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<https://caliber.az/en/post/who-s-stirring-up-serbia-students-fans-or-the-eu>  


Who’s stirring up Serbia: students, fans, or the EU? - Analysis


Alexander Limansky

11–14 minutes

  _____  

For ten months now, this former Yugoslav republic has been shaken by street 
unrest. Recently, the protests have become increasingly radical: participants 
are assaulting opponents, attempting to burn them alive, and vandalising and 
setting fire to government buildings and offices. What awaits the Serbian 
people in the near future?

“Popular revolution” – or just another coup?

Unlike other events, what is happening in Serbia today has largely escaped the 
attention of the global media. Meanwhile, as the confrontation intensifies, 
many participants in the unrest have already stopped remembering what it all 
started with. It all began with the collapse of a station canopy in Novi Sad in 
November 2024, which claimed 16 lives. The minister of construction resigned, 
followed by the prime minister. The direct perpetrators of the tragedy were 
also punished. However, civil society declared that the measures taken by the 
authorities were insufficient. They took people to the streets with the aim of 
overthrowing the current government, and especially President Aleksandar Vučić. 
Since then, the intensity of the confrontation has only increased, and 
recently, the most serious escalation has been observed.



Initially, the protests were largely peaceful—often taking the form of 
carnival-style gatherings or youthful street “parties.” But soon, following the 
usual pattern, the organisers turned to violent actions. In recent weeks, the 
cheerful students have increasingly been replaced by street fighters wielding 
clubs and wearing masks. Their targets include police officers, offices of the 
ruling party, and supporters of President Aleksandar Vučić, whom the protesters 
contemptuously call “čaći.” Opponents, in turn, refer to the protesters as 
“blockers” because of their efforts to block roads, educational institutions, 
and other facilities, aiming to inflict economic damage on the authorities.

The new wave of open violence began on August 13. On that day, attacks occurred 
in Belgrade and Novi Sad on camps of Vučić supporters—mockingly dubbed 
“čačilends.” In response, the authorities began organising street mobilisations 
in their own support. The attackers were prepped for violent action and armed 
with improvised weapons. They beat government supporters with sticks and hurled 
firecrackers and “flares” (fake flares)—the favourite tools of football fans. 
Serbian football hooligans, notorious across Europe for their aggressiveness 
and radicalism, are actively participating in the protests. On the streets, 
there have also been mob attacks on Vučić supporters, who are beaten and 
humiliated by groups of assailants.

On August 14 in Novi Sad, the headquarters of the ruling Serbian Progressive 
Party (SNS) was stormed, pelted with firecrackers, and set on fire. Sixty-four 
people were injured, including 15 law enforcement officers, five of whom were 
elite “Cobra” special forces operatives. Four police officers suffered serious 
injuries. Across the country that day, 47 police officers were reported 
injured. Thirty-seven active participants in the unrest were arrested, 
including a Croatian citizen.

“Independent” TV channels broadcast a segment showing a man in a construction 
helmet with a bloodied mouth telling a journalist that “the situation is 
terrifying” and that he had seen a man with a gun. “The ‘čaći’ are arming 
themselves with firearms!” proclaimed media outlets sympathetic to the 
protests. In reality, it was “Cobra” officer Vladimir Brkušanin who had been 
forced to fire warning shots into the air to save his colleagues from enraged 
protesters.

Belgrade was also tense, as radicalised demonstrators gathered near the General 
Staff building, which was cordoned off by police. Attacks on ruling party 
offices spread across the country during those days.

“The gang is running wild on the streets…”

Videos from the streets of Serbian cities increasingly resembled war-zone 
reports: blasts and explosions echoed, rockets and fireworks flew through the 
air, smoke covered everything, and crowds of agitated people alternated between 
attacking and fleeing.



President Aleksandar Vučić addressed the nation. He stated that those 
responsible for attempting to burn people alive would be punished and that 
several criminal cases had already been opened. He also promised that law 
enforcement would respond to provocations more quickly and firmly. Yet on 
August 15, unrest continued in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Niš, and Pančevo. Police 
deployed special equipment on the streets of Belgrade.

