swp-berlin.org 
<https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-eus-raw-materials-diplomacy-serbia-as-a-test-case>
  


The EU’s Raw Materials Diplomacy: Serbia as a Test Case


Melanie Müller; Lea Maria Strack; Marina Vulović

62–79 minutes

  _____  

In July 2024, the European Union (EU) and the Serbian government signed a 
strategic raw materials partnership. For the EU, this cooperation represents an 
important step towards diversifying its supply chains and strengthening 
economic partnerships in its neighbourhood. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić 
has a geopolitical interest in this cooperation, which he also wants to use to 
further consolidate his already extensive power domestically. The signing of 
the partnership agreement has triggered massive protests in Serbia. Critics 
fear that the implementation of the raw materials partnership could further 
undermine already fragile rule-of-law structures, as well as environ­mental and 
social standards. The case of Serbia illustrates that the EU can only exert 
limited influence on the country’s authoritarian government in a geopolitically 
tense context. However, it must strategically use its available leverage to 
mitigate the existing risks.

In 2024, the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) to ensure the 
col­lective supply of so-called strategic raw materials – resources that are 
“of significant importance for the EU and exhibit very 
<https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/security-of-supply-in-times-of-geo-economic-fragmentation>
  high supply risks”. To enhance supply security and, in particular, to reduce 
the high level of dependence on Chinese raw material imports, the EU aims to 
expand European capacities in mining, processing, and recycling while 
diversifying its import sources.

To achieve this diversification, the EU has signed several partnership 
agreements with resource-rich countries in various regions of the world. The 
raw materials partnership with EU accession candidate Serbia is of particular 
interest for two reasons. First, Serbia has significant deposits of lithium, 
which is a strategic raw material crucial for battery produc­tion 
<https://www.spektrum.de/news/kritische-rohstoffe-auf-der-suche-nach-europas-lithium/2230737>
 . Second, this partnership would allow the EU to expand its geopolitical 
influence in the Balkan raw materials sector, where China has become 
increasingly active in recent years.

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding 
<https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/6fe0e605-9299-45c3-b846-2efb85585251_en>
  (MoU) on the EU-Serbia raw materials partnership was publicly celebrated at 
the Serbian Critical Raw Materials Summit in July 2024. The MoU, which is not 
legally binding, consists of five components: cooperation in developing value 
chains for raw materials, batteries, and electric vehicles; research and 
inno­vation; high ESG (environmental, social, governance) standards; the 
mobilisation of financial instruments; and the development of skills for 
high-quality jobs in the raw materials and battery sectors.

Serbia and the EU are currently developing a joint roadmap that will list 
specific activities for cooperation and identify entry points for collaboration 
between companies. Additionally, the aim is to implement projects while 
adhering to high, transparent sustainability standards. This includes a 
com­mitment to high governance standards, social and environmental criteria, 
and the enforcement of Serbian environmental and mining laws.

The central element of the raw materials partnership is the planned lithium 
mining project in the Jadar Valley, a project that is being pursued by the 
British-Australian company Rio Tinto. The company has been active in Serbia 
since the establishment of its subsidiary Rio Sava Exploration in 2001, and it 
has positioned itself as a partner to the EU for the European supply of raw 
ma­terials. There are very few European corpo­rations capable of implementing a 
project of this scale. Rio Tinto has relatively little experience in lithium 
mining, but it aims to secure a larger share of the battery metals market and 
expand its portfolio.

Both current Chancellor Olaf Scholz and the European Commissioner for Trade and 
Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič, have publicly pledged that Germany and the 
EU will support the successful implementation of the project. Rio Tinto has 
asked the Euro­pean Commission to recognise the Jadar Project as a “strategic 
project 
<https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma_en>
 ” under the CRMA, as it would contribute to the diver­si­fication of European 
raw material im­ports. Although such recognition does not typi­cally involve 
financial support, it can facil­itate access to low-interest loans and pro­vide 
political backing from the European Commission and EU member states.


