Ima li ikog na ovom sajtu da je Srbin, da je rodjen u Srbiji, da svo svoje zivotno vreme radi i zivi iskljucivo u Srbiji i od svog poslovnog zivota, tj posla koji m se bavi svo svoje vreme da je komercijalnog profila a licnog zbora a ne nekomrcijalnog, da govori Srpskim jezikom, i da pise srpskim pismom? Ocekujem da vidjenja i rasprave o putu kojim ide ili je vodjen, tj navodjen, Srpski narod bude jasno opisan, Engleski jezik je jezik podanickog mentaliteta i kao takav na ovim stranicama ovog sajta necitan i nepozeljan, zato iskljucivo i izvrsno iskoracivanje sa svojim svatanjim i svacanja tudjeg zivota, a posebno Srpskog naroda u celini iskazuje se na nasem jeziku i pismu Srpskome. AMIN! predsednik stranke pe3nzioneraSrbije:DRAGANeskovic
2008/9/25, ANTIC.org-SNN <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > The Hague vs. Karadzic: A Grim > Update<http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=738> > > *by Srdja Trifkovic* > > http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=738 > > The amended ICTY > indictment<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LN441996.htm>against > Radovan Karadzic was made public by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal > on September 23. Its objective is not only to reinforce the charge of > genocide against the former Bosnian-Serb leader himself and *ipso > facto*against the Bosnian-Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), but also to make > yet > another attempt to assert the culpability of Serbia – and by extension the > collective guilt of the entire Serbian nation – in that alleged crime. > > The Tribunal is making the assertion of Belgrade's complicity in an > indirect and partly concealed manner. Unlike the > original<http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kar-ii950724e.htm>indictments > (July-November 1995), amended > in May > 2000<http://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:N8AA-h94zg0J:www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/kar-ai000428e.htm+icty+amended+indictment+karadzic&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us>, > in the latest modified indictment the OTP (Office of the Prosecutor) narrows > down it focus on one "overreaching" and three "common" joint criminal > conspiracies. The first of them accuses Karadzic of being part of a criminal > conspiracy to carry out genocide in Bosnia in the areas claimed by Serbs. It > claims that, in addition to a number of persons from the Republika Srpska, > this "joint criminal conspiracy" included several former top officials of > the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, specifically > former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, former security > service chief Jovica Stanisic, his aide Frenki Simatovic, and prominent > politician Vojisal Seselj (Art. 11), as well as an indeterminate number of > unnamed and unindicted personnel of the Serbian Interior Ministry, MUP, the > Yugoslav People's Army, JNA, and the Yugoslav Army, VJ (Art. 12). > > It is noteworthy that Karadzic's named alleged co-conspirators from > Belgrade are either unable to defend themselves against this new charge, or > else have not been accused of it – although they are in ICTY custody: > > - Milosevic died in March 2006 and therefore he is unable to defend > himself against this new charge, although he mounted a vigorous and > effective defense against a similar > charge<http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai040421-e.htm>concerning > Kosovo; > > > - Stanisic, Simatovic and Seselj have been indicted by the ICTY on > lesser counts, but since none of them have been accused of "genocide" by > the > Tribunal they cannot mount any defense in their own trials against this > additional and very serious charge that appears on Karadzic's rap sheet; > > > - Additional Belgrade personnel (MUP, JNA and VJ) remain unnamed and > therefore cannot mount a defense. > > The ICTY OTP strategy is clear: to force Karadzic to defend not just > himself against the charge of genocide, but also his various alleged > fellow-conspirators in Serbia – named and unnamed – who have not been > accused of this supreme crime themselves. His failure to do so will result > in a conviction that will apply not only to him but also to all others. > > In preparing his defense Karadzic will naturally focus on himself and his > own actions, as may well be expected of any accused. This will be just what > the OTP wants: to smuggle the *pan-Serbian conspiracy* to commit > "genocide" involving Belgrade – a charge so far unproven and rejected by the > International Court of Justice – on the back of Karadzic's indictment. If it > is "proven," at the ICTY, the Sarajevo Muslims will duly renew their case > against Serbia at the ICJ. > > A year and a half ago, in a landmark > case<http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles7/TrifkovicRuling.php>that put a > nation on trial for genocide for the first time in history, > Serbia was found not > guilty<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1441632.ece>by > the International Court of Justice at The Hague. "The court finds that > the acts of genocide at Srebrenica cannot be attributed to [Serbia's] state > organs," said the ICJ president, Judge Rosalyn > Higgins<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icvjudge/Higgins.html>, > in the ruling made public on February 26, 2007. She said it could also not > be established that Serbia had been complicit by supplying aid to the > Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1995, when the killings at Srebrenica took > place. Reflecting the complexities of the case, the 16 judges deliberated > for 10 months. The court's decisions are binding, without appeal, and > enforceable by the UN Security Council. > > The Muslim authorities in Sarajevo instituted proceedings against Serbia > at the ICJ in March > 1993<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2006/ipresscom_2006-09_bhy_20060227.htm>, > charging the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (as it was then) of violating > the 1948 U.N. Genocide Convention. The case continued after the end of the > Bosnian war in October 1995 and the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in October > 2000, even though the Republika Srpska (RS)—a constituent Bosnian > entity—subsequently objected to the charge being brought on behalf of > "Bosnia-Herzegovina" as a whole. The RS authorities disputed the legitimacy > of the filing of the Bosnian application to the Court because it had not > been ratified by the post-Dayton presidency, where the Bosnian Serbs would > have been able to veto it. > > Most major media depositors in the bank of collective Serbian > guilt<http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=8985>have tried to spin the > verdict, but they could not alter the significance of > the ICJ ruling, which came just two weeks before the first anniversary of > the death of Slobodan > Milosevic<http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=384582007>in > detention at The > Hague > Tribunal<http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/News/Trifkovic00/NewsST032000.html>. > The "Bosnian" case against Milosevic had rested on his alleged incitement of > the Bosnian Serbs to commit genocide and his supposed personal > responsibility for its occurrence. As John > Laughland<http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/laughland3.html>was quick > to note <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2022969,00.html> in *The > Guardian* on February 28, 2007, Milosevic was posthumously exonerated by > the ICJ. He had always argued that neither Yugoslavia nor Serbia had command > of the Bosnian Serb army, and this has now been upheld by the world court. > > "If Milosevic were still alive," I wrote in February 2007, "the ICTY would > have to devise some creative stratagems to deal with the implications of the > ICJ verdict. It would have found them, no doubt." > > Now we know that it has done so regardless of his death, posthumously > reindicting Milosevic in the charge against Karadzic. This reflects ever > more glaringly the fact that the ICTY <http://www.un.org/icty/> is a > political, rather than judicial institution. It will continue to deny what > I have argued for > years<http://www.balkanstudies.org/wordfiles/Bosnia/OUP_Bosnia_2001.htm>: > that the crimes in Bosnia in 1992-1995 were not the direct result of > anyone's "nationalist project" as such. The crimes were the results of the > war, not its causes. However severely they must be judged, they were the > consequence of a great, complex international blunder, and of Izetbegovic's > decision to secede. Events cut channels deeper and less controllable than > the intentions of anyone. > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "serbia" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/serbia -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
