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Andrew Coyne: Fighter jet mess reeks of politics, deceit and cowboy economics


DND

6-7 minutes

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As an interim measure, the Liberal government says it will upgrade Canada’s 
aging fleet of CF-18 Hornets with 18 equally aging Australian F-18 Hornets. 

Let me see if I have this straight. In order to meet an urgent “capability gap” 
with regard to its aging fleet of fighter jets, the federal government is 
kicking the competition to produce a replacement jet that it promised two years 
ago another year into the future 
<http://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/feds-worry-aussie-fighter-jets-could-dredge-up-disastrous-used-submarine-saga>
 . A winner will be chosen no sooner than 2022, five years from now, or a dozen 
years after the winner of the previous competition was declared. The planes 
will be delivered in 2025.

In the meantime, as an interim measure, it will upgrade its current fleet of 
30-year-old CF-18 Hornets with 18 virtually identical second-hand Australian 
F-18 Hornets of the same age. This follows its decision to cancel a previous 
agreement to buy the same number of new F-18 Super Hornets from Boeing, in 
retaliation for Boeing’s invocation of U.S. trade remedy laws against Canada’s 
subsidies to Bombardier. The earliest the interim planes will be in the air is 
the “early 2020s,” leaving perhaps two years before they are mothballed.

Boeing likewise faces effective exclusion from the competition for a long-term 
replacement for the CF-18s owing to proposed new rules against procuring 
military equipment from companies who do “economic harm” to Canada. Not 
excluded from the competition: Lockheed Martin’s F-35, the plane that was first 
chosen in 2010, but which the incoming Liberal government had promised it would 
not choose, in the same platform in which it promised to immediately launch an 
“open and transparent competition.”

The F-35, by the way, is the plane that Australia has chosen to replace its 
aging F-18s: the one it is now selling to us. It may well be the plane that 
Canada eventually chooses to replace, er, itself. But that’s not until after 
the next election, so it hardly counts.

Everything about this whole sorry mess reeks of politics, deceit and cowboy 
economics — or in other words, procurement as usual 
<http://nationalpost.com/opinion/andrew-coyne-the-problem-with-military-procurement-in-canada-is-the-military-always-comes-last>
 . The “capability gap” suffers from a pronounced credibility gap: virtually no 
independent expert agrees it exists, defined as it is by a standard of military 
readiness — the ability to meet both our NORAD and our NATO commitments, 
simultaneously, in full — that has never been asked of us and is unlikely ever 
to be.

The cancelling of the Boeing purchase, likewise, while an obvious money-saver — 
used jets are cheaper — is unprecedented in subordinating the needs of national 
defence to the prosecution of a private trade dispute. As an attempt at 
blackmail it is also spectacularly unwise: there is no indication Boeing has 
any intention of withdrawing its suit, and in any case Canada has an interest, 
as the smaller party in any dispute with the United States, in maintaining a 
rules-based approach to its resolution.

But it is the proposed new rules governing military procurement that are the 
silliest part of this shemozzle. Procurement has long been disfigured by 
attempts to attach local content requirements, such as the notorious Industrial 
and Technological Benefits (ITBs), in an attempt to rope international arms 
manufacturers into the dubious project of propping up the Canadian defence 
sector.

Or rather, to pretend to. The burden of such disguised subsidies is almost 
certainly not borne by the contractors, who compete for capital on 
international markets and can ill afford to hand out freebies. Rather, it is 
priced into the contracts. As such, it is subject to the same criticism as any 
other industrial subsidy. The cost is borne not only by the taxpayer and/or the 
military, but by other sectors of the economy, from whom capital and labour are 
thereby diverted.

The 'capability gap' suffers from a pronounced credibility gap

Now the government proposes attaching still another non-military condition to 
future military purchases, starting with the $19-billion fighter jet contract. 
The details have yet to be revealed — or, it would seem, written down — but 
apparently it would involve some sort of test of every competing bidder 
<http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/in-shot-at-boeing-19b-competition-to-build-new-fighter-jets-will-penalize-companies-that-harm-canadas-economy>
 ’s “overall impact on Canada’s economic interests,” assessing their “economic 
behaviour” in the years prior to the contract being awarded. “Bidders 
responsible for harming Canada’s economic interests,” the government warns, 
will be at a “distinct disadvantage.”

The best word for this, other than petulant, is eccentric. No one knows how any 
of these terms would be defined, still less how this novel approach would 
square with Canada’s obligations under international trade law. Which types of 
“behaviour” would be assessed? What sorts of “harm” would count? The prospect 
is for still further delays and still higher costs as these highly subjective 
judgments are worked out, with still greater uncertainty the result.

Is Boeing, a major employer in Manitoba, really doing “harm” to Canada by 
defending itself against alleged unfair trade practices on the part of 
Bombardier, a major employer in Quebec? A strong argument could be made to the 
contrary: that by calling out the federal government’s decades-long history of 
favouring Bombardier, to the tune of billions of public dollars, Boeing is 
doing Canada an enormous service.

The government may pretend that the economic interests of the country are 
synonymous with Bombardier’s. But that’s no reason the rest of us have to.

* * *

Correction: In a recent column, I said the first three of 15 frigates to be 
supplied to the Royal Canadian Navy under a proposal put forward by an 
Italian-French consortium would be built in Europe, with the rest constructed 
by Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax. That was part of an earlier plan proposed in 
2016 by the Italian partner, Fincantieri; it is not part of the current 
proposal.

 

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