Resistance and protests against the “Jadar Project”


The project has long been highly controversial in Serbia: Even before the 
signing of the partnership agreement with the EU, pro­tests had erupted as 
critics feared severe negative consequences for the environment and local 
communities. The protest move­ment has gone through various phases. It is now 
directed not only against the project itself but also against the EU’s 
project-relat­ed support for the Serbian government. The protest has reached a 
scale that threat­ens the implementation of the raw ma­terials partnership with 
Serbia.


First phase (2004–2022): Criticism of the mining project and a short-lived 
protest victory


As early as 2004, Rio Sava began the geo­logical exploration of the Jadar 
Valley, which is a predominantly agricultural region in western Serbia near the 
small town of Loz­nica. Over the following years, Rio Sava conducted around 500 
exploratory drillings and discovered Jadarite, a mineral that is unique in the 
world due to its com­position. Jadarite is rich in lithium and boron and can be 
used for the production of lithium carbonate, boric acid, and sodium sulphate.

According to estimates by the German Mineral Resources Agency (DERA), the 
planned production volume of 58,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate per year could 
cover between 10 and 15 per cent 
<https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/debatte-um-lithiumabbau-nach-abkommen-mit-serbien-interview-michael-schmidt-dlf-e09ae5c7-100.html>
  of Europe’s lithium demand by 2030.

In 2017, the Serbian government and Rio Sava signed an MoU 
<https://www.riotinto.com/en/news/releases/2017/jadar-mou-serbia-signed> , 
which included the estab­lishment of a joint working group to im­plement the 
Jadar Project. The first pro­tests in the region emerged in 2020, when the 
government adopted the regu­lation for the “Spatial Plan of the Special Purpose 
Area for the Implementation of the “Jadar” Project of Exploitation and 
Pro­cessing of Jadarite Mineral”. The protesters criticised the lack of 
transparency and the absence of a public debate regarding the planned expansion 
of the mining sector in Serbia; the environmental risks associated with the 
extraction and processing of the mineral and the storage of industrial waste; 
and the uncertainties encountered by land­owners who might face expropriation 
if they refused to sell their property voluntarily.

In September 2021, the protests reached the capital, Belgrade. After sustained 
and increasingly nationwide pressure on the government, the authorities revoked 
all permits previously granted to Rio Sava in January 2022, including the 
spatial plan 
<https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/183853/government-revokes-spatial-plan-for-jadar.php>
 , and declared that the project would not be realised.


Second phase (2022–2023): Criticism of the government’s reversal and the lack 
of trans­parency and participation


However, shortly after, President Vučić declared that halting the project had 
been his “biggest mistake 
<https://taz.de/Umstrittenes-Lithium-aus-Serbien/!5899786/> ”. This statement – 
made immediately after his victory in the parliamentary elections – led critics 
to suspect that the previous suspension of the project had been merely a 
tactical move for electoral purposes.

Three further developments fuelled doubts about the finality of the project’s 
cancellation. A petition submitted to the National Assembly in June 2022, 
signed by about 38,000 people, calling for a poten­tial ban on the exploration 
and mining of lithium and boron in Serbia was declared “lost”. This raised 
concerns, since the National Assembly is legally required to respond to 
petitions with more than 30,000 signatures. Additionally, the Ministry of 
Mining and Energy did not terminate the licensing process for the mining permit 
as legally required. Instead, it extended the deadline for completing the 
required docu­mentation 18 times 
<https://rs.boell.org/en/2024/08/02/lithium-mining-serbia-open-and-productive-debate-not-possible>
  without providing any justification. Furthermore, in September 2023, the 
Serbian government signed an initial Letter of Intent 
<https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/58154>  with the European Commission 
to establish a strategic raw materials partnership, which was formalised into a 
more concrete MoU in July 2024. These events gave parts of the population the 
impression that the project was being pushed forward – despite the official 
halt – by the Serbian government, the EU, and espe­cially Germany, whose 
automotive indus­try has a strong interest in Serbian lithium.

The lack of response to the petition and the partnership agreement with the 
Euro­pean Commission further deepened frustra­tion over the lack of 
transparency and the inadequate level of participation by civil society.


Third phase (since 2024): Resumption of the project, pro­tests against the 
government and the EU


In July 2024 – shortly before the signing of the EU-Serbia raw materials 
partnership – the Serbian Constitutional Court invalidated the January 2022 
decision to annul the already approved spatial plan. It justified this by 
stating that the government had ex­ceeded its competencies with the project’s 
suspension and had therefore acted un­constitutionally.

