation to join the 
BRICS summit in Russia in October, saying that Serbia would have important 
guests during that period and that he would decide at a later date.

Speaking at the Globsec forum in Prague on August 31, Vucic rejected the idea 
that Belgrade was a Kremlin Trojan horse, saying that he hadn't had personal 
contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin for 2 and 1/2 years.

While Vucic relies heavily on Russia, said Kurt Volker, a former U.S. 
ambassador to NATO and envoy for Ukraine, he is "still trying to maintain some 
freedom of maneuver and independence."

'Stabilitocracy'

A criticism often leveled at Brussels is that the EU is prepared to put its 
larger interests of maintaining a geopolitical and ethnic balance in the 
volatile Balkans ahead of concerns about fundamental freedoms. Some critics 
have called this the EU's "stabilitocracy approach."

While initially criticizing Serbia's last parliamentary elections in December 
2023, which were marred with numerous irregularities, those concerns were soon 
swept under the rug with the business deals with the EU and France.

"If Macron's getting a sale, he's not going to push very hard on other issues," 
Volker told RFE/RL.

For years, international watchdogs and rights groups have warned about Serbia's 
poor record on media freedom, the rule of law, and rampant corruption. The 
latest Freedom House report gave Serbia a political rights score of 18 out of a 
possible 40, placing it in the "partly free" category, and noting the country's 
downward tendency toward authoritarianism.

While the Serbian authorities paint a picture of the country as a regional 
economic powerhouse with one of the highest growth rates in Europe, Serbia 
continues to face numerous obstacles.

According to a July assessment from the U.S. International Trade 
Administration, "these challenges include weak rule of law; political 
interference in the economy; a slow-moving judicial system subject to political 
pressure; both real and perceived issues of corruption; an overly complex and 
sometimes nontransparent bureaucracy; [and] an opaque tendering process."

And, in many ways, Vucic has been a stronger leader than Milosevic, who died in 
2006 in prison in The Hague, where he was being tried for war crimes. 
Domestically, the Serbian president has succeeded where Milosevic failed, for 
example by exerting control over parts of Belgrade that had been traditional 
strongholds for the opposition.

"Under Vucic, we've seen reinforced Serbian nationalism. We've seen efforts to 
undermine Montenegro. We've seen efforts to prop up [Bosnian Serb leader] 
Milorad Dodik and undermine Bosnia," Volker said.

Given that 70 percent of Serbia's trade is with the European Union, many in the 
EU wonder if Vucic is truly committed to the principles of the bloc or if 
Serbia's ambition to join is solely motivated by economic need.

Catch-All Policy

Vucic runs his domestic and international policy almost like a permanent 
election campaign: keeping his opponents -- and even partners -- on their toes, 
uncertain about his next move.

Calibrated contradictions abound. While it was Vucic who clinched the deal with 
Western countries to mine more lithium, he has also accused Western security 
services of masterminding popular protests against the mines and plotting a 
"color revolution" against him.

"Vucic has a catch-all policy," Ivan Vejvoda, a fellow at the Institute for 
Human Sciences in Vienna, told the Financial Times in June.

"One moment you have [Chinese President] Xi [Jinping] visiting. Then, days 
later, [Olena] Zelenska (the first lady of Ukraine) and Dmytro Kuleba 
(Ukraine's former foreign minister) come [to visit]. Then he goes to the 
Russian cultural center and gives a revisionist speech. And then, two days 
later, he is with the EU, talking about growth plans," Vejvoda said.

The risk Vucic runs is that, while his policy may seem pragmatic, in the end he 
might be perceived by Serbia's international partners as untrustworthy.

"Staying on the fence is not easy," Center for Liberal Strategies fellow 
Krastev said. "In a certain way, you become too vulnerable."

Volker, on the other hand, doesn't necessarily think that Vucic has an end 
point in mind.

"For somebody in his position, it's like riding a bicycle," he said. "You have 
to keep this up indefinitely, keep juggling all the balls, and then you keep 
going. And that's the goal in itself, just to be in power and keep going."

By RFE/RL

 

 

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