On August 16, the epicentres of the riots were Belgrade and Valjevo. In 
Valjevo, a crowd set fire to the ruling party’s office and torched the city 
hall and prosecutor’s office. Police dispersed the participants using armoured 
vehicles. A total of 137 police officers were injured or wounded.

Vučić once again addressed the nation: “Serbia and its citizens are in great 
danger: people are not allowed out into the city; Belgrade and Novi Sad are 
empty. Restaurateurs, hairdressers, and craftsmen cannot work in peace because 
gangs are running wild on the streets. They believe they have the right to 
beat, burn, and destroy.” The Serbian president characterised the protesters’ 
actions as terrorism.

For a time, either Serbian security forces managed to regain control of the 
situation, or the radicals simply ran out of steam. After all, fighting the 
police and hurling incendiary objects requires a lot of adrenaline and is 
exhausting in the long run. Or perhaps the organisers of the unrest decided to 
change tactics, mixing “pacifism” with street fighting. Whatever the case, the 
violent clashes were replaced by non-violent demonstrations. On September 1, 
even schoolchildren took part—showing that the protest organisers are not shy 
about involving children in their schemes.

However, by September 5, clashes resumed near the Faculty of Philosophy at the 
University of Novi Sad. Large-scale protests also took place in Niš, Čačak, and 
Kosjerić. In Užice, protesters blocked the Zlatibor highway and gathered 
outside the police station, shouting insults at law enforcement officers.

On September 7 in Šabac, protesters blocked  
<https://srbin.info/sve-staje-studenti-pozivaju-na-ulice-indeksom-protiv-pendreka-ruta-protesta/>
 a convoy of people opposing the blockade in an attempt to provoke a clash. 
According to Vučić, he asked his supporters, who outnumbered the opposing 
group, to step back: “We do not want a fight with our brothers and sisters.”



It became clear that not all members of the security forces remain a reliable 
pillar of the government. Commander of the SAJ special unit, Spasoje Vulević, 
along with several other officers, were dismissed. On September 7, at a rally 
in Borča, President Vučić stated  
<http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/vucic-na-skupu-u-borci-moj-poziv-blokaderima-za-dijalog-je-uvek-otvoren.-i-da-nisam-bio-za-smenu-vulevica-sada-vidim-da-je-dobro-sto-je-smenjen.-ovo-nisu-smene-velike-smene-tek-dolaze.-sve-sudije-su-im-vazne-komandanti-su-svi-njihovi.html>
 that participants in the attempted coup had infiltrated the police, tax, and 
judicial bodies, and should have been removed much earlier. Vučić noted that 
more and more Serbs are coming out in support of law and order. However, he 
emphasised that he still supports dialogue with the protesters. He also 
announced that in the coming weeks, citizens will see “changes in the system” 
and that all criminals will be held accountable.

According to police data, on September 8, 126,000 people participated in 
protests across 111 settlements. In Belgrade, protesters held a large 
demonstration near the government building. In clashes in Kosjerić, three 
police officers were injured.

Hunting the “Serbian Lukashenko”

The EU has openly encouraged the street unrest, freely criticising the Serbian 
authorities, who, it should be noted, have been exercising restraint.

At the start of the escalation, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos 
stated that reports of “violence” by the authorities “are very worrying.” In 
September, Serbian opposition figures Zdravko Ponoš and Borko Stefanović 
visited Brussels, where they once again outlined the “regime’s atrocities.”

On 5 September, Members of the European Parliament from the Green Party, Rasmus 
Nordqvist and Vula Céci, demanded “free” elections and then went to Novi Sad, 
where they took part in an illegal protest. And this is what they call 
non-interference?