Two of the ten judges of the Constitutional Court criticised 
<https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija-ustavni-sud-vlada-jadar-litijum/33037342.html>
  the Court’s hasty deci­sion and the fact that a ruling had been made without 
initiating a formal procedure – an occurrence that had only happened twice in 
the past 11 years. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, the Serbian government 
issued a decree reinstating the previously suspended spatial plan for the Jadar 
Project.

This decision triggered another wave of major protests across the country, to 
which the government responded with increasing levels of repression 
<https://www.nzz.ch/international/serbien-belgrad-bekaempft-den-protest-gegen-lithium-bergwerk-ld.1846817>
  in the form of police raids, arrests, and the public defamation of opponents 
of the project.

A bill introduced by the opposition in September 2024 to ban lithium mining in 
Serbia was rejected by a majority in par­lia­ment. This further intensified the 
frustration of the protesters, who by now were not only criticising the 
government’s actions but, since the signing of the partnership agreement, were 
increasingly directing their criticism towards the EU as well.


Dismantling of the rule of law and democracy


The Serbian government’s course of action shows that the EU has chosen a 
difficult partner. The government in Belgrade has systematically weakened 
democracy and the rule of law over the past 10 years, as evidenced by rankings 
in the Rule of Law Index 
<https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2023/Serbia/historical>
 , the Corruption Perception Index 
<https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/serbia> , and reports from Freedom 
House <https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia> . Signifi­cant setbacks 
<https://rsf.org/en/country/serbia>  have also been recorded in terms of 
freedom of speech and press: The political opposition, critical civil society 
actors, and the media are increasingly coming under pressure.

However, experiences from the mining sector show that an open climate for civil 
society actors and support from the popu­la­tion (the social licence to 
operate) are cru­cial for the successful implementation of projects. In the 
long term, a culture of trans­parency and monitoring is also necessary, as 
significant negative impacts can arise even in the later phases of projects, 
which are often designed to last for decades; continu­ous oversight is 
therefore indispensable.

Serbia is far from achieving this: In December 2024, Amnesty International 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur70/8813/2024/en/>  reported that 
Serbian authorities had planted spyware on the mobile phones of activists and 
journalists as well as on the phones of individuals protesting against the 
lithium project. Activists advocating for environmental protection and freedom 
of expression have been increasingly pres­sured by the regime since 2024. Many 
have been arrested, threatened, and targeted with public smear campaigns. A 
planned legal amendment that would have effec­tive­ly criminalised activism was 
only abandoned due to public pressure.

Although the EU criticised these develop­ments in Serbia in its 2024 Rule of 
Law Report 
<https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/862952fa-6e79-44c4-b629-174a441e3d2e_en?filename=62_1_58091_coun_chap_serbia_sb.pdf>
 , it has few effective levers and has shown little willingness to push Serbia 
towards serious reforms. The EU accession negotiations, which have been ongoing 
since 2014, have effectively stalled in recent years. Serbia is only making 
slow progress with the necessary reforms.

Critical voices therefore suspect that the government in Belgrade is now 
pushing for the rapid implementation of the raw materials project, as the 2023 
elections – which had to be repeated in some areas due to allegations of 
election fraud – have con­firmed the government and strengthened its position. 
Vučić seeks to expand his power by diversifying his political and economic ties 
while simultaneously curbing domestic criticism through economic integration 
with the EU. The openly aggressive actions that have been taken against 
critical voices illustrate that Vučić has little concern that restrictions on 
democratic fundamental rights could jeopardise the partnership agree­ment with 
the EU.

However, these developments are increas­ingly becoming a risk for the EU, as 
criticism of the planned lithium mining project has now taken on a 
transnational dimension. At the same time, the project has become a focal point 
for broader domestic political conflicts. The protests are symptomatic of a 
deep-seated distrust concerning the government’s willingness and ability to 
uphold the rule of law and properly manage such high-risk projects. This 
mistrust was further reinforced by an accident in Novi Sad in November 2024 
when 15 people lost their lives due to a col­lapsed train station canopy. 
Critics are ques­tioning how a government that cannot even ensure the safety of 
basic infrastructure can responsibly oversee a venture such as the Jadar 
Project.

