fabians.org.uk <https://fabians.org.uk/the-next-war/>  


The next war? - Fabian Society


Luke John Davies

8–10 minutes

  _____  

In late September 2023, the Serbian army massed on the border with Kosovo 
following a shootout between Kosovan police and around 30 armed ethnic Serbs. 
The militants had attacked three police units in a carefully staged operation 
before taking refuge in a nearby monastery, leaving one officer and three 
gunmen dead. Ethno-nationalist politicians in both countries talked up the 
possibility of conflict; only pressure from Biden’s White House saw the Serbian 
army reluctantly withdraw.

In other words, a second shooting war on European soil very nearly started – 
and nobody in the UK noticed. The non-EU states of the Balkan peninsula – the 
ex-Yugoslav republics of Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and 
North Macedonia, alongside Albania and Moldova to the east – are regularly 
ignored in the British geopolitical discourse, dismissed as far away and 
unimportant. Even the Balkan EU members – Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia 
and Slovenia –are seen as little more than tourist destinations. This is a 
dangerous and misguided way to view the region.

One of the lessons that the Labour government should have learnt from Russia’s 
invasion is to pay attention to simmering trouble-spots – as we should have 
done with Ukraine between 2014 and 2022. Most of the main geopolitical 
challenges facing the United Kingdom are playing out in the Balkans, and have 
been for at least a decade. Russian misinformation is widespread, as is 
election meddling, and it is the most likely location for another Ukraine-like 
conflict to break out. Meanwhile, organised crime finds the Western Balkans – a 
region entirely surrounded by EU states, where the rule-of-law is piecemeal, 
multi-state coordination of law enforcement almost non-existent, weapons 
leftover from the wars of the 90scommonplace and deprivation rife – the perfect 
staging post for their activities in western Europe, whether drug running, 
people smuggling, modern slavery or corruption. The Western Balkan route for 
migrants and refugees is at least comparable in scale to those crossing the 
Mediterranean sea in boats, but far less publicly discussed. Two-thirds of the 
regions power still comes from burning lignite coal, and many of the power 
plants there are over forty years old, undermining European efforts to combat 
climate change.

On every one of these issues western European nations, including Britain, are 
failing to step up, even where straightforward self-interest suggests they 
should. The most pressing of those challenges is Russia’s attempt to upend the 
global order in Europe, which is very visible in the Balkans.

Russia’s influence in the region is large, and dangerous, particularly in 
Serbia. Russia sees Serbia as a ‘sister-culture’ in the same way it does 
Ukraine. It was in defence of Serbs that Russia intervened to begin the first 
world war, and this has not been forgotten in either country. Serbian media 
overwhelmingly portrays the Ukrainian conflict through the Kremlin’s lens and 
Serbia refuses to participate in the global sanctions against Russia. Serbia’s 
ethno-nationalist president, Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, leads a regime characterised 
by the same democratic backsliding and admiration for Putin seen in Hungary and 
more recently Slovakia.

The sister-culture perspective is sometimes lost in discussion of Russian views 
of what they term their blizhneye zarubezhye, usually translated as 
‘near-abroad’. In short, Putin’s internal population control rests on the 
contention that a western-style liberal democracy wouldn’t work in the Russian 
cultural world. If a culture which ordinary Russians deem to be close to theirs 
– Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, Belarus – could successfully transition 
into such a liberal democracy, it could be held up as an example to challenge 
Putin at home. This helps explain why the Russians intervened in Ukraine and 
Georgia after the Bucharest Declaration in April 2008 put them on the path to 
NATO membership; the Kremlin had been relatively sanguine about the Baltic 
states joining four years earlier. More recently, beyond a few sound and fury 
statements, Russia has not made too much of Sweden and Finland’s accessions.

Russia also continues to support Belgrade on its stance towards Kosovo. This is 
partly because the west’s recognition of Kosovan independence in 2008 is still 
held up by the Kremlin both as justification for its invasions of Georgia and 
Ukraine and as an example of the west’s hypocrisy –which, from the perspective 
of the global south, is an accusation that strikes home. Stoking tensions 
between Serbia and Kosovo has the potential to both tie down NATO forces and 
attention and to expose the alliance as a paper tiger unable to keep the peace 
in Europe. That is attractive to the Kremlin.

Russian malignity spreads further through the region than Serbia. A probably 
Russian-inspired and assisted coup in Montenegro – perhaps a last-ditch attempt 
to prevent the country joining NATO – was foiled in 2016. The cancellation and 
re-running of the recent elections in Romania following Russian influence 
operations is a rare story from the Balkans that made it into western 
headlines. Russian backed commentators are making hay in North Macedonia and 
Albania about the decision by France, Denmark and the Netherlands to veto their 
accession to EU membership in 2019. And it is Moldova – a former Soviet 
republic, with a frozen conflict in Transnistria involving Russian soldiers on 
its internationally recognised territory – that is the most likely Kremlin 
target after Ukraine (rather than the Baltics or Poland, which benefit from the 
protection of EU and NATO membership).

Meanwhile, the EU has taken its eye off the ball in Bosnia and Kosovo, reducing 
western military presence in both states and ignoring both the 
Russian-supported (though not Russian-created) rise in ethnonationalist 
rhetoric in Serb-majority areas and the repressive actions of both governments 
towards those Serbian minorities. Bosnian Croat leaders are also destabilising 
the country over electoral reforms. In North Macedonia, the prime minister is 
accused of interfering in the independence of the judiciary, threatening to 
incite street protests unless five senior judges resign.

But these clouds are not without silver linings. Serbia is not a Russian 
vassal, however close their historical ties. It has condemned the invasion of 
Ukraine repeatedly at the UN and in public statements. Vuˇci´c plays a careful 
balancing game, and has so far successfully played Russia and the EU off 
against each other, benefitting from both EU accession development funding and 
cheap Russian oil and gas. In areas other than sanctions and normalising 
relations with Kosovo, Serbia is making progress on there forms needed to join 
the EU, unlike, say, Turkey. Many ordinary Serbs are attracted to the EU and 
the western model. Student-led protests against corruption, which followed the 
deadly collapse of a poorly built railway station canopy in Novi Sad, have been 
well-organised, long-lasting and effective, invoking the memory of the2002 
overthrow of Slobodan Miloševi´c (in whose government Vuˇci´c served as 
minister of information).

Meanwhile, when Ukraine cut off the flow of Russian oil and gas over its 
territory, the Moldovan government was able to find alternatives; the 
separatists in Transnistria were not. This has given Dorin Recean, the pro-EU 
prime minister, unexpected leverage, especially after the incumbent president, 
Maia Sandu, won re-election against her pro-Russian challenger Alexandr 
Stoianoglo. Over the border, Russian election-meddling in Romania has played 
out visibly in public – making people there more aware of misinformation 
efforts and helping Romanian democracy survive. Following the 2018 resolution 
of its naming dispute with Greece, North Macedonia has moved much closer to the 
EU in recent years, as has Albania. Britain needs to play its part in 
encouraging these pro-Western actors. Perhaps the key lesson for Labour in 
foreign affairs is that we need to act carefully yet decisively as revanchist 
forces attempt to undermine and rewrite the global international order, led by 
Russia’s violent actions in Europe. Whilst Ukraine is the most obvious place 
this process is happening, the Balkans may well be next. Britain, and the rest 
of Europe, needs to wake up and pay attention.

Image Credit: Konstantin Novakovic via creative commons

 

-- 
http:www.antic.org
--- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"SERBIAN NEWS NETWORK" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to senet+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/senet/0a8e01dbd0a9%24f86fab80%24e94f0280%24%40gmail.com.

Reply via email to