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Adrift


Europe | Jul 1st, 19:05

 

THE campaign to leave the European Union repeatedly urged Britain to "Take
back control". It is now a week since voters narrowly opted for Brexit, and
the country has seldom looked so wildly off the rails. The prime minister
has handed in his notice. The leader of the opposition is struggling to
survive a coup. The pound hit a 31-year low against the dollar and banks
lost a third of their value, before stabilising. Meanwhile there is talk in
Scotland and Northern Ireland of secession.

Every one of these calamities was predicted in the event of a Leave victory,
and yet still the country seems transfixed by what it has brought upon
itself. It is time to snap out of the daze. The country needs a new leader,
a coherent approach to negotiating with the EU, and a fair settlement with
those nations within its own union that voted Remain. The damage to
Britain's prosperity and to its standing in the world is already grave, and
will become far worse if the country now fails to "take back control" of its
future.

The sick man of nowhere

Brexit's grisly first week, and the misery ahead, have already provoked
buyer's remorse. More than 4m people have signed a petition calling for a
re-run of the vote. An instant rejection of the result would be wrong.
Although we regret the Brexit vote, 34m people have cast their ballot and
the result was clear. A straight rematch would be no fairer than allowing
England's footballers another crack at Iceland, which inflicted a second
humiliation a week after the referendum.

And yet Britain's fate is still highly uncertain. Although Britons opted to
leave the EU, Brexit comes in 57 varieties. The mildest sort would be an
arrangement like Norway's, involving continuing access to Europe's "single
market" in return for the free movement of people from EU countries and a
contribution to the EU budget. At the opposite extreme, Britain could cut
its ties entirely, meaning no more payments into the EU budget and no more
unlimited migration-but no special access to the market which buys nearly
half Britain's exports, either. Voters were told they could have it all.
They cannot.

The Norwegian option would do the least damage to the economy. It would also
be the best chance to preserve the union with Scotland and Northern Ireland,
both of which voted Remain. The ruling Scottish Nationalists, who lost an
independence referendum in 2014, always said that Britain's leaving the EU
would justify another ballot on independence. They are right-especially
since in 2014 many Scots voted to stay in Britain in order to remain in the
EU. But independence would be painful: it might mean promising one day to
adopt the euro and hardening the border with England, with which Scotland
trades more than it does with the EU. Under a Norwegian-style deal, Scots
might prefer to stick with England. The Nationalists should wait to see a
deal before asking for a new referendum.

In Northern Ireland Brexit raises other problems. One is the prospect of
resurrecting the border between north and south, a dismal piece of symbolism
which might be avoided if Britain got a Norwegian settlement. Another
shamefully overlooked snag is that Britain's exit from Europe will break the
Good Friday Agreement of 1998, in which Northern Ireland's peace process was
underpinned by the EU. This treaty has kept the peace in the UK's most
troubled region for nearly 20 years. Fixing the mess will be an urgent task
for the prime minister.

Point of no Breturn

Who should that be? Tory party members, who have the final say, may favour
one of the victorious Leave campaigners, a mediocre bunch who have disgraced
themselves during the campaign: lying about inflated budget payments and
phantom Turkish migrants, before vanishing after the vote when the Brexit
hit the fan. None of them would make a worthy prime minister. And yet the
very falseness of the prospectus they flogged may be their best
qualification for the job. Britain's next leader must explain to 17m voters
that the illusion they were promised-all the EU's benefits with none of its
obligations-does not exist. Only when the authors of the Brexit fantasy
themselves return from Brussels without this magical deal might Leave voters
accept that a compromise is necessary.

European leaders are in no mood to negotiate with their bolshie neighbour.
That is why Britain should delay as long as it can before invoking Article
50 of the Lisbon treaty, the mechanism for a Brexit negotiation, which sets
a two-year deadline. For every extra month that the cost of Brexit sinks in,
the possibility of a fudge will increase. Angela Merkel, a champion
procrastinator who, like her French and Dutch counterparts, faces angry
elections next year, may also feel that accommodating some British demands,
such as allowing an emergency brake on the free movement of people during
"surges" (perhaps applied across the EU), would be possible, though she may
find it hard to sell the idea to other European leaders.

Given that nearly half of British voters did not want out, it is likely that
a majority might prefer a Norwegian compromise to complete isolation.
Whatever deal takes shape in Brussels will be so far from what was promised
by the Leave campaign that it will surely have to be put to the British
public again, through a general election, another referendum or both. It is
even possible that the whole notion of Brexit may stall. A thin majority
have said they would prefer life outside the EU to life inside. But it may
be that, when faced with the question of whether to endorse a Norway-like
deal that entails many of the costs of being in the single market without
having a say in the rules, many would rather stay in the EU after all.

Negotiating over Brexit will stretch the tolerance of both British voters
and European leaders. Yet the EU specialises in muddled compromises and
talking its way around referendums. After months of economic hardship, and a
recession-induced fall in immigration, British voters may be ready to think
differently about the balance between immigration, the economy and their
place in Europe. By far the most likely outcome of this sorry situation
remains Brexit. But it would be wrong completely to discount the possibility
of an inelegant, humiliating, and yet welcome, Breversal.

 

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