The way in which the Jadar Project has been pushed forward in Serbia – and 
re­inforced through government repression – has mobilised people who are 
criticising in particular the EU’s silence on the actions of the Serbian 
government.

This benefits the nationalist forces that have joined the protest against the 
project and are using this silence as a justification for their fundamental 
opposition to Serbia’s EU accession. German and US diplomats 
<https://www.wsj.com/business/this-2-4-billion-lithium-mine-is-caught-between-russia-and-the-west-a785be24>
  allege that these forces are being influenced due to Russian interference, 
which aims to discredit the project and thereby prevent Serbia from 
establishing closer ties with the EU. However, they have not yet publicly 
provided any evidence to support this claim. And even if this suspicion were to 
be confirmed, it would be overly simplistic to attri­bute the protest solely to 
a potential disin­for­mation campaign, given the valid criti­cisms of the 
project. The social and environmental risks of the project are well documented 
– and they highlight potential areas in which improvements can be made.


Ecological and economic risks of implementing the raw materials partnership


Environmental risks


According to Serbian law, mining projects must undergo an environmental impact 
as­sessment under certain conditions in order to evaluate their potential 
effects. The scope and content of the assessment are determined by the relevant 
authorities.

In November 2024, Serbia enacted new laws on Environmental Impact Assessments 
and Strategic Environmental Assessments. However, these laws are not yet fully 
aligned with corresponding EU directives, and the bylaws required for their 
application are still pending. Furthermore, the European Commission has 
repeatedly pointed out significant deficiencies 
<https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9198cd1a-c8c9-4973-90ac-b6ba6bd72b53_en?filename=SWD_2023_695_Serbia.pdf>
  in the implementation of these laws and emphasised the need for structural 
reforms to strengthen admin­istrative capacities at the national and local 
levels, in regulatory authorities, and within the judiciary.

In November 2024, the Ministry of En­viron­mental Protection defined the scope 
and content of the environmental impact assessment for the underground mine in 
the Jadar Valley. Rio Tinto is obliged to sub­mit the required study within one 
year. How­ever, the ministry’s decision has been criticised. Rio Tinto only 
submitted an application for an assessment of the under­ground mine, even 
though environmental impact assessments are also required for the processing 
plant and the tailings storage facility.

Therefore, the Belgrade-based Renew­ables and Environmental Regulatory 
Insti­tute (RERI) fears that Rio Tinto intends to avoid an evaluation of the 
project’s overall impact through this artificial segmentation 
<https://reri.org.rs/en/rio-tinto-salami-slicing-in-accordance-with-the-highest-european-standards-of-environmental-protection/>
 , a practice known as “project splitting”, numerous cases of which have 
already been documented 
<https://reri.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Implementation-of-the-Law-on-Environmental-Impact-Assessment-in-the-Republic-of-Serbia.pdf>
  in Serbia. In some instances, companies have allegedly acted with the 
knowledge and support of the responsible state authorities in an effort to 
obscure cumu­lative environmental impacts or entirely bypass the requirement 
for an environ­mental impact assessment.

It is the responsibility of Serbian authorities to prevent such improper 
project prac­tices and to ensure a transparent and legally compliant 
environmental impact assessment.

According to Energy Minister Dubravka Handanović, it could take another two 
years 
<https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/rio-tintos-serbia-lithium-project-could-take-two-years-approve-minister-says-2024-08-09/>
  before all of the necessary permits for the project’s implementation are 
obtained. A decision by the Assembly of the City of Loznica on the local 
spatial plan is also re­quired for the project’s realisation. Environ­mental 
activists in Serbia have already announced massive protests 
<https://balkangreenenergynews.com/local-activists-in-serbia-block-roads-to-reignite-protests-against-lithium-mining/>
 .