The initiators of sanctions against Serbia were, predictably, the Greens. On 
September 9, co-chair of the Greens/EFA faction, Bas Eickhout, stated  
<https://srbin.info/lider-zelenih-u-ep-eu-da-razmotri-finansiranje-srbije/#gsc.tab=0>
 that the EU should reconsider funding Serbia. According to him, “autocracy is 
taking root in Europe, and peaceful protesters are being attacked.”

Yet, for some reason, the leader of the European Greens does not seem to notice 
how these so-called “peaceful protesters” are setting buildings on fire, 
assaulting opponents, and injuring police officers.

Also on 9 September, the European Parliament held hearings on Serbia at the 
initiative of the Greens, the Socialists and Democrats, Renew Europe, and the 
EPP. Representatives of the Serbian opposition—Ponoš, Stefanović, Biljana 
Đorđević, and Pavle Grbović—called 
<http://www.nspm.rs/hronika/vucic-na-skupu-u-borci-moj-poziv-blokaderima-za-dijalog-je-uvek-otvoren.-i-da-nisam-bio-za-smenu-vulevica-sada-vidim-da-je-dobro-sto-je-smenjen.-ovo-nisu-smene-velike-smene-tek-dolaze.-sve-sudije-su-im-vazne-komandanti-su-svi-njihovi.html>
  on the EU to exert pressure, effectively impose sanctions, and send a special 
mission from the European Commission. The conclusion reached: the EU should 
stop treating Vučić as a democratic leader and recognise him as an autocrat—a 
“Serbian Lukashenko.”

The story of the collapsed station canopy has long been forgotten. Today, the 
main demand of the protesters, the opposition, and the EU is early elections. 
After these elections, according to one scenario, “non-partisan experts” 
cultivated by pro-Western NGOs are expected to come to power. At the same time, 
numerous political parties, previously with little chance, are now eager to 
claim positions for themselves.



The authorities are refusing to hold early elections under the pressure of 
crowds and street terror. SNS leader in the Assembly, Milenko Jovanov, stated 
<https://www.sns.org.rs/novosti/vesti/jovanov-stitimo-srbiju-od-spoljnih-uticaja>
 : “The ‘blockers’ cannot tolerate anyone who thinks differently. By smashing 
buses in Čačak and attacking people at anti-blockade rallies, they have shown 
that there are no conditions for holding elections.”

Regarding the involvement of MEPs, Jovanov asked: “If one of our deputies went 
to Germany and started misbehaving there, participating in violent 
demonstrations, would anyone say: that’s a Serbian deputy? Or would I be 
arrested?”

It is clear that the goal of the protests, organised by pro-Western NGOs with 
the support of EU funds and political networks, is the complete reorientation 
of Belgrade’s foreign policy. In the European Parliament, Vučić is criticised 
for his visits to China and handshakes with Putin.

However, it seems that the West is irritated less by Vučić’s ties to Russia 
(there are plenty of Russophiles among the protesters) than by Serbia’s growing 
closeness with China. In 2027, the country will host a specialised “Expo 2027” 
in partnership with China, which has already attracted participation from 120 
countries. China is actively investing in Serbia, creating jobs and raising 
wages, pensions, and social benefits. Alongside Hungary, Serbia is becoming one 
of China’s main hubs in Europe. It is precisely this—not “democracy 
violations”—that is causing irritation in Brussels and Strasbourg.

But it’s not that simple. The protests are indeed massive, encompassing various 
segments of society and backed by political forces ranging from left-wing 
environmentalists to ultra-right groups and monarchists. Unlike Alexander 
Lukashenko in 2020, Aleksandar Vučić cannot rely on a fully consolidated state 
apparatus. For example, a rioter who beat a police officer with a four-metre 
pole was released by a court in Novi Sad. Up to 40% of Serbia’s media outlets 
are owned by foreigners, and many of them actively work to inflame the 
situation.

Ultimately, the outcome of the confrontation will depend on ordinary Serbs. 
Will they be able to resolve their differences through dialogue? Or will they 
descend into the chaos of internecine struggle, handing the country over to the 
external control of globalist forces that have always dreamed of stripping 
Serbia of its independence and its right to choose allies?

 

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