Regulatory oversight by Serbian author­ities has repeatedly failed in the 
mining sector in recent years. One example is the Chinese-Serbian joint venture 
Serbia Zijin Copper DOO Bor, which operates Serbia’s largest copper mine and 
smelting plant. According to experts, the relevant author­ities rarely hold 
Zijin accountable 
<https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/umweltverschmutzung-in-serbien-gefahr-in-ostwind-17471603.html>
  for regu­larly exceeding permissible sulphur dioxide emissions 
<https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/bor-mining-and-smelting-complex-serbia-zijin-copper/>
  and polluting rivers.

Additionally, Zijin has been convicted seven times in the past four years for 
illegal construction activities 
<https://reri.org.rs/en/zijin-sentenced-to-two-million-dinars-for-illegal-construction-in-bor/>
 ; in five cases, only fines below the legally required minimum penalties were 
imposed. This has undermined the public’s trust in the authorities and in their 
willingness to enforce environ­mental regulations.

Amid general criticism of the integrity of Serbian authorities, a debate has 
emerged regarding the information that is available on the Jadar Project. 
According to Rio Tin­to’s current plans, approximately 220 hec­tares 
<https://riotintoserbia.com/en/jadar-project/concerns-and-facts>  of land will 
be required for the under­ground mine and processing plant, with an additional 
167 hectares <https://riotintoserbia.com/en/communications/faq>  needed for the 
industrial waste landfill.

In addition to the resulting loss of agricultural land, forests, and 
biodiversity, critics fear negative effects on the region’s drink­ing water 
reservoir and on the adja­cent rivers Drina and Jadar. These risks are to be 
analysed in the already mentioned environmental impact assessment, with 
pre­liminary drafts for the assessment having been published by Rio Tinto in 
June 2024.

However, doubts have been raised about the credibility of these drafts. 
Scientists from the Faculty of Biology at the University of Belgrade, who were 
originally involved in preparing a report for Rio Tinto, con­cluded that the 
project posed significant risks to the ecosystem 
<https://www.miningsee.eu/the-faculty-of-biology-rejects-responsibility-for-conclusions-in-the-impact-study-drafts-published-by-rio-tinto/>
  and distanced them­selves from the company’s claims.

A study <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-024-68072-9>  published in a 
scientific journal in July 2024 on the impact of the Jadar River and the soil 
near the exploratory drill holes, which had allegedly already been affected by 
the test drillings, further reinforced these concerns. Rio Tinto raised doubts 
about the study’s data collection methodology and requested its withdrawal. 
However, the sub­sequent revisions made by the authors were minor, and the 
journal did not find fault with the methodology. Rio Tinto, on the other hand, 
argues that the elevated heavy metal concentrations in the Jadar River were 
caused by the collapse of the tailings dam at the former “Stolice” antimony 
mine during the 2014 floods and denies any con­nection to the exploratory 
drilling.

Assessing this controversy is further com­plicated by the fact that, according 
to Rio Tinto, one of the eight authors had repeat­edly spread false claims 
<https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/rio-tinto-demantuje-ratka-ristica-jadar-bi-bio-podzemni-rudnik-poljoprivreda-bi-se-neometano-odvijala-na-povrsini/>
  about the project. Additionally, in December 2023, he ran as a mayoral 
candidate 
<https://serbiaelects.europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/12/14/right-wing-opposition-campaign-summary-protection-of-kosovo-rejection-of-the-eu-and-lithium-mining/>
  in Belgrade for a Euro­sceptic, ultranationalist, and pro-Russian opposition 
coalition, raising questions about his scientific independence.

Another unresolved question is who would be responsible for cleanup costs if 
the project were to cause an environmental disaster. Rio Tinto has attempted to 
counter this criticism, stating that it models ex­treme­ly rare events, such as 
catastrophic floods, and designs the mine’s infrastructure accordingly. 
Furthermore, Rio Tinto asserts that it is legally required to obtain insurance 
that would cover third-party damages in the event of an accident. How­ever, 
many Serbians remain sceptical, as the mere existence of legal regulations does 
not necessarily guarantee that the respon­sible authorities will actually 
ensure com­pliance.

There is widespread doubt among the public about both the willingness and the 
ability of Serbian authorities to adequately enforce environmental laws. 
Additionally, due to the repression of Serbian civil soci­ety, there is a lack 
of independent actors who can monitor the available data – espe­cially since 
many people in Serbia distrust the data provided by Rio Tinto. Their 
scep­ticism is reinforced by the fact that Rio Tinto has faced legal action 
<https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/rio-tinto-class-action-over-bougainville-mine-damage-set-october-hearing-2024-07-23/>
  and been con­victed 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-enforcement/notifications/rio-tinto-alcan-inc-ordered-to-pay-500000-for-violating-the-fisheries-act.html>
  in other countries for violations of environmental standards. As a result, 
many do not view Rio Tinto as a trustworthy actor.


Economic viability


The economic viability of the project has also been a subject of contention. 
The Ser­bian government has successfully attracted foreign investments through 
an active sub­sidy policy: In recent years, the proportion of targeted state 
aid has ranged between 2 and 5 per cent of GDP, whereas the Euro­pean average 
is just 0.5 per cent. In the course of Serbia’s EU accession, it would be 
required to significantly reduce this rate. In recent years, the country has 
deepened its ties with China, which has now become Ser­bia’s second-largest 
investor 
<https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/economic-relations-between-the-western-balkans-and-non-eu-countries>
  after the EU. The Serbian government’s support for the Jadar Project can also 
be interpreted as a signal to the EU and the United States, in­dicating its 
intention to better balance its international relations and strengthen its 
negotiating position on the global stage.

Rio Tinto has already invested €475 mil­lion in the project and expects an 
additional €2.55 billion 
<https://ergostrategygroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Ergo-Strategy-Group-Jadar-Economic-Impact-Assessment-Sep23-EN-spread.pdf>
  in investments, making it Ser­bia’s largest foreign direct investment to 
date. The company plans to create an aver­age of 1,500 jobs during the 
four-and-a-half-year construction phase, with a peak of around 3,500 jobs 
<https://ergostrategygroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Ergo-Strategy-Group-Jadar-Economic-Impact-Assessment-Sep23-EN-spread.pdf>
 . Once fully operational, the project is expected to create 1,300 per­manent 
positions, of which 90 per cent should be held by Serbians.

>From the first year of full production, taxes and other levies could 
>contribute around €48 million 
><https://ergostrategygroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Ergo-Strategy-Group-Jadar-Economic-Impact-Assessment-Sep23-EN-spread.pdf>
>  annually to the Serbian state budget, with long-term projections estimating 
>€185 million per year, of which €24.5 million is earmarked for the 
>munici­pality of Loznica.

Additionally, Rio Tinto plans to spend approximately €300 million annually on 
supplies <https://riotintoserbia.com/en/jadar-project/economic-impact> , with 
70 per cent of them expected to be sourced from Serbia.

However, a recently published report by economists and business experts casts 
doubt on the figures provided by Rio Tinto, arguing that the Jadar Project 
offers only limited economic benefits 
<https://n1info.rs/vesti/koliko-bi-srbija-dobila-od-projekta-jadar-analiza-ekonomskih-strucnjaka/?utm_source=onesignal&utm_medium=webpush&utm_campaign=2024-10-06-Koliko-bi-Srbij>
  for Serbia. The authors highlight, among other issues, uncertain 
infrastructure costs such as for roads and wastewater systems. So far, there 
are no reliable estimates for the total costs nor for the distribution of 
expenses be­tween the Serbian government, local munici­palities, and Rio Tinto.

The government has reaffirmed its inten­tion to establish downstream industries 
with higher added value within Serbia. Recently, Vučić stated that at least 
87.1 per cent 
<https://sarajevotimes.com/vucic-i-demand-that-at-least-87-1-percent-of-lithium-is-processed-in-serbia/>
  of the extracted lithium should be processed domestically.

Currently, the government is negotiating with various companies regarding the 
con­struction of a cathode factory. In September 2023, Serbia signed an MoU 
with the Slovak battery manufacturer InoBat to build a bat­tery factory in 
Cuprija starting in 2025. The Serbian government has pledged €419 mil­lion in 
subsidies for the project. Addition­ally, companies such as Mercedes and 
Stel­lantis have expressed interest in establishing agreements with Serbia to 
develop a lithium value chain.

Thus, the implementation of the Jadar Project could serve as an impetus for 
in­creased European corporate activity in Ser­bia. According to EU estimates, 
this could create up to 20,000 jobs 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/da/statement_24_5481> . 
However, few con­crete commitments or results have materi­alised so far. 
Nonetheless, further economic commitments alone will not be enough to dispel 
the well-founded criticisms of the project.


Conclusion and policy recommendations


Given Serbia’s deficiencies in the rule of law, the increasing restrictions on 
speech and the media, and the strong resistance within the country, the 
realisation of the Jadar Project carries several risks. In recent weeks, the 
government has come under increased pressure due to widespread cor­ruption and 
a political system that is domi­nated by the ruling party. Following several 
weeks of mass protests, Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned on 28 January. 
This once again highlights how little trust the population has in the 
government’s ability to uphold legislation and standards of any kind.

So far, the EU has publicly signalled its commitment to implement the raw 
ma­terials partnership and the Jadar Project. To maintain credibility, it must 
demonstrate that it is actively addressing the sus­tain­ability risks of the 
project and will push the Serbian government to adhere to high environmental 
protection standards. The EU accession process provides some con­crete, albeit 
limited, levers to demand this compliance. After all, environmental con­cerns 
and compliance with the Green Agenda (including in the raw materials sector) 
are not only part of Cluster Four of the acces­sion negotiations (“Green Agenda 
and Sus­tainable Connectivity”), but also an integral part of the EU’s Growth 
Plan for the West­ern Balkans. This plan links the disbursement of financial 
aid to the implementation of reforms, particularly in the area of the rule of 
law.

This strategy remains effective, even if Serbia is not seriously pursuing EU 
mem­bership. The EU-Serbia raw materials part­nership should not be viewed in 
isolation from ongoing processes, but rather as a supplement to existing 
efforts. The EU should also leverage the ESG conditions agreed upon in the 
partnership agreement to strengthen institutional capacities within the 
responsible authorities. The implementation and enforcement of the 
Environmental Impact Assessments, the Strategic En­viron­mental Assessments, 
and measures against environmental crimes should be prioritised and made a 
condition for further cooperation.

Although regulatory enforcement is the responsibility of Serbian authorities, 
Rio Tinto has also expressed openness to being supervised by independent 
international experts 
<https://riotintoserbia.com/en/environment/Jadar-Project-Layers-of-Assurance> . 
Given Germany’s strong involvement in advancing the raw materials part­nership, 
it should seize this opportunity to provide expertise in environmental impact 
assessment and monitoring. Furthermore, Germany can support local civil society 
in critically monitoring raw material extraction and advocating for rapid 
certification under the multi-stakeholder standard of the Initiative for 
Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA).

Regarding the economic viability of the project, the European Commission could 
commission an independent assessment to evaluate the actual project costs, 
ensuring a transparent evaluation. This document should be published in 
Serbian. Additionally, the EU could make concrete infrastructure investment 
offers. Although Rio Tinto should finance the infrastructure necessary for its 
operations, the EU could support additional infrastructure projects through the 
Global Gateway initiative to provide tangible benefits to the local population.

However, these measures are only meaningful if Germany and the EU actively 
advo­cate for democratic rights and the rule of law, publicly and unequivocally 
criticise the Ser­bian government’s repressive actions, and en­sure that voices 
in Serbia can express criti­cism without fear of intimidation or threats. The 
project should not be realised at the expense of civil society and its 
repression.

Given years of backsliding on the rule of law and limited progress in Serbia’s 
EU accession negotiations, the EU must retain the option of withdrawing its 
support for the Jadar Project – whether or not it is recognised as a “strategic 
project” – should standards in the country fail to improve. Although this would 
entail geopolitical and economic losses, they remain manageable, given the 
possibility of geographically diver­sifying the raw materials sector if 
necessary.

Ultimately, what is at stake in Serbia is not just economic interests, but the 
EU’s credibility as both a political actor and a com­munity of shared values.

Dr Melanie Müller is Deputy Head of the Africa and Middle East Research 
Division at SWP and co-heads the Research Network Sustainable Global Supply 
Chains. Lea Strack works as a Research Assistant in this project, which is 
funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
Dr Marina Vulović is a Visiting Fellow in the EU / Europe Research Division at 
SWP and a member of the academic staff at the University of Potsdam.

 

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